

# **Pain Sensitivity Predicts Support for Moral and Political Views Across the Aisle**

(in press, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*; accepted July 12, 2023)

Authors: Spike W. S. Lee<sup>1,2</sup>, Cecilia Ma<sup>2</sup>

Affiliations: <sup>1</sup>Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada. <sup>2</sup>Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada.

ORCID iDs: 0000-0002-3357-0179 (Lee), 0000-0001-5475-1510 (Ma)

Acknowledgements: We thank Rebecca Neel, John A. Bargh, Paul Bloom, Yoel Inbar, Matthew Feinberg, Hause Lin, the Morality Lab, and the Mind and Body Lab for comments; Joe Hoang, Daisy Liu, and Norman Zeng for assistance. This work was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (Joseph-Armand Bombardier Canada Graduate Scholarship – Doctoral Award 2021; Insight Development Grant 430-2021-00060; Insight Grant 435-2017-0127) and the Ontario Ministry of Research, Innovation and Science (Early Researcher Award – Round 13).

The authors declare no competing interests.

Author contributions: Both authors contributed equally to this work. Based on the Contributor Roles Taxonomy (CRediT), Spike W. S. Lee contributed to Conceptualization, Methodology, Supervision, Writing – Original Draft, Writing – Review & Editing, and Funding Acquisition. Cecilia Ma contributed to Conceptualization, Methodology, Investigation, Formal Analysis, Visualization, Data Curation, Project Administration, and Funding Acquisition.

Correspondence should be addressed to Spike W. S. Lee ([spike.lee@utoronto.ca](mailto:spike.lee@utoronto.ca)).

All data, analysis code, research materials, and preregistrations of study and analysis plans are available at [https://osf.io/mgcef/?view\\_only=ed0786335fdc41a39ea4b7a1c9c2e444](https://osf.io/mgcef/?view_only=ed0786335fdc41a39ea4b7a1c9c2e444).

24           © 2023, American Psychological Association. This paper is not the copy of record  
25   and may not exactly replicate the final, authoritative version of the article. Please do not  
26   copy or cite without authors' permission. The final article will be available, upon  
27   publication, via its DOI: 10.1037/pspa0000355

## Abstract

We live in a time of exacerbating political polarization. Bridging the ideological divide is hard. Although some strategies have been found effective for interpersonal persuasion and interaction across the aisle, little is known about what *intrapersonal* attributes predict which individuals are more inclined to support their ideological opponent's views. The present work identifies a low-level attribute—sensitivity to physical pain—that robustly predicts individual variations in support for moral and political views typically favored by one's ideological opponent. We first summarize a psychophysical validation of an established pain sensitivity measure ( $n = 263$ ), then report a series of exploratory and preregistered confirmatory studies and replications ( $N = 7,360$ ) finding that more (vs. less) pain-sensitive liberal Americans show greater endorsement of moral foundations typically endorsed by conservatives (Studies 1a–1c), higher likelihood of voting for Trump over Biden in the 2020 Presidential Election, stronger support for Republican politicians, and more conservative attitudes toward contentious political issues (Studies 2a–2b). Conservatives show the mirroring pattern. These “cross-aisle” effects of pain sensitivity are driven by heightened harm perception (Study 3). They defy lay intuitions (Study 4). They are not attributable to multicollinearity or response set. The consistent findings across studies highlight the value of deriving integrative predictions from multiple previously unconnected perspectives (social properties of pain, moral foundations theory, dyadic morality theory, principle of multiple determinants in higher mental processes). They open up novel directions for theorizing and research on why pain sensitivity predicts support for moral and political views across the aisle.

(250 words)

Keywords: pain, ideology, harm, moral foundations, political attitudes

## Introduction

Liberals and conservatives exhibit numerous divergent ideological beliefs and psychological tendencies, from views about societal structure (Kteily et al., 2019; Pratto et al., 1994), traditions (Altemeyer, 1981), status quo (Jost et al., 2004), friends (Waytz et al., 2019), and family (Lakoff, 2002; Feinberg et al., 2019), to personality and behavioral profiles (Carney et al., 2008) and basic affective (Inbar et al., 2009) and cognitive styles (Jost et al., 2003). Given their pervasive differences, bridging the divide is no easy feat (Brandt et al., 2014), particularly with the exacerbating political polarization and sectarianism of our time (Finkel et al., 2020).

Various strategies have been offered and found effective for facilitating cross-aisle persuasion and interaction. Examples include framing liberal policies around moral themes that conservatives care about and vice versa (Feinberg & Willer, 2019), correcting overestimation of how negative one's political opponents feel toward one's political allies (Lees & Cikara, 2019; Ruggeri et al., 2021), discussing personal experience rather than arguing about facts with one's political opponents (Kubin et al., 2021), prompting the belief in the utility of cross-partisan empathy (Santos et al., 2022), and using language that de-moralizes people's attitudes and thus increases their willingness to compromise (Kodapanakkal et al., 2022). All of these strategies focus on *interpersonal* communication. In contrast, little is known about what *intrapersonal* attributes undergird who is generally more or less inclined to support moral and political views opposite to one's ideological placement (even without any cross-aisle persuasive attempt or social interaction). We propose that such individual variations are predicted by a low-level attribute whose relation to morality and politics has received little attention in prior theorizing or research: sensitivity to physical pain.



## 74 **Relating pain to morality and politics**

75           Biologically vital for survival, sensing pain is one of the most universal experiences,  
76 observable even in newborn infants (Jones et al., 2017) and non-human vertebrates (National  
77 Research Council of the National Academies, 2009). Individuals vary though in their sensitivity  
78 to pain stimuli (Nielsen et al., 2009). We suggest that these variations may be associated with  
79 moral and political views, due to two social properties of pain.

80           First, sensing physical pain (e.g., in bodily injury) and sensing social pain (e.g., in  
81 relational rejection) involve shared neural bases (Eisenberger et al., 2003; DeWall et al., 2010;  
82 Kross et al., 2011; Lieberman & Eisenberger, 2015), subjective experiences, and linguistic  
83 expressions (MacDonald & Leary, 2005). These overlapping processes imply that higher  
84 sensitivity to physical pain may be associated with higher sensitivity to social pain. Second, pain  
85 experience can be socially contagious and occur vicariously, such that perceiving a conspecific  
86 in pain or in painful situations increases one's own pain, a process that has been found  
87 physiologically and behaviorally in both mice (Langford et al., 2006; Lidhar et al., 2021; Smith  
88 et al., 2016) and humans (Goubert et al., 2005; Loggia et al., 2008; Singer et al., 2004). Meta-  
89 analytic imaging evidence also shows that feeling for others in pain and directly feeling pain  
90 oneself involve common neural networks, particularly the bilateral anterior insular cortex and  
91 medial/anterior cingulate cortex (Lamm et al., 2011). Witnessing others in somatic pain can even  
92 result in vicarious activation of one's somatosensory cortices, as shown in multiple fMRI  
93 experiments (Keysers et al., 2010).

94           Integrating both of these social properties of pain (overlap between physical pain and  
95 social pain; overlap between one's own pain and others' pain) suggests that individuals with  
96 higher sensitivity to their own physical pain may be more sensitive not only to their own social

pain, but also to others' physical and social pain (e.g., others' distress, social ills, harms being committed; for suggestive evidence, see Xiao et al., 2015). It is known that perception of suffering, damage, or harm—be it physical or non-physical—caused by an intentional agent on a vulnerable patient can intensify judgments across moral domains (cf. dyadic morality theory; Gray et al., 2012, 2022; Schein & Gray, 2018). Considering that higher sensitivity to physical pain may heighten perception of harm and that perception of harm can intensify moral views, it follows that more pain-sensitive individuals may have stronger moral views (e.g., stronger reactions to unfairness; Wang et al., 2019).

This raises an empirical question: Does pain sensitivity predict all moral views similarly strongly? Or does it predict some moral views more strongly than others? If so, which ones? We consider three competing hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 is the most straightforward (Figure 1a). It draws on the reasoning above and expects simply that higher pain sensitivity should predict greater perception of harm and stronger moral views across domains. Hypotheses 2 and 3 add conceptual nuances by drawing on moral foundations theory and its corresponding evidence that liberals and conservatives hold different moral views (i.e., different views about what values and behaviors are morally relevant and are right or wrong; Graham et al., 2009, 2013). Both hypotheses 2 and 3 expect that pain sensitivity should particularly strongly predict perceived harm and moral views in certain domains, and that which domains of perceived harm and moral views are most strongly predicted by pain sensitivity should depend on how liberal or conservative the perceiver is (Figure 1b).<sup>i</sup> But hypotheses 2 and 3 differ in their expectations about how exactly this pattern should look like.

---

<sup>i</sup> Terminological clarification about the word *harm* is warranted here. Moral foundations theory (Graham et al., 2009, 2013) calls one of the moral domains Care/Harm, which refers specifically to concerns about “suffering, distress, or neediness” and “motivations to care, nurture, and protect” (Graham et al., 2013, p. 69). In contrast to this domain-specific view, dyadic morality theory (Gray et al., 2012, 2022; Schein & Gray, 2018) takes a domain-

Hypothesis 2 expects that higher pain sensitivity should predict greater perception of harm and stronger moral views, and that these predictive effects of pain sensitivity should be particularly strong for those domains one is already likely to deem important given one's political orientation, but weaker for those domains one is less likely to deem important given one's political orientation (Figure 1c). In other words, those harms that one is most ready to perceive and those moral views that one is most inclined to endorse are the ones that should be most amplified by pain sensitivity. Conservatives (more than liberals) are known to readily perceive harm in betrayal to one's group, subversion to one's authorities, and contamination of one's body and soul; liberals (more than conservatives) are known to readily perceive harm in failures to care for the vulnerable and to attain equality (Graham et al., 2009, 2013). Accordingly, hypothesis 2 expects that higher pain sensitivity should predict amplified perception of harm and moral views in domains of disloyalty, disrespect, and degradation more strongly among conservatives than liberals, but in domains of unkindness and inequality more strongly among liberals than conservatives.

Hypothesis 3 also expects that higher pain sensitivity should predict greater perception of harm and stronger moral views. Contrary to hypothesis 2, however, it expects that these predictive effects of pain sensitivity should be particularly strong for those domains one is *not* likely to deem important given one's political orientation, but weaker for those domains one is already likely to deem important given one's political orientation (Figure 1d). In other words, those harms that one is less ready to perceive and those moral views that one is less inclined to

---

general view and uses the word *harm* in a broader sense. It conceptualizes harm as affective in nature (Gray et al., 2022) and as "intuitively perceived" whenever a situation involves "an intentional agent causing damage to a vulnerable patient" (Schein & Gray, 2018, p. 32), whatever tangible or intangible form the damage may take. When we use the word *harm*, we mean it in the broader sense, which is also compatible with the way many psychologists and the general public use this word (Haslam, 2016).


endorse are the ones that should be most amplified by pain sensitivity. This assumption draws on the basic principle that higher mental processes (e.g., social or moral judgments) are multiply determined such that the effect of a given factor decreases as the effect of competing factors increases (Bless et al., 2003). To liberals, if their liberal ideology and their liberal-leaning media diet and social network already tell them that racism, sexism, and inequality are immoral, then whether they have high or low pain sensitivity is unlikely to matter much for their perception of harm in these domains. But their liberal ideology does not typically lead them to perceive as much harm in nonconformity to societal traditions, challenge to authority figures, and unconventional sexual practices, so there is more room for higher pain sensitivity to amplify liberals' perception of harm in these domains (i.e., domains in which conservatives typically perceive greater harm). Applying the same logic to liberals and conservatives alike predicts a "cross-aisle" pattern of interaction effects (pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation): higher pain sensitivity should predict greater perception of harm and stronger moral views, particularly in domains typically deemed important by one's ideological opponent.

For ease of reference, we will use the following shorthand for the three hypotheses throughout the rest of our article.

- Hypothesis 1: *heightening all harms*
- Hypothesis 2: *heightening own side*
- Hypothesis 3: *heightening other side*

## **Figure 1**

*Three Competing Hypotheses About How Pain Sensitivity May Be Related to Moral and Political Views*



*Note.* Higher pain sensitivity may predict heightened perception of **(a)** all harms similarly strongly or **(b)** some harms most strongly, either **(c)** those harms that one is already likely to deem important given one's political orientation or **(d)** those harms that one is not likely to deem important given one's political orientation.

To test these competing hypotheses, we examine the relations of pain sensitivity and political orientation to moral views in Studies 1a (exploratory), 1b (direct replication), and 1c (preregistered conceptual replication). Considering that people's moral views are closely linked to their political views (Graham et al., 2013; Schein & Gray, 2018), we also test these competing hypotheses in the realm of political views<sup>ii</sup> in Studies 2a (exploratory) and 2b (preregistered replication). We further replicate these relations (of pain sensitivity and political orientation to moral and political views) and test the hypothesized process (moderated mediation by perceived harm) in Study 3 (preregistered). Finally, we compare the actual effects of pain sensitivity observed in Studies 1a–3 against lay intuitions about the effects of pain sensitivity in Study 4 (descriptive). Before reporting these primary studies, we first summarize our psychophysical validation of an established measure of pain sensitivity.

### **Psychophysical Validation of Pain Sensitivity Measure**

To test the hypotheses above with sufficient statistical power, in general we aimed for large sample sizes, and in the case of preregistered studies we determined the sample size by conducting power analysis based on effect sizes from prior data. To attain the required sample

---

<sup>ii</sup> We use the term *political views* to refer to a person's views on specific political issues, varying on the spectrum of support—oppose. We use the term *political orientation* to refer to a person's general ideological leaning, varying on the spectrum of liberal—conservative.

sizes in a feasible manner, we needed a valid and reliable measure of pain sensitivity that could be used in online surveys. We chose the Pain Sensitivity Questionnaire, or PSQ (Ruscheweyh et al., 2009), because it had been validated in multiple psychophysical studies (Ruscheweyh et al., 2009, 2012; Sellers et al., 2013) among various samples (healthy adults, chronic pain patients, patients experiencing subcutaneous injection of lidocaine as a pain stimulus) as a reliable measure that consistently predicts the subjective intensity of pain experience across different sensory modalities (heat pain, cold pain, pressure pain, and pinprick pain) in daily life situations.

Prior validation studies mostly focused on subjective intensity of pain experience. To provide an independent and extended validation of the PSQ, we conducted a psychophysical study to assess not only subjective intensity of pain experience but also other parameters of pain sensitivity. A brief summary is provided below. All methodological details and full results are available in the Supplemental Material.

Using a pressure algometer for pain induction, our study involved two parts. The first part assessed pain threshold (minimum level of physical stimulation at which a person starts experiencing pain) and pain tolerance (maximum level of pain-inducing physical stimulation a person can tolerate). The second part assessed changes in subjective intensity of pain experience in response to increases in objective amount of physical stimulation. We examined the extent to which these parameters were predicted by PSQ scores.

We found that higher PSQ scores predicted both overall higher subjective pain intensity and steeper increases in subjective pain intensity as a result of increases in objective pressure amount. Beyond subjective pain intensity, we also found that higher PSQ scores predicted lower pain tolerance. These results dovetail and extend prior validation studies (Ruscheweyh et al., 2009, 2012; Sellers et al., 2013)—using different methods and spanning different populations

(students, healthy adults, chronic pain patients, patients experiencing subcutaneous injection of lidocaine as a pain stimulus) from different countries (Germany, U.S., Canada)—to suggest that the PSQ, as a self-report measure, reflects experiential qualities of physical pain. Given such validity evidence, we use the PSQ as a tool for measuring pain sensitivity among large samples to test our theoretical hypotheses with sufficient power throughout our primary studies.

### **General Methodological Information Across Studies**

For concision, this section outlines general methodological information across our studies. Subsequent Method sections describe each study's procedure and analyses. Fine-grained details of each study's participants, sample size justification, exclusion criteria, and measures are provided in the Supplemental Material, where measures are described in order of presentation to participants. Reliability, mean, and standard deviation of the measures are available in supplemental tables.

**Transparency and Openness.** We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, all measures, and all manipulations (if any) in each study. Studies 1a, 1b, 2a, and 4 were not preregistered. All aspects of Studies 1c, 2b, and 3 were preregistered, including study design, hypotheses, sample size justification based on power analysis, data collection, stopping rules, exclusion criteria, and analysis plan. For all studies, we follow the APA Journal Article Reporting Standards for Quantitative (JARS–Quant) Research in Psychology (Appelbaum et al., 2018). All data, analysis code, research materials, and preregistrations of study and analysis plans are available at [https://osf.io/mgcef/?view\\_only=ed0786335fdc41a39ea4b7a1c9c2e444](https://osf.io/mgcef/?view_only=ed0786335fdc41a39ea4b7a1c9c2e444). Data for all studies were processed, analyzed, and visualized using R 4.1.3 (R Core Team, 2022)



with the aid of various packages noted in subsequent Method sections. Data visualization for Study 4 also involved using Tableau 2021.4.3 (*Tableau Desktop*, 2021).

**Participants.** Adults in the U.S. were recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk (Study 1a) or Prolific (Studies 1b–4) because we aimed to collect data from Americans of diverse demographic backgrounds and spanning the ideological spectrum, from very liberal to very conservative, in order to test the interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation. In each study, we examined the initial distribution of liberals and conservatives and balanced them out by continuing recruitment of participants on the less-represented side of the ideological spectrum (e.g., if there were more liberals than conservatives, then we would continue recruiting conservatives until we had a balanced sample). Other than that, any U.S. adult could participate, and the recruitment material was generic. Across studies, the mean age hovered around the recent mean age of the U.S. population (38.5 years in 2022) and gender distribution was fairly representative of the U.S. population. That said, we did not set out to collect representative samples, because we were interested in testing the hypothesized relations among variables, not in estimating the population means of variables.

**Procedures and Exclusion Criteria.** To maximize power, we (1) used or adapted established measures with known reliability and content validity, (2) determined the sample size for each preregistered study by running power analysis based on effect sizes from prior data or pilot data, and (3) used multilevel modelling analyses wherever possible to test the highest-order interaction effects of interest. (Information pertaining to the last two aspects is highlighted in yellow throughout the manuscript and Supplemental Material for ease of identification.) Within each measure, items were presented in randomized order unless noted otherwise. Reverse-worded items were reverse-scored for analysis. All studies concluded with attention checks,

demographic measures (including political orientation), debriefing, and re-consent for participants to indicate whether they would like to have their data included in or withdrawn from the study. Participants were excluded if they did not provide re-consent, did not pass the attention check (e.g., failing to check the right boxes) or problematic response patterns check (e.g., choosing the same response for all items on a scale), or completed the study more than once.

**Data Analysis and Visualization.** All statistical tests were two-sided. Given our primary interest in the interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation, in each study we (1) centered all predictors and (2) conducted collinearity diagnostics and found no concern of multicollinearity (Cohen et al., 2013; Thompson et al., 2017; for details, see **General Discussion -> Potential Artifacts -> Multicollinearity**). In all statistical analyses, both pain sensitivity and political orientation were treated as continuous variables. In data visualization, for clarity of depiction and ease of comprehension, political orientation is shown as if it were a categorical variable (with liberal participants in one group and conservative participants in another).

In multilevel modeling analyses, all outcomes were analyzed using 2-level models because measures were nested within participants. Each outcome was modelled as a function of the highest-order interaction effect and all lower-order effects. Models involving cross-level interaction effects included a random slope for the level 1 predictor (measures) in addition to a random intercept (Aguinis et al., 2013). Models for the continuous (Likert) outcomes in all studies were linear mixed models fit by REML with an unstructured covariance matrix and Satterthwaite degrees of freedom using the `lmer` function in the `lme4` package v1.1-28 (Bates et al., 2022, p. 4) and the `lmerTest` package v.3.1-3 (Kuznetsova et al., 2020) in R 4.1.3 (R Core Team, 2022). The model for the dichotomous outcome in Study 2a (voting for Trump over Biden) was a generalized linear mixed model fit by maximum likelihood (Laplace

Approximation) using the `glmer` function in the `lme4` package. The ICC (intraclass correlation coefficient) for each model suggested that the continuous (Likert) measures in general were fairly clustered within participants and that the dichotomous measures (intended and actual voting preferences) were highly clustered within participants.

**Research Ethics.** All studies had received institutional ethics approval and were executed in compliance with relevant ethical guidelines and APA ethical standards, including adherence to the legal requirements of the study country.

## **Pain Sensitivity Predicts Moral Views (Studies 1a–1c)**

### *Method*

#### **Procedure**

As part of a larger survey, participants in Study 1a (exploratory;  $N = 950$ ) completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011), which was chosen because it is the most widely used measure of the five moral foundations that have been established across cultures (Graham et al., 2013). In addition, participants completed the PSQ (Ruscheweyh et al., 2009, 2012; Sellers et al., 2013). To test if our effects of interest might be explained away by other variables known to predict moral foundations, participants also completed established measures of disgust sensitivity (Haidt et al., 1994), emotion reactivity (Nock et al., 2008), anxiety (Spielberger, 2012), anger proneness (Spielberger et al., 1983), and empathy (Reniers et al., 2011). These variables, together with gender, served as control predictors in our analyses. Finally, in the demographics section, participants rated their political orientation ( $1 = Liberal$ ,  $5 = Centrist$ ,  $9 = Conservative$ ).

To ascertain replicability, Study 1b (direct replication;  $N = 686$ ) used the same measures (with minimal modifications as noted in the Supplemental Material) and analytic strategy as in Study 1a, and recruited participants from a different platform. Study 1c ( $N = 1,313$ ) was a preregistered conceptual replication that focused on contrasting pain sensitivity with disgust sensitivity—a frequently studied variable in moral and political psychology (Inbar et al., 2009; Petersen et al., 2020; Pizarro et al., 2011)—and used a psychometrically improved version of the Disgust Scale (Olatunji et al., 2007). Prior to the Disgust Scale - Revised, participants also completed the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011) and the PSQ (Ruscheweyh et al., 2009, 2012; Sellers et al., 2013).

### **Analyses**

Hierarchical regression models were used to test our hypotheses. In Studies 1a (exploratory) and 1b (direct replication), support for each moral foundation was regressed on the interaction effect of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation and their main effects, first without (step 1) and then with (step 2) all the control predictors. Relevance of each moral foundation was analyzed in the same way.

In Study 1c (preregistered conceptual replication), to test our preregistered primary hypotheses, support for each moral foundation was regressed on the interaction effect of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation and their main effects, first without (step 1) and then controlling for (step 2) disgust sensitivity and gender, and finally also controlling for the interaction effect of disgust sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation (step 3). Relevance of each moral foundation was analyzed in the same way.

In each of Studies 1a–1c, support for and relevance of all moral foundations were also analyzed using multilevel modelling. Both pain sensitivity and political orientation were between-participant and continuous. Moral foundations were within-participant and effects-coded: -1 (care/harm, fairness/cheating) vs. 1 (loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation).

### *Results*

Study 1a found significant interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation on support for all five moral foundations and relevance of four of the five moral foundations ( $p$ s  $\leq$  0.0264; Table 1, step 1). After adding various control predictors (step 2), the interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation on all moral foundations were significant. Because of the highly similar patterns between support for and relevance of each moral foundation, we will refer to them collectively as endorsement of the moral foundation.

335 **Table 1**

336 *Hierarchical Regressions of Support for and Relevance of Moral Foundations on the Interaction*  
 337 *Effect of Pain Sensitivity × Political Orientation and Their Main Effects (Step 1), Together with*  
 338 *Control Predictors (Step 2), in Study 1a*

Predictor	Care/Harm		Fairness/Cheating		Loyalty/Betrayal		Authority/Subversion		Sanctity/Degradation	
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2
<i>Support for moral foundation</i>										
<b>Pain Sensitivity × Political Orientation</b>	<b>0.07*</b> (0.03)	<b>0.07*</b> (0.03)	<b>0.20***</b> (0.03)	<b>0.18***</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.08**</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.07*</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.16***</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.15***</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.17***</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.15***</b> (0.03)
Pain Sensitivity	0.28*** (0.03)	0.23* (0.04)	0.32*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.04)	0.44*** (0.03)	0.36*** (0.03)	0.32*** (0.03)	0.25*** (0.03)	0.35*** (0.03)	0.23*** (0.03)
Political Orientation	-0.22*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.29*** (0.03)	-0.26*** (0.03)	0.37*** (0.03)	0.37*** (0.03)	0.40*** (0.03)	0.40*** (0.03)	0.39*** (0.03)	0.39*** (0.03)
Disgust Sensitivity		0.11*** (0.03)		0.08* (0.03)		0.10*** (0.03)		0.11*** (0.03)		0.23*** (0.03)
Emotion Reactivity		0.04 (0.05)		0.03 (0.05)		0.14** (0.04)		0.08 (0.05)		0.08 (0.04)
Anxiety		-0.02 (0.04)		-0.09* (0.04)		-0.13*** (0.04)		-0.19*** (0.04)		-0.08* (0.04)
Anger		-0.14* (0.05)		0.03 (0.05)		-0.01 (0.04)		0.02 (0.05)		0.01 (0.04)
Empathy		0.29*** (0.03)		0.28*** (0.03)		0.05 (0.03)		0.08* (0.03)		0.07* (0.03)
Gender		-0.15* (0.06)		0.20*** (0.06)		0.21*** (0.05)		0.05 (0.06)		0.03 (0.05)
$R^2$	.098	.233	.189	.280	.418	.449	.331	.373	.353	.416
$\Delta R^2$		.136		.091		.030		.041		.063
$F$	32.79***	30.57***	70.54***	38.97***	218.15***	81.68***	150.30***	59.69***	165.60***	71.45***
$\Delta F$		26.68***		18.99***		8.24***		9.96***		16.13***
<i>Relevance of moral foundation</i>										
<b>Pain Sensitivity × Political Orientation</b>	<b>0.11**</b> (0.03)	<b>0.08*</b> (0.03)	<b>0.12***</b> (0.03)	<b>0.10**</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.04</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.06*</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.07*</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.08**</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.12***</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.12***</b> (0.03)
Pain Sensitivity	0.08* (0.03)	0.05 (0.04)	0.08* (0.03)	0.06 (0.04)	0.41*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.04)	0.42*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.04)	0.38*** (0.03)	0.25*** (0.03)
Political Orientation	-0.23*** (0.03)	-0.16*** (0.03)	-0.23*** (0.03)	-0.18*** (0.03)	0.27*** (0.03)	0.26*** (0.03)	0.29*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.36*** (0.03)	0.35*** (0.03)
Disgust Sensitivity		0.07* (0.03)		0.05 (0.03)		0.15*** (0.03)		0.13*** (0.03)		0.24*** (0.03)
Emotion Reactivity		-0.15** (0.05)		-0.20*** (0.05)		0.09 (0.05)		0.08 (0.05)		0.07 (0.04)
Anxiety		0.04 (0.04)		0.03 (0.04)		-0.03 (0.04)		-0.10* (0.04)		-0.03 (0.04)
Anger		-0.04 (0.05)		0.00 (0.05)		0.07 (0.05)		0.11* (0.05)		0.01 (0.04)
Empathy		0.43*** (0.03)		0.36*** (0.03)		0.10*** (0.03)		0.10*** (0.03)		0.09** (0.03)
Gender		-0.05 (0.06)		0.05 (0.06)		0.09 (0.06)		0.02 (0.06)		0.02 (0.05)
$R^2$	.061	.254	.061	.192	.304	.349	.319	.359	.341	.409
$\Delta R^2$		.194		.132		.045		.040		.068
$F$	19.67***	34.27***	19.55	23.89***	132.60***	53.91***	142.10***	56.24***	156.90***	69.38***
$\Delta F$		39.10***		24.55***		10.45***		9.38***		17.23***

339 *Note.* Political orientation was a continuous variable (1 = liberal, 5 = centrist, 9 = conservative).

340 Gender was coded as a dichotomous variable (-1 = female, 1 = male). Standardized regression

341 coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .005$ , \*\*\*  $p <$


342 .001. If we used the more stringent criterion of Bonferroni-corrected alpha = .05 / 10 interaction

effects of interest = .005, the interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation remained significant on support for four of the five moral foundations ( $ps \leq .00305$ ) and on relevance of three of the five moral foundations ( $ps \leq .00111$ ).

As noted in **General Methodological Information Across Studies**, both pain sensitivity and political orientation were treated as continuous variables in all statistical analyses. Only for the purpose of visualizing the interaction effects (Figure 2, Table S1), we categorized participants into liberals (political orientation below scale midpoint) and conservatives (political orientation above scale midpoint). Recall that loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation are the moral foundations typically favored by conservatives more than by liberals (Graham et al., 2009, 2013); we found that higher pain sensitivity predicted endorsement of these “conservative moral foundations” more strongly among liberals ( $\beta s = 0.42\text{--}0.50$ ) than among conservatives ( $\beta s = 0.20\text{--}0.40$ ). In contrast, care/harm and fairness/cheating are the moral foundations typically favored by liberals more than by conservatives (Graham et al., 2009, 2013); we found that higher pain sensitivity predicted endorsement of these “liberal moral foundations” more strongly among conservatives ( $\beta s = 0.23\text{--}0.54$ ) than among liberals ( $\beta s = -0.03\text{--}0.23$ ). These opposite patterns constituted significant cross-level interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation  $\times$  moral foundations (loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation vs. care/harm and fairness/cheating) in multilevel modelling analyses ( $ps \leq 1.80\text{e-}6$ ; Table 2).

## Figure 2

Interaction Effects of Pain Sensitivity  $\times$  Political Orientation on Support for (Top Row) and Relevance of (Bottom Row) Moral Foundations in Study 1a



Note. 95% confidence intervals are shown around the lines for conservatives (i.e., political orientation above scale midpoint;  $n = 404$ ) and liberals (i.e., political orientation below scale midpoint;  $n = 405$ ). For ease of reference, an overall line is shown for all participants who indicated any political orientation (i.e., regardless of whether it was above, below, or at scale midpoint;  $N = 950$ ). Statistical details are available in Table S1.



374 **Table 2**

375 *Highest-Order Interaction Effects of Theoretical Interest in Multilevel Modelling of Outcomes in*  
 376 *Studies 1a–3*

Study	Highest-Order Interaction of Interest in Exploratory Multilevel Model	Measures (Within-Participant): Effects-Coding Where Relevant	Outcome (Likert)	ICC	$\beta$	SE	$t$	df	$p$
1a	PS x PO x Measures	Moral foundations: -1 vs. 1 <sup>a</sup>	Support for moral foundations	.301	-0.133	0.0145	-9.174	920	< .001
			Relevance of moral foundations	.323	-0.089	0.0167	-5.366	920	< .001
1b	PS x PO x Measures	Moral foundations: -1 vs. 1 <sup>a</sup>	Support for moral foundations	.270	-0.131	0.0164	-7.989	655	< .001
			Relevance of moral foundations	.324	-0.083	0.0172	-4.819	654	< .001
1c	PS x PO x Measures	Moral foundations: -1 vs. 1 <sup>a</sup>	Support for moral foundations	.240	-0.151	0.0121	-12.473	1256	< .001
			Relevance of moral foundations	.306	-0.083	0.0172	-4.819	654	< .001
2a	PS x PO x Measures	Political figures: -1 vs. 1 <sup>b</sup>	Support for political figures	.101	-0.151	0.0147	-10.306	997	< .001
	PS x PO	Political issues: all issues <sup>c</sup>	Support for political issues	.365	-0.145	0.0106	-13.712	1001	< .001
2b	PS x PO x Measures	Political figures: -1 vs. 1 <sup>b</sup>	Support for political figures	.179	-0.207	0.0159	-13.010	999	< .001
	PS x PO	Political issues: all issues <sup>c</sup>	Support for political issues	.380	-0.237	0.0145	-16.329	1012	< .001
3	PS x PO x Measures	Moral foundations: -1 vs. 1 <sup>a</sup>	Support for moral foundations	.344	-0.149	0.0106	-14.112	1563	< .001
			Relevance of moral foundations	.338	-0.105	0.0115	-9.136	1563	< .001
	PS x PO	Political issues: all issues <sup>c</sup>	Support for political issues	.362	-0.273	0.0117	-23.284	1564	< .001
Study	Highest-Order Interaction in Multilevel Model	Measures (Within-Participant)	Outcome (Dichotomous)	ICC	$\beta$	SE	$z$		$p$
2a	PS x PO	Voting preferences: intended & actual	Voting for Trump over Biden	.972	-8.521	1.2609	-6.758		< .001

377 *Note.* PS = pain sensitivity (between-participant, continuous). PO = political orientation

378 (between-participant, continuous). <sup>a</sup>Effects-coding of moral foundations (within-participant): -1  
 379 (care/harm, fairness/cheating) vs. 1 (loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation).

380 <sup>b</sup>Effects-coding of political figures (within-participant): -1 (Joe Biden, Kamala Harris, Bernie  
 381 Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, Nancy Pelosi, Steny Hoyer, Chuck Schumer) vs. 1 (Donald Trump,  
 382 Mike Pence, Mitch McConnell, Kevin McCarthy). <sup>c</sup>All political issues (within-participant) were  
 383 coded such that higher scores represented more conservative views.

384

Study 1b (direct replication) found a highly similar pattern of interaction effects (Figure 3, Table S2), again generally robust to the addition of control predictors (Table S3). Likewise, Study 1c (preregistered conceptual replication) found significant interaction effects (pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation) on support for all five moral foundations and relevance of four of the five moral foundations (Figure 4, Table S4), controlling for disgust sensitivity, gender, and the interaction effect of disgust sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation (Table S5).<sup>iii</sup> Both Studies 1b and 1c also replicated the significant cross-level interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation  $\times$  moral foundations (loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation vs. care/harm and fairness/cheating) in multilevel modelling analyses (Table 2).


---

<sup>iii</sup> In addition to our primary hypotheses of interaction effects, Studies 1a–1b revealed main effects of pain sensitivity on (a) support for all moral foundations, (b) relevance of three moral foundations (loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation), and (c) political orientation (Tables 1, S3, and S6). For comprehensiveness, we included these effects in the preregistration of Study 1c. To test (a), support for each moral foundation was regressed on pain sensitivity, first without (step 1) and then controlling for (step 2) disgust sensitivity, political orientation, and gender. To test (b), relevance of each of the three moral foundations (loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation) was regressed on pain sensitivity, first without (step 1) and then controlling for (step 2) disgust sensitivity, political orientation, and gender. To test (c), political orientation was regressed on pain sensitivity, first without (step 1) and then controlling for (step 2) disgust sensitivity and gender. Results for (a) and (b) are available in Table S7. Results for (c) are available in Table S6.

394 **Figure 3**

395 *Interaction Effects of Pain Sensitivity  $\times$  Political Orientation on Support for (Top Row) and Relevance of (Bottom Row) Moral Foundations*  
 396 *in Study 1b*

397




400

401 *Note.* 95% confidence intervals are shown around the lines for conservatives (i.e., political orientation above scale midpoint;  $n = 288$ ) and  
 402 liberals (i.e., political orientation below scale midpoint;  $n = 287$ ). For ease of reference, an overall line is shown for all participants who  
 403 indicated any political orientation (i.e., regardless of whether it was above, below, or at scale midpoint;  $N = 686$ ). Statistical details are  
 404 available in Table S2.

# Figure 4

Interaction Effects of Pain Sensitivity  $\times$  Political Orientation on Support for (Top Row) and Relevance of (Bottom Row) Moral Foundations in Study 1c



Note. 95% confidence intervals are shown around the lines for conservatives (i.e., political orientation above scale midpoint;  $n = 554$ ) and liberals (i.e., political orientation below scale midpoint;  $n = 583$ ). For ease of reference, an overall line is shown for all participants who indicated any political orientation (i.e., regardless of whether it was above, below, or at scale midpoint;  $N = 1,260$ ). Statistical details are available in Table S4.

## *Discussion*

Exploratory and confirmatory evidence from Studies 1a–1c showed that higher pain sensitivity predicted greater endorsement of moral foundations typically highlighted by one’s ideological opponent. Specifically, higher pain sensitivity predicted greater endorsement of “conservative moral foundations” (loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation) more strongly among liberals than among conservatives, and greater endorsement of “liberal moral foundations” (care/harm, fairness/cheating) more strongly among conservatives than among liberals. The effects could not be explained away by other control variables known to predict moral views. Nor could they be attributed to moderate ideology because throughout all of our studies, more pain-sensitive liberals and conservatives did *not* place themselves closer to the midpoint of the ideological spectrum (see **General Discussion** for details). Results of Studies 1a–1c (as well as Studies 2a, 2b, and 3) also could not be attributed to methodological artifacts such as multicollinearity and response set (**General Discussion -> Potential Artifacts**).

The observed pattern of interaction effects supports hypothesis 3 (heightening other side), which specifies that higher pain sensitivity should predict stronger moral views, particularly in domains typically deemed important by one’s ideological opponent. The observed pattern does not support hypothesis 2 (heightening own side), which predicts the opposite pattern of interaction effects. It also does not support hypothesis 1 (heightening all harms), which predicts no interaction effects, but only positive, similarly strong main effects of pain sensitivity on all moral foundations. Contrary to these predictions, interaction effects consistently emerged, and the main effect of pain sensitivity varied in size for different moral foundations (Tables 1, S3, and S5). Overall, results support hypothesis 3 (heightening other side).

### **Pain Sensitivity Predicts Political Views (Studies 2a–2b)**

Building on the evidence thus far, and considering that moral foundations are closely related to people's political views (Graham et al., 2013; Schein & Gray, 2018), a corollary prediction is that individuals with higher pain sensitivity are more inclined to show political attitudes and voting preferences typically exhibited by their ideological opponents. Supportive evidence for this prediction would reveal a novel theoretical relation (between pain sensitivity and political views). It would also shed light on outcomes that are often hard to move but have significant consequences in the real world (e.g., political attitudes toward contentious issues, voting preferences in a presidential election). We test this prediction in Studies 2a (exploratory) and 2b (preregistered replication).

### ***Method***

#### **Procedure**

Study 2a (exploratory;  $N = 1,007$ ) explored the hypothesized interaction effect of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation on voting preference in the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election, support for leading Republican/conservative and Democratic/liberal figures, and attitudes toward 25 contentious political issues. Data were primarily collected on October 10–15, 2020 (pre-election), except for the brief post-election survey on November 4–9, 2020 (right after November 3 the Election Day) where the same participants were recruited to indicate whom they actually voted for ( $N = 723$ ; 71.8% of the original sample). We describe each wave of data collection in turn.

During the pre-election primary data collection, participants first rated their attitudes toward 15 contentious political issues with item-specific scale labels (adapted from prior

research; Day et al., 2014; Feinberg & Willer, 2015; Koleva et al., 2012; Qian & Yahara, 2020) and 10 contentious political issues with items-general scale labels (adapted from prior research; Christie et al., 2019; Feinberg & Willer, 2015; Franks & Scherr, 2019; Frimer et al., 2017; Monroe et al., 2020). Responses to some issues were reverse-scored such that higher scores would always indicate more conservative attitudes. Then, 3 items prompted participants to indicate their likelihood of voting for a liberal, a conservative, and an independent political candidate. Next, participants rated their support for 11 leading political figures, each with 3 items (using Donald Trump as an example here: “I support Donald Trump”; “I approve of Donald Trump’s performance in the administration of his job”; “I support the political issues that Donald Trump stands for”). Participants were also asked whom they intended to vote for in the upcoming 2020 U.S. Presidential Election. Finally, participants completed the PSQ (Ruscheweyh et al., 2009, 2012; Sellers et al., 2013), attention check, and demographic measures (including political orientation).

During the post-election brief data collection, participants were asked whom they actually voted for in the 2020 Presidential Election.

To provide a preregistered replication of Study 2a’s results, Study 2b ( $N = 1,022$ ) used the same measures as in Study 2a, with two exceptions. First, because the 2020 Election had already happened, Study 2b measured actual (not intended) voting preference. Second, because of the highly consistent results across political issues in Study 2a, Study 2b included 10 of the 25 original issues, selected on the basis of (a) significant interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation and (b) significant effects of pain sensitivity among both liberals and conservatives.

## 483   **Analyses**

484           Multiple regression models were used to test our hypotheses. Each dependent variable  
 485 was regressed on the interaction effect of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation and their main  
 486 effects. All of the dependent measures were continuous and analyzed using linear regression,  
 487 except for intended voting preference in the pre-election data of Study 2a (exploratory) and  
 488 actual voting preference in the post-election data of Study 2a (exploratory) and in Study 2b  
 489 (preregistered replication). These dependent variables were categorical and thus analyzed using  
 490 logistic regression.

491           In Study 2a, because actual voting preference (measured post-election) showed a highly  
 492 similar pattern of results to intended voting preference (measured pre-election), we also  
 493 submitted them to multilevel modelling analysis (Table 2, bottom row) and formally tested their  
 494 consistency using cross-tabulation analysis. Indeed, intended voting preference and actual voting  
 495 preference were highly consistent (98.3% of participants who had indicated they intended to vote  
 496 for Trump later reported actually having voted for him, and 98.9% of participants who had  
 497 indicated they intended to vote for Biden later reported actually having voted for him;  
 498 McNemar's  $\chi^2(1) = 0, P = 1$ , among Trump and Biden voters). Such consistency was observed  
 499 regardless of whether we analyzed participants who completed the post-election survey on  
 500 November 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 (Table S8), alleviating concerns about memory distortion following  
 501 the announcement of election results.

502           In both Studies 2a and 2b, each set of dependent variables was also analyzed using  
 503 multilevel modelling (Table 2). Both pain sensitivity and political orientation were between-  
 504 participant and continuous. Political figures were within-participant and effects-coded: -1 (Joe  
 505 Biden, Kamala Harris, Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, Nancy Pelosi, Steny Hoyer, Chuck



Schumer) vs. 1 (Donald Trump, Mike Pence, Mitch McConnell, Kevin McCarthy). Political issues were also within-participant and all coded such that higher scores represented more conservative views.

## *Results*

Study 2a found significant interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation on intended and actual voting preferences in the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election and on support for all leading Republican/conservative and Democratic/liberal figures ( $ps \leq 9.40e-7$ ; Table S9). As in Studies 1a–1c, both pain sensitivity and political orientation were treated as continuous variables in all statistical analyses, but for the purpose of visualizing the interaction effects (Figure 5), we categorized participants into liberals (political orientation below scale midpoint) and conservatives (political orientation above scale midpoint). Higher pain sensitivity predicted higher intended voting preference for Trump over Biden among liberals ( $\beta = 1.92$ ), but higher intended voting preference for Biden over Trump among conservatives ( $\beta = -0.53$ ). Likewise, higher pain sensitivity (measured pre-election) predicted higher actual voting preference (measured post-election) for Trump over Biden among liberals ( $\beta = 0.98$ ), but higher actual voting preference for Biden over Trump among conservatives ( $\beta = -0.37$ ).

Higher pain sensitivity also predicted higher likelihood of voting for a conservative candidate and greater support for Trump, Pence, McConnell and McCarthy among liberals ( $\beta$ s = 0.14–0.38) more than among conservatives ( $\beta$ s = -0.07–0.05). In contrast, higher pain sensitivity predicted higher likelihood of voting for a liberal candidate and greater support for Biden, Harris, Sanders, Warren, Pelosi, Hoyer, and Schumer among conservatives ( $\beta$ s = 0.20–0.39) more than among liberals ( $\beta$ s = -0.09–0.03). These opposite patterns constituted a significant cross-level

529 interaction effect of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation  $\times$  political figures (Republican vs.  
530 Democratic) in multilevel modelling analyses ( $p < 2\text{e-}16$ ; Table 2).


531 In addition, we found a robust pattern of significant interaction effects of pain sensitivity  
532  $\times$  political orientation on attitudes toward 23 of the 25 contentious political issues ( $ps \leq .008$ ;  
533 Table S10), where response options were presented on a bipolar scale and scored or reverse-  
534 scored such that higher scores always indicated conservative (as opposed to liberal) attitudes.  
535 Higher pain sensitivity predicted conservative attitudes toward the political issues among liberals  
536 more than among conservatives (Figure 6).

537 Study 2b (preregistered) replicated the interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political  
538 orientation on all measures ( $ps \leq .001$ ; Tables 2 and S11–S12, Figures 7–8), reinforcing the  
539 conclusion that individuals with higher pain sensitivity are more inclined to support political  
540 views and show voting preferences typically exhibited by their ideological opponents.


541


Figure 5

Interaction Effects of Pain Sensitivity  $\times$  Political Orientation on Voting or Support for Political Figures in Study 2a



548 *Note.* 95% confidence intervals are shown around the lines for conservative participants (i.e., political orientation above scale  
549 midpoint;  $n = 434$ ) and liberal participants (i.e., political orientation below scale midpoint;  $n = 455$ ). For ease of reference, an overall  
550 line is shown for all participants who indicated any political orientation (i.e., regardless of whether it was above, below, or at scale  
551 midpoint;  $N = 1,005$ ). Statistical details are available in Table S9.

552 **Figure 6**553 *Interaction Effects of Pain Sensitivity  $\times$  Political Orientation on Support for Political Issues in Study 2a*




559 *Note.* 95% confidence intervals are shown around the lines for conservative participants (i.e., political orientation above scale  
 560 midpoint;  $n = 434$ ) and liberal participants (i.e., political orientation below scale midpoint;  $n = 455$ ). For ease of reference, an overall  
 561 line is shown for all participants who indicated any political orientation (i.e., regardless of whether it was above, below, or at scale  
 562 midpoint;  $N = 1,005$ ). Items are coded or recoded such that higher scores represent more conservative views. They are labelled  
 563 accordingly in the figure here. Items are listed in descending order of magnitude of the interaction effect  $\beta$ . Statistical details are  
 564 available in Table S10.

565

566 **Figure 7**567 *Preregistered Interaction Effects of Pain Sensitivity  $\times$  Political Orientation on Voting or Support for Political Figures in Study 2b*

568



569

570


571

572 *Note.* 95% confidence intervals are shown around the lines for conservative participants (i.e., political orientation above scale  
573 midpoint;  $n = 453$ ) and liberal participants (i.e., political orientation below scale midpoint;  $n = 424$ ). For ease of reference, an overall  
574 line is shown for all participants who indicated any political orientation (i.e., regardless of whether it was above, below, or at scale  
575 midpoint;  $N = 1,015$ ). Statistical details are available in Table S11.



576 **Figure 8**

577 *Preregistered Interaction Effects of Pain Sensitivity  $\times$  Political Orientation on Support for Political Issues in Study 2b*



580 *Note.* 95% confidence intervals are shown around the lines for conservative participants (i.e., political orientation above scale

581 midpoint;  $n = 453$ ) and liberal participants (i.e., political orientation below scale midpoint;  $n = 424$ ). For ease of reference, an overall

582 line is shown for all participants who indicated any political orientation (i.e., regardless of whether it was above, below, or at scale

583 midpoint;  $N = 1,015$ ). All items are coded and labelled in the figure such that higher scores represent more conservative views. Items

584 are listed in descending order of magnitude of the interaction effect  $\beta$ . Statistical details are available in Table S12.

## *Discussion*

Exploratory and confirmatory evidence from Studies 2a–2b indicated that higher pain sensitivity predicted stronger inclinations to support political views and show voting preferences typically exhibited by one’s ideological opponent. Specifically, among liberals, higher pain sensitivity predicted higher likelihood of voting for Trump over Biden in the 2020 Presidential Election, stronger support for leading Republican politicians, and more conservative attitudes toward contentious political issues. Among conservatives, higher pain sensitivity predicted higher likelihood of voting for Biden over Trump in the 2020 Presidential Election, stronger support for leading Democratic politicians, and more liberal attitudes toward contentious political issues. The cross-aisle effects of pain sensitivity on political views in Studies 2a–2b echo the cross-aisle effects of pain sensitivity on moral views in Studies 1a–1c. Both sets of results support hypothesis 3 (heightening other side).<sup>iv</sup>

It is important to be precise about what our cross-aisle effects did and did not show. Consider first the patterns in Figures 6 and 8. They show that highly pain-sensitive liberals and highly pain-sensitive conservatives hold more similar attitudes toward various contentious political issues than less pain-sensitive liberals and less pain-sensitive conservatives do. These graphs generally show interaction effects (pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation) in the form of attenuation, not crossover. The differences on the left end of the graph (i.e., low pain sensitivity) are attenuated on the right end of the graph (i.e., high pain sensitivity). The same pattern is seen in our results for attitudes toward political figures (Figures 5 and 7) and endorsement of moral foundations (Figures 2–4). If these graphs had shown interaction effects in the form of crossover,

---

<sup>iv</sup> As higher pain sensitivity predicted stronger endorsement of various moral foundations in Studies 1a–1c and stronger support for political views typically exhibited by one’s ideological opponent in Studies 2a–2b, our findings are consistent with the idea that stronger endorsement of various moral foundations is associated with more ideologically diverse views on different issues (Pyszczynski et al., 2018).

606 they would have suggested that highly pain-sensitive liberals not only supported conservative  
 607 moral and political views but also rejected liberal ones, and that highly pain-sensitive  
 608 conservatives not only supported liberal moral and political views but also rejected conservative  
 609 ones. This is not the case. Higher pain sensitivity heightens support for moral and political views  
 610 typically exhibited by the other side without undermining support for moral and political views  
 611 typically exhibited by one's side.

612         The same interpretation is applicable to the effects of pain sensitivity on dichotomous  
 613 voting preferences (first two panels of Figure 5). The patterns suggest that some of the highly  
 614 pain-sensitive liberals intended to vote for Trump and actually did, and some of the highly pain-  
 615 sensitive conservatives intended to vote for Biden and actually did. The key phrase is *some of*:  
 616 Some of the highly pain-sensitive liberals and conservatives showed voting preferences typically  
 617 exhibited by their ideological opponents. But it was not the case that the majority of highly pain-  
 618 sensitive liberals or conservatives showed this “flipped” voting preference. Our interpretation of  
 619 these findings is guided by our general assumption that human behavior is multiply determined.  
 620 Specifically, pain sensitivity is one of many determinants of political attitudes and behaviors.  
 621 Higher pain sensitivity, amidst other factors, predicts a stronger inclination to hold political  
 622 views typically exhibited by one's ideological opponent and, in the case of a dichotomous choice  
 623 (Biden vs. Trump), a higher probability of voting across the aisle.

624         All together, results from Studies 2a–2b support hypothesis 3 (heightening other side). As  
 625 in Studies 1a–1c, the cross-aisle effects of pain sensitivity on political views could not be  
 626 attributed to moderate ideology because throughout all of our studies, more pain-sensitive  
 627 liberals and conservatives did not place themselves closer to the midpoint of the ideological  
 628 spectrum (see **General Discussion** for details).

### Testing the Process: Perception of Harm (Study 3, Preregistered)

The findings reported so far support the outcomes derived from hypothesis 3, but have not examined the process per se. Study 3 (preregistered) directly tested the process model (Figure 1b), wherein political orientation moderates the effect of pain sensitivity on harm perception, which drives moral and political views.

### *Method*

#### **Procedure**

Participants ( $N = 1,658$ ) first rated their endorsement of moral foundations as in Studies 1a–1c, followed by their attitudes toward 10 contentious political issues as in Studies 2a–2b (five issues with item-specific scale labels and five issues with items-general scale labels). Next, participants completed measures of perceived harm. Specifically, they rated how much harm they perceived in behavioral violations of each moral foundation and in attitudinal disagreements with each moral foundation, using 32 items we modified from the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011). They also rated how much harm they perceived in the liberal attitude and in the conservative attitude toward each contentious political issue, using 20 items we modified from the aforementioned measure of attitudes toward political issues; for each issue, the difference score (perceived harm in the liberal attitude minus perceived harm in the conservative attitude;  $PH_{lib-con}$ ) served as the preregistered measure of interest. Finally, participants completed the PSQ (Ruscheweyh et al., 2009, 2012; Sellers et al., 2013), attention check, and demographic measures (including political orientation).

## 652 Analyses

653 All preregistered analyses are presented in Table 3 and summarized below.

654 (1) To test the interaction effect of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation on perceived  
 655 harm (i.e., the moderated first path of our conceptual model in Figure 1b), we ran three sets of  
 656 regression models (first column of results in Table 3). In each regression model, the predictors  
 657 were the interaction effect of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation and their main effects. The  
 658 outcome was (a) perceived harm in attitudinal disagreements with each moral foundation (rows  
 659 1-5 of results in Table 3), (b) perceived harm in behavioral violations of each moral foundation  
 660 (rows 6-10), or (c) perceived harm in the liberal attitude minus perceived harm in the  
 661 conservative attitude ( $PH_{lib-con}$ ) toward each contentious political issue (rows 11-20).

662 (2) To test the effect of perceived harm on moral and political views (i.e., the second path  
 663 of our conceptual model in Figure 1b), we ran three sets of regression models (second column of  
 664 results in Table 3). In each regression model, the predictor was each kind of perceived harm as  
 665 described in the last paragraph. The outcome was (a) support for each moral foundation (rows 1-  
 666 5 of results in Table 3), (b) relevance of each moral foundation (rows 6-10), or (c) attitude  
 667 toward each contentious political issue (rows 11-20).

668 (3) To test for moderated mediation (i.e., the full conceptual model in Figure 1b), we  
 669 implemented three sets of structural equation models with 10,000 bootstraps using the `lavaan`  
 670 package v0.6-10 (Rosseel et al., 2022) in R 4.1.3 (R Core Team, 2022). Results are presented in  
 671 the last column of Table 3. (a) Support for each moral foundation was predicted by perceived  
 672 harm in attitudinal disagreements with the corresponding foundation, which in turn was  
 673 predicted by the interaction effect of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation and their main effects  
 674 (rows 1-5 of results in Table 3). (b) Relevance of each foundation was predicted by perceived

harm in behavioral violations of the corresponding foundation, which in turn was predicted by the interaction effect of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation and their main effects (rows 6-10). (c) Attitude toward each contentious political issue was predicted by  $PH_{lib-con}$  toward the corresponding issue, which in turn was predicted by the interaction effect of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation and their main effects (rows 11-20).

**Table 3**

*Preregistered Moderated Mediation Analyses in Study 3*

Support for Moral Foundation	Interaction Effect of Pain Sensitivity $\times$ Political Orientation on Perceived Harm in Attitudinal Disagreements with Moral Foundation			Effect of Perceived Harm in Attitudinal Disagreements with Moral Foundation on Support for Moral Foundation			Index of Moderated Mediation		
	$\beta$	SE	p	$\beta$	SE	p	$\beta$	SE	p
Care/Harm	-0.007	0.02	.778	0.399	0.02	< .001	-0.003	0.01	.782
Fairness/Cheating	0.072	0.02	.003	0.340	0.02	< .001	0.021	0.01	.010
Loyalty/Betrayal	-0.093	0.02	< .001	0.451	0.02	< .001	-0.027	0.01	.001
Authority/Subversion	-0.113	0.02	< .001	0.383	0.02	< .001	-0.031	0.01	< .001
Sanctity/Degradation	-0.117	0.02	< .001	0.469	0.02	< .001	-0.035	0.01	< .001
Relevance of Moral Foundation	Interaction Effect of Pain Sensitivity $\times$ Political Orientation on Perceived Harm in Behavioral Violations of Moral Foundation			Effect of Perceived Harm in Behavioral Violations of Moral Foundation on Relevance of Moral Foundation			Index of Moderated Mediation		
	$\beta$	SE	p	$\beta$	SE	p	$\beta$	SE	p
Care/Harm	0.117	0.02	< .001	0.464	0.02	< .001	0.057	0.01	< .001
Fairness/Cheating	0.139	0.02	< .001	0.440	0.02	< .001	0.063	0.01	< .001
Loyalty/Betrayal	-0.082	0.02	< .001	0.616	0.02	< .001	-0.048	0.01	< .001
Authority/Subversion	-0.050	0.02	.014	0.607	0.02	< .001	-0.028	0.01	.021
Sanctity/Degradation	-0.112	0.02	< .001	0.695	0.02	< .001	-0.078	0.01	< .001
Political Issue	Interaction Effect of Pain Sensitivity $\times$ Political Orientation on $PH_{lib-con}$			Effect of $PH_{lib-con}$ on Attitude Toward Political Issue			Index of Moderated Mediation		
	$\beta$	SE	p	$\beta$	SE	p	$\beta$	SE	p
Decreasing global warming restrictions	-0.324	0.02	< .001	0.585	0.02	< .001	-0.198	0.02	< .001
No universal healthcare	-0.287	0.02	< .001	0.689	0.02	< .001	-0.196	0.02	< .001
No impeachment of former president Donald Trump	-0.241	0.02	< .001	0.727	0.02	< .001	-0.176	0.02	< .001
Illegal immigrants weaken the U.S. economy	-0.272	0.02	< .001	0.570	0.02	< .001	-0.174	0.02	< .001
ACA/Obamacare was a mistake	-0.288	0.02	< .001	0.570	0.02	< .001	-0.167	0.02	< .001
The poor should work harder	-0.275	0.02	< .001	0.478	0.02	< .001	-0.149	0.01	< .001
No marching in protest	-0.220	0.02	< .001	0.606	0.02	< .001	-0.133	0.02	< .001
Not funding stem cell research	-0.196	0.02	< .001	0.639	0.02	< .001	-0.126	0.02	< .001
No sterile drug facilities	-0.181	0.02	< .001	0.671	0.02	< .001	-0.120	0.02	< .001
No kneeling in protest	-0.146	0.02	< .001	0.652	0.02	< .001	-0.097	0.02	< .001

*Note.*  $PH_{lib-con}$  = perceived harm in the liberal attitude minus perceived harm in the conservative attitude toward a contentious political issue. Attitudes toward all political issues were coded such that higher scores represented more conservative views.

In addition to the above preregistered analyses, multilevel modelling analyses were conducted. Both pain sensitivity and political orientation were between-participant and continuous. Moral foundations were within-participant and effects-coded: -1 (care/harm, fairness/cheating) vs. 1 (loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation). Political issues were also within-participant and all coded such that higher scores represented more conservative views.

### *Results*

The hypothesized moderated mediation was significant in 19 of the 20 preregistered statistical models (9 on moral views,  $ps \leq .02100$ ; 10 on political views,  $ps \leq 1.92e-8$ ; last column in Table 3). Starting with moral views (rows 1-10 in Table 3), higher pain sensitivity predicted perceived harm in behavioral violations of and attitudinal disagreements with loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation more strongly among liberals than among conservatives (pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation interaction  $\beta_s = -0.117$ – $-0.050$ ). In contrast, higher pain sensitivity predicted perceived harm in behavioral violations of care/harm and fairness/cheating and in attitudinal disagreements with fairness/cheating (but not care/harm) more strongly among conservatives than among liberals (interaction  $\beta_s = 0.072$ – $0.139$ ). Greater perceived harm in behavioral violations of or attitudinal disagreements with each moral foundation consistently predicted endorsement of the foundation ( $\beta_s = 0.340$ – $0.695$ ).

Turning to political views (rows 11-20 in Table 3), across all 10 political issues, higher pain sensitivity consistently predicted  $PH_{lib-con}$  more strongly among liberals than conservatives

(interaction  $\beta$ s = -0.324–0.146). Greater  $PH_{lib-con}$  consistently predicted more conservative attitudes toward the political issues ( $\beta$ s = 0.478–0.727).

To enhance understanding of the preregistered difference score ( $PH_{lib-con}$ ) for each political issue, we present its descriptive statistics and its correlation with political orientation in Table S13. Higher  $PH_{lib-con}$  for every issue was associated with more conservative political orientation. We also conducted exploratory analyses that broke down  $PH_{lib-con}$  into its two components and analyzed them separately (Table 4). Specifically, perceived harm in the liberal attitude toward each issue was regressed on the interaction effect of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation and their main effects. Perceived harm in the conservative attitude toward each issue was analyzed in the same way. For ease of comprehending the results, readers might think of “perceived harm in the liberal attitude toward each issue” as a conservative tendency and “perceived harm in the conservative attitude toward each issue” as a liberal tendency. Results showed that higher pain sensitivity predicted greater perceived harm in the liberal attitude toward every issue (i.e., conservative tendency) more strongly among liberals than among conservatives. Likewise, higher pain sensitivity predicted greater perceived harm in the conservative attitude toward every issue (i.e., liberal tendency) more strongly among conservatives than among liberals. In short, both components of the preregistered difference score ( $PH_{lib-con}$ ) showed the cross-aisle effects of pain sensitivity.

#### **Table 4**

*Exploratory Analyses That Separately Examined the Interaction Effect of Pain Sensitivity  $\times$  Political Orientation on Perceived Harm in the Liberal Attitude and on Perceived Harm in the Conservative Attitude Toward Each Political Issue in Study 3*



Political Issue	Interaction Effect of Pain Sensitivity × Political Orientation on...					
	Perceived Harm in Liberal Attitude Toward Political Issue			Perceived Harm in Conservative Attitude Toward Political Issue		
	$\beta$	$SE$	$p$	$\beta$	$SE$	$p$
Decreasing global warming restrictions	-0.15	0.02	< .001	0.33	0.02	< .001
No universal healthcare	-0.17	0.02	< .001	0.29	0.02	< .001
No impeachment of Former President Donald Trump	-0.15	0.02	< .001	0.22	0.02	< .001
Illegal immigrants weaken the U.S. economy	-0.14	0.02	< .001	0.28	0.02	< .001
ACA/ Obamacare was a mistake	-0.17	0.02	< .001	0.26	0.02	< .001
The poor should work harder	-0.14	0.02	< .001	0.24	0.02	< .001
No marching in protest	-0.14	0.02	< .001	0.19	0.02	< .001
Not funding stem cell research	-0.10	0.02	< .001	0.20	0.02	< .001
No sterile drug facilities	-0.13	0.02	< .001	0.16	0.02	< .001
No kneeling in protest	-0.15	0.02	< .001	0.06	0.02	< .001

Overall, these results supported the moderated mediation process model (Figure 1b) in hypothesis 3 (heightening other side). They further replicated the interaction effects of pain sensitivity × political orientation on moral and political views found across Studies 1a–2b (see multilevel modelling analyses in Table 2).

### Lay Intuitions about Pain Sensitivity (Study 4, Descriptive)

Are the robustly observed interaction effects consistent with lay people's intuitions about pain sensitivity? We addressed this question empirically in our final study, which sought to describe lay intuitions about the effects of pain sensitivity and compare them with the actual effects of pain sensitivity observed in Studies 1a–3.

### Method

#### Procedure

Participants received introductory sample items from the PSQ (Ruscheweyh et al., 2009, 2012; Sellers et al., 2013) and were asked to imagine a [person] who responded to the PSQ items with generally high ratings and thus had high sensitivity to physical pain. Participants were then asked to rate their intuitions about a [person] with high sensitivity to physical pain (compared with a [person] with low sensitivity to physical pain) on a number of measures, including the

[person]’s moral foundations, political orientation, voting preference, support for political figures, and attitudes toward political issues. The text in the [person] placeholder was either “person,” “politically liberal person,” or “politically conservative person.” This manipulation (with three between-participant conditions) allowed us to examine lay intuitions about the interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation in two ways (see **Analyses** below).

## **Analyses**

To probe whether participants’ intuitions would reflect the interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation observed in Studies 1a–3, we used two methods. Both methods found the same pattern of results.

In method 1, participants were asked to think of a pain-sensitive person and compare this target with a less pain-sensitive person, both of whom were specified as either politically liberal or politically conservative (two between-participant conditions). In method 2, a separate group of participants was asked to think of a pain-sensitive person and compare this target with a less pain-sensitive person, and political orientation was not mentioned at all. We measured participants’ inferred political orientation of the pain-sensitive person.

Regardless of whether the hypothetical pain-sensitive person was specified as liberal or conservative (method 1; Figure 9), or inferred as liberal or conservative (method 2; Figure S1), all lay intuitions regarding the hypothetical pain-sensitive person (expected support for political figures, expected voting preference, expected attitudes toward political issues, expected moral foundations) were tested against the scale midpoint using one-sample *t*-tests (for all continuous measures) or against equal frequency distribution using a chi-square test (for the one categorical

measure: expected voting preference between Trump and Biden). Effect sizes were converted to the metric of  $r$  for data visualization.

## Results

Lay intuitions about pain sensitivity turned out to be mostly wrong, often in diametric opposition to the actual effects of pain sensitivity. Specifically, participants expected that a more pain-sensitive target (relative to a less pain-sensitive target) would be more supportive of political figures and attitudes typically supported by the target's ideological allies, but more opposed to political figures and attitudes typically supported by the target's ideological opponents. These lay intuitions were found regardless of whether the target was specified (method 1) as liberal (Figure 9a) or conservative (Figure 9b). They were also found regardless of whether the target was inferred (method 2) as liberal (Figure S1a) or conservative (Figure S1b). Yet these lay intuitions are exactly opposite to the actual effects of pain sensitivity.


Likewise, participants expected that a more pain-sensitive target (relative to a less pain-sensitive target) would much more strongly endorse moral foundations typically endorsed by the target's ideological allies, but either oppose or less strongly endorse moral foundations typically endorsed by the target's ideological opponents. Contrary to these lay intuitions, higher pain sensitivity actually predicted stronger endorsement of moral foundations typically endorsed by one's ideological opponents more than those typically endorsed by one's ideological allies.

## Figure 9

*Actual Effects of Pain Sensitivity in Studies 1a–3 versus Lay Intuitions About Pain Sensitivity When the Target's Political Orientation Was Specified in Study 4*

795 **a**

Liberal participants in Studies 1-3 and participants in the “target’s political orientation specified as liberal” condition in Study 4



796

797

**b**

Conservative participants in Studies 1-3 and participants in the “target’s political orientation specified as conservative” condition in Study 4



798

799 *Note. (a)* Actual effects of pain sensitivity among liberal participants in Studies 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a,  
800 2b, and 3 ( $ns = 406, 287, 583, 455, 424$ , and  $717$ ) versus lay intuitions about pain sensitivity for a  
801 target specified as liberal in Study 4 ( $n = 240$ ). *(b)* Actual effects of pain sensitivity among  
802 conservative participants in Studies 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b, and 3 ( $ns = 404, 288, 554, 434, 456$ , and  
803  $705$ ) versus lay intuitions about pain sensitivity for a target specified as conservative in Study 4  
804 ( $n = 237$ ). To facilitate comparison, all actual effects and lay intuitions were converted to the  
805 same metric of effect size,  $r$ . Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

806

## General Discussion

A series of exploratory and preregistered confirmatory studies (total  $N = 7,360$ ) provides both theory-building and theory-testing evidence that individuals with higher sensitivity to physical pain are more inclined to support moral and political views typically exhibited by their ideological opponents (Studies 1a–3). Specifically, more (vs. less) pain-sensitive liberal Americans show greater endorsement of moral foundations typically endorsed by conservatives (loyalty to ingroup, respect for authority, sanctity of oneself; Studies 1a–1c), even after controlling for a variety of variables that are known to predict moral foundations (e.g., disgust sensitivity, emotion reactivity, empathy). More pain-sensitive liberals also show higher likelihood of voting for Trump over Biden in the 2020 Presidential Election, stronger support for leading Republican politicians, and more conservative attitudes toward contentious political issues (Studies 2a–2b). In contrast, more (vs. less) pain-sensitive conservatives show greater endorsement of moral foundations typically endorsed by liberals (caring for the vulnerable and equality for all; Studies 1a–1c), higher likelihood of voting for Biden over Trump, stronger support for leading Democratic politicians, and more liberal attitudes toward contentious political issues (Studies 2a–2b). These cross-aisle effects of pain sensitivity are driven by heightened perception of harm (Study 3) such that more pain-sensitive individuals perceive greater harm in behaviors or issues where their political orientation does not typically lead them to perceive harm (Figure 1d). Overall, the interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation are highly consistent across a wide variety of measures and analyses, often large in effect size, and robustly supported in well-powered and preregistered studies and replications.

The cross-aisle effects of pain sensitivity on moral and political views are distinct from the effects of other intrapersonal variables of basic sensitivity. Those tend to show main effects,

not interaction effects. For example, higher disgust sensitivity (Inbar et al., 2009; Petersen et al., 2020; Pizarro et al., 2011), higher gustatory sensitivity (Ruisch et al., 2020), and lower interoceptive sensitivity (Ruisch et al., 2022) all predict more conservative moral and political views. Unlike these main effects, higher pain sensitivity predicts more conservative moral and political views among liberals, but more liberal moral and political views among conservatives. The interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation are not only distinct from the main effects of other variables, but also contrary to lay intuitions (Study 4). Lay people wrongly expect pain sensitivity to predict moral and political views typically favored by one's ideological allies. In reality, it predicts views typically favored by one's ideological opponents. The fact that lay people mispredict the effects of pain sensitivity also implies that the observed effects of pain sensitivity in Studies 1a–3 are unlikely to have resulted from demand characteristics.

Our findings across studies highlight the counterintuitive role of pain sensitivity, as a low-level attribute, in higher-order moral and political views. The relevance of pain sensitivity to morality and politics has received little attention in prior theorizing and research. Our theoretical approach is, to our knowledge, the first that integrates insights from multiple previously unconnected perspectives, which are individually insufficient and jointly necessary for deriving our predictions. Without prior work on the social properties of pain (DeWall et al., 2010; Eisenberger et al., 2003; Goubert et al., 2005; Keysers et al., 2010; Kross et al., 2011; Lamm et al., 2011; Langford et al., 2006; Lidhar et al., 2021; Lieberman & Eisenberger, 2015; Loggia et al., 2008; MacDonald & Leary, 2005; Singer et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2016), it would be unclear why higher sensitivity to physical pain should predict heightened perception of harm. Without prior work on harm perception as an intuitive template underlying moral judgment (Gray et al., 2012, 2022; Schein & Gray, 2018), it would be unclear why heightened perception of harm



853 should predict stronger moral views. Without prior work on the different moral foundations of  
 854 liberals and conservatives (Graham et al., 2009, 2013), it would be unclear why political  
 855 orientation should be a moderator of the effects of pain sensitivity. Without prior work on the  
 856 basic principle of multiple determinants in higher mental processes (Bless et al., 2003), it would  
 857 be unclear how exactly political orientation should moderate the effect of pain sensitivity. These  
 858 perspectives, each by itself, would not predict our results. We integrate them into a coherent  
 859 model. We demonstrate the utility of this model in generating novel predictions. And we find  
 860 robust evidence supporting these predictions.

861       Note that our integrative model highlights the mediating role of harm perception (Gray et  
 862 al., 2012, 2022; Schein & Gray, 2018) in the predictive effects of pain sensitivity on people's  
 863 moral views. An alternative prediction could have been derived from a hypothetical model that  
 864 ignores the notion of harm perception and simply focuses on the unique content of each moral  
 865 foundation (Graham et al., 2009, 2013). Among the five established moral foundations, the only  
 866 one that has an obvious link to pain is the care/harm foundation, which taps into our "ability to  
 867 feel (and dislike) the pain of others" and "underlies virtues of kindness, gentleness, and  
 868 nurturance" (Ditto et al., 2019). At this surface level, the care/harm foundation might have been  
 869 expected as the only moral foundation with a direct association with pain sensitivity. But it turns  
 870 out that pain sensitivity is associated with all moral foundations—and it is not a straightforward  
 871 main effect. Among liberals, pain sensitivity predicts endorsement of "conservative moral  
 872 foundations" more strongly than endorsement of "liberal moral foundations" (to which care/harm  
 873 belongs); among conservatives, pain sensitivity predicts endorsement of "liberal moral  
 874 foundations" more strongly than endorsement of "conservative moral foundations." These  
 875 interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation are incompatible with the simplistic

hypothetical model, but compatible with our integrative model, which specifies that higher pain sensitivity predicts heightened perception of harm in moral issues where one's political orientation does not typically lead one to perceive harm, a pattern that is aligned with the general principle of multiple determinants in higher mental processes (Bless et al., 2003).

As people's moral views are closely linked to their political views (Graham et al., 2013; Schein & Gray, 2018), our model also predicts the same conceptual pattern of interaction effects (pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation) on political views. We find remarkably consistent results across all measures of political interest. Higher pain sensitivity predicts higher likelihood of voting for the presidential candidate typically favored by one's ideological opponent (i.e., liberals voting for Trump; conservatives voting for Biden), regardless of whether voting preference was measured before the election (i.e., whom participants intended to vote for) or after the election (i.e., whom participants had actually voted for). Higher pain sensitivity predicts stronger support for leading political figures typically favored by one's ideological opponent (i.e., liberals supporting Trump, Pence, McConnell, McCarthy; conservatives supporting Biden, Harris, Pelosi, Schumer, etc.). Higher pain sensitivity predicts attitudes that are typically favored by one's ideological opponent toward contentious political issues. In short, higher pain sensitivity predicts "cross-aisle" political views, be they measured as a dichotomous choice (voting for either Trump or Biden), on a unipolar continuum (support for a leading Republican, support for a leading Democrat), or on a bipolar continuum (more conservative or more liberal attitude toward a political issue).

As we consistently find that more pain-sensitive individuals are more inclined to support moral and political views typically exhibited by their ideological opponents, one may wonder: are more pain-sensitive individuals simply more ideologically moderate? That is, do the cross-

aisle effects of pain sensitivity on moral and political views emerge because more pain-sensitive liberals and conservatives are closer to the ideological midpoint? Not according to participants' ideological self-placement (Table S14). Across studies, among liberals, higher pain sensitivity was not associated with rating oneself as less liberal; among conservatives, higher pain sensitivity was generally associated with rating oneself as slightly more conservative, never less. That is, while pain sensitivity consistently predicted cross-aisle moral and political views, it did not predict moderate ideological self-placement. Furthermore, we conducted additional analyses to explore the potential role of moderate (or extreme) ideological self-placement in our primary phenomenon of interest. Across Studies 1a–3, we created a new variable, ideological extremity, by recoding political orientation (*1 = Liberal, 5 = Centrist, 9 = Conservative*) in terms of difference from the midpoint (such that 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 became 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4). Even after controlling for ideological extremity, 141 of the 142 significant interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation found in Studies 1a–3 remained significant (Table S15). These supplementary results suggest that the cross-aisle effects of pain sensitivity are not reducible to moderate (or extreme) ideological self-placement. Instead, they are driven by heightened perception of harm in behaviors or issues where one's political orientation does not typically lead one to perceive harm, as specified in our theoretical model.

One may also wonder if the cross-aisle effects of pain sensitivity are attributable to methodological artifacts such as multicollinearity or response set. They are not (see **Potential Artifacts** below). These consistent cross-aisle effects, together with our integrative model, open up uncharted territory for considerable theoretical and empirical work (see **Future Directions** afterwards).

## 922 **Potential Artifacts**

923       **Multicollinearity.** Given our primary interest in the interaction effects of pain sensitivity  
 924  $\times$  political orientation, Studies 1a–3 involved regressing the outcomes on the interaction effect of  
 925 pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation and their main effects. In regression analyses, substantial  
 926 correlations among predictors would constitute the problem of multicollinearity, which would (a)  
 927 destabilize the predictors' partial coefficients and (b) inflate their standard errors, resulting in  
 928 wider confidence intervals and higher Type II error rates (Cohen et al., 2013). To probe the  
 929 possibility of multicollinearity, we used the `ols_vif_tol`, `ols_eigen_cindex`, and  
 930 `ols_coll_diag` functions of the `olsrr` package v0.5.3 (Hebbali, 2020) in R 4.1.3 (R Core Team,  
 931 2022) to run collinearity diagnostics across studies. Variance inflation factor (VIF), tolerance  
 932 (i.e., the reciprocal of VIF), and condition index (i.e., the square root of the ratio of the largest  
 933 eigenvalue among all orthogonal dimensions extracted from principal components analysis to the  
 934 eigenvalue of a particular orthogonal dimension) suggested minimal multicollinearity (Table  
 935 S16) and thus no collinearity concern in our regression analyses (Cohen et al., 2013; Thompson  
 936 et al., 2017).

937       **Response Set.** Considering the robust interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political  
 938 orientation observed across Studies 1a–3, a potential concern could be response set, the notion  
 939 that some participants might have simply completed all measures with higher ratings, other  
 940 participants with lower ratings, regardless of the measures' content, resulting in spurious effects.  
 941 Three observations argue against this concern. First, a number of items were reverse-worded  
 942 (and thus reverse-scored in analysis), yet the measures showed reliabilities resembling those in  
 943 prior research (Table S17), indicating that participants were likely responding to the measures'  
 944 content. Second, additional analyses (Table S18) showed that ignoring reverse-wording and

reverse-scoring (which should not be ignored) would result in no coherent pattern of effects (which would have been found as a result of response set). Third, response set would not be able to account for the fact that pain sensitivity predicted the same participants' responses to some measures differently than their responses to other measures (e.g., pain sensitivity predicted liberal participants' endorsement of loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation differently than their endorsement of care/harm and fairness/cheating; Figures 2–4, Tables 1–2 and S1–S5). These observations suggest that the robust interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation were unlikely to be a mere consequence of response set.

## **Future Directions**

**Pain Sensitivity and Political Orientation.** We found robust interaction effects between pain sensitivity and political orientation. Both variables involve a number of nuances that deserve future investigation.

Starting with political orientation, as noted in **General Methodological Information Across Studies**, it was treated as a continuous variable throughout our statistical analyses. As such, it captured variations across the ideological spectrum, from highly liberal to moderately liberal to moderately conservative to highly conservative. But more fine-grained aspects of political orientation may be examined. For example, social/cultural and economic/fiscal aspects of ideology, while overlapping with each other, have proven dissociable (Azevedo et al., 2019; Johnston & Ollerenshaw, 2020). They may interact with pain sensitivity in different ways or to different degrees. Also, the extremity of one's ideology is not the same as the strength or centrality of one's political identity (Huddy, 2001), especially in the American bipartisan context

(Huddy et al., 2015). Whether these related but distinct variables show the same patterns of interaction with pain sensitivity remains to be explored.

Turning to pain sensitivity, the Pain Sensitivity Questionnaire we used came with the advantage that it had been validated multiple times in prior psychophysical studies (Ruscheweyh et al., 2009, 2012; Sellers et al., 2013) as a reliable measure that predicts subjective intensity of pain experience across a variety of sensory modalities (heat pain, cold pain, pressure pain, and pinprick pain) that are common in daily life situations and thus relatable to participants. Our psychophysical validation study further supports and extends the validity of the PSQ by showing that higher PSQ scores predicted overall higher subjective pain intensity, steeper increases in subjective pain intensity with increases in objective pressure amount, and lower pain tolerance. In spite of this range of validity evidence, one disadvantage of the PSQ is that its wording focuses on subjective *intensity* of pain experience, which is only one psychophysical parameter of pain sensitivity.

Other parameters exist, such as awareness, tolerance, threshold, and just noticeable difference. These parameters are distinct from each other. Subjective intensity refers to the subjective experience of pain intensity when a person receives a specified objective level of pain-inducing physical stimulation (e.g., 490 Kpa pressure, 80°C temperature, 10 mA electric shock). Awareness is the frequency with which a person is aware of and attentive to their experience of pain in naturalistic settings. Tolerance is the maximum level of pain-inducing physical stimulation a person can tolerate. Threshold is the minimum level of physical stimulation at which a person starts experiencing pain. Just noticeable difference is the smallest difference between two levels of pain-inducing physical stimulation at which a person can detect a difference consistently and accurately 50% of the time. Which of these specific parameters of the

broad construct of pain sensitivity are most robustly linked to individual variations in moral and political views? Answering this question will require further, laborious psychophysical assessment and, according to our power analyses based on effect sizes of the interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation, probably fairly large sample sizes ( $N \sim 1,000$ ).

Additional psychophysical assessments of pain sensitivity will also serve the methodological function of either corroborating or challenging the present findings based on self-report measurement of pain sensitivity. The utility of self-report measurement of psychological factors underlying political attitudes has been a subject of debate due to several concerns. First, for some low-level constructs (e.g., interoceptive sensitivity), people may be unable to provide accurate self-assessment (Ruisch et al., 2022). Second, even if people are able to provide accurate self-assessment, they may be unwilling to provide truthful responses to measures of certain psychological constructs underlying political attitudes (e.g., cognitive rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity underlying right-wing attitudes) due to social desirability and related motivations (Taber & Young, 2013); indeed, self-report measures and behavioral measures of these constructs do not always show the same pattern of associations with political attitudes (Van Hiel et al., 2016). Third, political attitudes often need to be measured via self-report (by asking people what they think about certain topics), and when the psychological factors of interest are also measured via self-report, common method variance may inflate the magnitude of association between the two (Brannick et al., 2010; Podsakoff et al., 2003).

It is useful to be aware of these general concerns, but it is also important to contextualize them in specific studies to gauge the likelihood that they pose validity threats. Our stance is that in the present context of pain sensitivity measurement, the first concern does not pose substantial validity threats, the second concern is unlikely though cannot be ruled out, and the third concern

is most complex and worth addressing. More broadly, we also believe that adding psychophysical assessment of pain sensitivity will be a useful direction for future research.

Regarding the first concern, as noted earlier, the PSQ has been validated multiple times in prior studies (hence our choice of it) and in our own validation study such that people are able to provide self-report assessment of their subjective intensity of pain in ways that reliably map onto psychophysical assessment of their pain experience in situ. Such mapping may be more reliable in the case of pain sensitivity than in the case of interoceptive sensitivity because pain is a more specific notion and is easily understandable to lay people whereas interoception is a broader, more nebulous notion and is less readily comprehensible to lay people.

The validation of reliable mapping between self-report and psychophysical measures also partly relieves the second concern, namely, social desirability. Social desirability is most likely to shape responses to topics that carry clear social-evaluative implications (e.g., being “rigid” or “intolerant”). In the case of the PSQ, participants were asked to read statements about relatable experiences in daily life (e.g., “You burn your tongue on a very hot drink,” “You trap your finger in a drawer”) and rate how painful they imagined the experience to feel. Rating oneself as feeling more or less pain in these situations does not seem to bear any obvious relation to social evaluation. And these ratings do map onto objective psychophysical measures. Nevertheless, the extent to which responses to the PSQ are susceptible to social desirability is ultimately an empirical question.

Regarding the third and last concern, common method variance might be at work but was unlikely to be the sole driver of the present findings for several reasons (Brannick et al., 2010; Podsakoff et al., 2003): (a) Self-report pain sensitivity predicted the same participants’ responses to some self-report measures differently than their responses to other self-report measures (e.g.,



pain sensitivity predicted liberal participants' endorsement of loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation differently than their endorsement of care/harm and fairness/cheating; Figures 2–4, Tables 1–2 and S1–S5). (b) Other psychological factors (beyond pain sensitivity) that were also measured via self-report did not show the same patterns of association with self-report measures of moral views (Tables 1, S3, and S5). (c) A number of near-zero correlations exist among other self-report measures in our studies (e.g., between anxiety and moral foundations; Table S19). (d) More broadly, experts on common method variance have pointed out that “we should not take as default mode the position that self-report data are inherently full of serious problems of method variance that automatically lead to fallacious inferences” (Brannick et al., 2010, p. 417). In fact, “self-report is sometimes the preferred method of measurement” (p. 418). Still, we cannot eliminate the possibility that common method variance might have inflated the magnitude of the associations we observed. Psychophysical assessment of pain sensitivity will address this concern (though it will introduce a different and less widely appreciated concern, namely, method variance due to the use of different methods; Brannick et al., 2010). It will also provide useful data for triangulating the present findings.

**Mediation by Harm Perception.** We found that the interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation on moral and political views were mediated by harm perception (Study 3). Although the evidence bearing on the mediation was robust across the variety of moral and political views we examined, it was correlational in nature, which involves limitations and invites further investigation on two fronts. First, methodologically, experimental work that manipulates the mediating variable (Jacoby & Sassenberg, 2011; Spencer et al., 2005) or that manipulates the independent variable in ways that encourage changes in the putative mediating

variable (Bullock & Green, 2021; West & Aiken, 1997) would provide corroborative evidence. Second, a substantive concern might be that the mediating variable was conceptually too close to the dependent variable. Recall that the dependent variable was support for certain moral views, perceived relevance of certain behaviors to morality, or attitude toward certain contentious political issues. The mediating variable was perceived harm in opposition to those moral views, perceived harm in those behaviors or their opposites, or the difference between perceived harm in the liberal attitude and perceived harm in the conservative attitude toward those political issues. The concern about conceptual proximity between the mediating and dependent variables might be alleviated by the recognition that perceived harm is only one of the elements—not the sole determinant—of judgments in moral (Schein & Gray, 2018) and political realms (Kubin et al., 2021). Other elements such as social norm and identity matter as well. In other words, one’s moral and political views are not identical or reducible to one’s perception of harm in disagreement with those views. This suggests that evidence for the mediating role of perceived harm should not be trivialized.

There is a catch though. The concept of harm has exhibited expanded meanings and uses over time, a historical pattern known as “concept creep” (Haslam, 2016). Against this semantic backdrop, it is plausible that when lay people rate how much harm they perceive, at least some of them interpret the concept of harm loosely and rely on the same intuitive understanding that forms the basis of their moral and political views. If true, it would constitute a case of content overlap between the mediating and dependent variables and thus undermine the theoretical value of the mediational evidence, regardless of whether the mediation is based on measurement (as we did) or manipulation (as we suggested above). Future research may address this issue by carefully probing what participants actually think of when they provide these ratings and by

triangulating it with manipulations of harm perception that clearly establish the meaning of harm to avoid problems of ambiguous interpretation and concept overuse within the experimental context. In so doing, fine distinctions may be made about where exactly the perceived harm is directed. For example, perceivers may focus on how harmful a target person's view on a particular issue is (as we measured in Study 3) or on how harmful a policy is (which we did not measure).<sup>v</sup> The former is more likely to tap into perception of the target person's character; the latter is more likely to tap into perception of the policy's consequences. These different perceptions may or may not show the same effects. Identifying such differences will clarify which kinds of harm are salient on participants' minds and driving the effects of pain sensitivity.

The link from pain sensitivity to harm perception may also be further unpacked. Recall that our argument for this link is rooted in neuroscientific, physiological, behavioral, and linguistic evidence for two social properties of pain: overlap between sensing physical and social pain (DeWall et al., 2010; Eisenberger et al., 2003; Kross et al., 2011; Lieberman & Eisenberger, 2015; MacDonald & Leary, 2005) and overlap between experiencing pain oneself and perceiving pain in one's conspecifics (Goubert et al., 2005; Keysers et al., 2010; Lamm et al., 2011; Langford et al., 2006; Lidhar et al., 2021; Loggia et al., 2008; Singer et al., 2004; Smith et al., 2016). Based on these social properties of pain, we proposed that individuals with higher sensitivity to their own physical pain may be more sensitive not only to their own social pain, but also to others' physical and social pain (e.g., others' distress, social ills, harms being committed), hence their heightened perception of harm. Does social pain sensitivity fully mediate the effect of physical pain sensitivity on harm perception? Or do physical pain sensitivity and social pain

---

<sup>v</sup> We thank a reviewer for suggesting this distinction.

1104 sensitivity actually exert differential influences (because, despite their overlap, they are still  
 1105 different constructs; for related evidence, see Riva et al., 2016)?

1106       More broadly, what other mediators may contribute to pain-sensitive individuals’  
 1107 heightened perception of harm in violations of moral and political views that their ideological  
 1108 opponents typically care about? For instance, is reactivity to negative events, which is linked to  
 1109 higher sensitivity to sensory processing (Van Reyn et al., 2022), one of those mediators?  
 1110 Furthermore, is heightened perception of harm associated with other psychological correlates  
 1111 such as greater attitude importance and stronger moral conviction? If so, do these correlates  
 1112 further mediate or crowd out the mediating role of harm perception? Teasing apart the unique  
 1113 contributions of physical pain sensitivity, social pain sensitivity, and other potential mediators  
 1114 will be important next steps.

1115       One may even argue that harm perception is a downstream consequence, not a mediator,  
 1116 of the effects of pain sensitivity. In other words, it may be that pain sensitivity predicts cross-  
 1117 aisle moral and political views for reasons unrelated to perception of harm in the issues at hand.  
 1118 For example, building on the premise that physical pain sensitivity is associated with social pain  
 1119 sensitivity, individuals with higher physical and social pain sensitivity may be more worried  
 1120 about upsetting others and thus be more inclined to adopt others’ perspectives and be “fence-  
 1121 sitters” in their moral and political views.<sup>vi</sup> Those views, in turn, may motivate the perception of  
 1122 greater harm in contradictory views through a process of motivated reasoning and post hoc  
 1123 justification of one’s views (Haidt, 2001; Kunda, 1990). It is even possible that harm perception  
 1124 is both a mediator and a downstream consequence: Pain sensitivity predicts heightened harm  
 1125 perception, which shapes moral and political views as we have found, and once those views are

---

<sup>vi</sup> We thank a reviewer for suggesting and inspiring these ideas.

formed, they motivate post hoc justification and further identification of harm in contradictory views. This feedback loop seems highly plausible to us, especially considering the strong correlations between moral/political views and perceived harm in contradictory views. Our cross-sectional data fall short of being able to diagnose the feedback loop. We are excited to see future evidence for or against it, using experimental or longitudinal designs or both.

**Generalizability and Applicability.** Beyond integrating theoretical insights and generating new predictions, our model (Figure 1d) and findings also open up new research questions along the lines of generalizability and applicability. In terms of generalizability, recall that we collected data from American adults of diverse demographic backgrounds and spanning the ideological spectrum, from very liberal to very conservative, in order to test the interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation. Although the samples' age and gender distributions were fairly representative of the American population, they were limited to one nation. And the studies were conducted at various time points between May 2019 and October 2021—a highly polarized era in the U.S. Do the cross-aisle effects of pain sensitivity generalize to other time periods and other populations, especially those in calmer political climates?

Applicability of our findings to various contexts also deserves empirical attention. For example, in interpersonal communicative contexts, several strategies have been found effective for facilitating cross-aisle persuasion and interaction, such as framing liberal policies around moral themes that conservatives care about and vice versa (Feinberg & Willer, 2019), correcting overestimation of how negative one's political opponents feel toward one's political allies (Lees & Cikara, 2019; Ruggeri et al., 2021), discussing personal experience rather than arguing about facts with one's political opponents (Kubin et al., 2021), prompting the belief in the utility of cross-partisan empathy (Santos et al., 2022), and using language that de-moralizes people's

attitudes and thus increases their willingness to compromise (Kodapanakkal et al., 2022). May these communicative strategies be more effective among more pain-sensitive individuals but less effective among less pain-sensitive individuals? In light of the robust associations of pain sensitivity with explicitly measured moral and political views, does pain sensitivity also predict implicit attitudes and nonverbal behaviors toward ideological opponents?

Experimentally, does temporary induction of physical pain (e.g., electric shock, extreme temperature, sharp pressure) produce similar effects (for suggestive evidence, see Xiao et al., 2015)? Does temporary reduction of physical pain (e.g., through the provision of social support; Brown et al., 2003) or temporary inhibition of physiological pathways of pain sensitivity (e.g., by taking acetaminophen; DeWall et al., 2010) produce opposite effects? Extrapolating our findings to clinical contexts, do interventions that reduce patients' chronic pain (Driscoll et al., 2021) produce unintended effects on their social views? Do clinical conditions associated with lower pain sensitivity, such as depression, which is associated with higher pain tolerance in certain pain modalities (Bär et al., 2005; Dickens et al., 2003), also predict social views? To pursue these future directions, we encourage behavioral, pharmacological, clinical, and neuroscientific research to start disentangling how the affective (Eisenberger et al., 2003; Lieberman & Eisenberger, 2015; Singer et al., 2004) and sensory (Kross et al., 2011; Loggia et al., 2008) components of physical pain may differentially contribute to its role in morality and politics.

## References

- 1169
- 1170 Aguinis, H., Gottfredson, R. K., & Culpepper, S. A. (2013). Best-Practice Recommendations for
- 1171 Estimating Cross-Level Interaction Effects Using Multilevel Modeling. *Journal of*
- 1172 *Management*, 39(6), 1490–1528. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206313478188>
- 1173 Altemeyer, B. (1981). *Right-wing authoritarianism*. University of Manitoba Press.
- 1174 Appelbaum, M., Cooper, H., Kline, R. B., Mayo-Wilson, E., Nezu, A. M., & Rao, S. M. (2018).
- 1175 Journal article reporting standards for quantitative research in psychology: The APA
- 1176 Publications and Communications Board task force report. *American Psychologist*, 73(1),
- 1177 3–25. <https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000191>
- 1178 Azevedo, F., Jost, J. T., Rothmund, T., & Sterling, J. (2019). Neoliberal Ideology and the
- 1179 Justification of Inequality in Capitalist Societies: Why Social and Economic Dimensions
- 1180 of Ideology Are Intertwined: Neoliberal Ideology and Justification. *Journal of Social*
- 1181 *Issues*, 75(1), 49–88. <https://doi.org/10.1111/josi.12310>
- 1182 Bär, K.-J., Brehm, S., Boettger, M. K., Boettger, S., Wagner, G., & Sauer, H. (2005). Pain
- 1183 perception in major depression depends on pain modality. *Pain*, 117(1), 97–103.
- 1184 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pain.2005.05.016>
- 1185 Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2022). *lme4: Linear mixed-effects models*
- 1186 *using “Eigen” and S4* (1.1-28) [R]. [https://cran.r-](https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lme4/index.html)
- 1187 [project.org/web/packages/lme4/index.html](https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lme4/index.html)
- 1188 Bless, H., Schwarz, N., & Wänke, M. (2003). The size of context effects in social judgment. In J.
- 1189 P. Forgas, K. D. Williams, & W. von Hippel (Eds.), *Social judgments: Implicit and*
- 1190 *explicit processes* (pp. 180–197). Cambridge University Press.

- 1191 Brandt, M. J., Reyna, C., Chambers, J. R., Crawford, J. T., & Wetherell, G. (2014). The  
 1192 Ideological-Conflict Hypothesis: Intolerance Among Both Liberals and Conservatives.  
 1193 *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 23(1), 27–34.  
 1194 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721413510932>
- 1195 Brannick, M. T., Chan, D., Conway, J. M., Lance, C. E., & Spector, P. E. (2010). What Is  
 1196 Method Variance and How Can We Cope With It? A Panel Discussion. *Organizational*  
 1197 *Research Methods*, 13(3), 407–420. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1094428109360993>
- 1198 Brown, J. L., Sheffield, D., Leary, M. R., & Robinson, M. E. (2003). Social Support and  
 1199 Experimental Pain: *Psychosomatic Medicine*, 65(2), 276–283.  
 1200 <https://doi.org/10.1097/01.PSY.0000030388.62434.46>
- 1201 Bullock, J. G., & Green, D. P. (2021). The Failings of Conventional Mediation Analysis and a  
 1202 Design-Based Alternative. *Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science*,  
 1203 4(4), 251524592110472. <https://doi.org/10.1177/25152459211047227>
- 1204 Carney, D. R., Jost, J. T., Gosling, S. D., & Potter, J. (2008). The Secret Lives of Liberals and  
 1205 Conservatives: Personality Profiles, Interaction Styles, and the Things They Leave  
 1206 Behind: Liberals and Conservatives. *Political Psychology*, 29(6), 807–840.  
 1207 <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00668.x>
- 1208 Christie, N. C., Hsu, E., Iskiwitch, C., Iyer, R., Graham, J., Schwartz, B., & Monterosso, J. R.  
 1209 (2019). The Moral Foundations of Needle Exchange Attitudes. *Social Cognition*, 37(3),  
 1210 229–246. <https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2019.37.3.229>
- 1211 Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. (2013). *Applied Multiple*  
 1212 *Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences* (3rd ed.). Routledge.  
 1213 <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203774441>



- 1214 Day, M. V., Fiske, S. T., Downing, E. L., & Trail, T. E. (2014). Shifting Liberal and  
 1215 Conservative Attitudes Using Moral Foundations Theory. *Personality and Social*  
 1216 *Psychology Bulletin*, 40(12), 1559–1573. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167214551152>
- 1217 DeWall, C. N., MacDonald, G., Webster, G. D., Masten, C. L., Baumeister, R. F., Powell, C.,  
 1218 Combs, D., Schurtz, D. R., Stillman, T. F., Tice, D. M., & Eisenberger, N. I. (2010).  
 1219 Acetaminophen Reduces Social Pain: Behavioral and Neural Evidence. *Psychological*  
 1220 *Science*, 21(7), 931–937. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797610374741>
- 1221 Dickens, C., McGowan, L., & Dale, S. (2003). Impact of Depression on Experimental Pain  
 1222 Perception: A Systematic Review of the Literature with Meta-Analysis: *Psychosomatic*  
 1223 *Medicine*, 65(3), 369–375. <https://doi.org/10.1097/01.PSY.0000041622.69462.06>
- 1224 Ditto, P., Graham, J., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Sherman, G., & Wojcik, S. P.  
 1225 (2019, October). *Moral Foundations Theory*. MoralFoundations.Org.  
 1226 <https://moralfoundations.org/>
- 1227 Driscoll, M. A., Edwards, R. R., Becker, W. C., Kaptchuk, T. J., & Kerns, R. D. (2021).  
 1228 Psychological Interventions for the Treatment of Chronic Pain in Adults. *Psychological*  
 1229 *Science in the Public Interest*, 22(2), 52–95. <https://doi.org/10.1177/15291006211008157>
- 1230 Eisenberger, N. I., Lieberman, M. D., & Williams, K. D. (2003). Does Rejection Hurt? An fMRI  
 1231 Study of Social Exclusion. *Science*, 302(5643), 290–292.  
 1232 <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1089134>
- 1233 Feinberg, M., Wehling, E., Chung, J. M., Saslow, L. R., & Melv  r Paulin, I. (2019). Measuring  
 1234 moral politics: How strict and nurturant family values explain individual differences in  
 1235 conservatism, liberalism, and the political middle. *Journal of Personality and Social*  
 1236 *Psychology*. <https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000255>

- 1237   Feinberg, M., & Willer, R. (2015). From Gulf to Bridge: When Do Moral Arguments Facilitate  
 1238       Political Influence? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 41(12), 1665–1681.  
 1239       <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167215607842>
- 1240   Feinberg, M., & Willer, R. (2019). Moral reframing: A technique for effective and persuasive  
 1241       communication across political divides. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*,  
 1242       13(12). <https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12501>
- 1243   Finkel, E. J., Bail, C. A., Cikara, M., Ditto, P. H., Iyengar, S., Klar, S., Mason, L., McGrath, M.  
 1244       C., Nyhan, B., Rand, D. G., Skitka, L. J., Tucker, J. A., Van Bavel, J. J., Wang, C. S., &  
 1245       Druckman, J. N. (2020). Political sectarianism in America. *Science*, 370(6516), 533–536.  
 1246       <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abe1715>
- 1247   Franks, A. S., & Scherr, K. C. (2019). Economic Issues Are Moral Issues: The Moral  
 1248       Underpinnings of the Desire to Reduce Wealth Inequality. *Social Psychological and*  
 1249       *Personality Science*, 10(4), 553–562. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550618772821>
- 1250   Frimer, J. A., Tell, C. E., & Motyl, M. (2017). Sacralizing Liberals and Fair-Minded  
 1251       Conservatives: Ideological Symmetry in the Moral Motives in the Culture War:  
 1252       Ideological Symmetry. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 17(1), 33–59.  
 1253       <https://doi.org/10.1111/asap.12127>
- 1254   Goubert, L., Craig, K. D., Vervoort, T., Morley, S., Sullivan, M. J. L., Williams, de C. A. C.,  
 1255       Cano, A., & Crombez, G. (2005). Facing others in pain: The effects of empathy. *Pain*,  
 1256       118(3), 285–288. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pain.2005.10.025>
- 1257   Graham, J., Haidt, J., Koleva, S., Motyl, M., Iyer, R., Wojcik, S. P., & Ditto, P. H. (2013). Moral  
 1258       Foundations Theory. In P. Devine & A. Plant (Eds.), *Advances in Experimental Social*

- 1259 *Psychology* (Vol. 47, pp. 55–130). Elsevier. [https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-407236-](https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-407236-7.00002-4)  
 1260 [7.00002-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-407236-7.00002-4)
- 1261 Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of  
 1262 moral foundations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 96(5), 1029–1046.  
 1263 <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015141>
- 1264 Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011). Mapping the  
 1265 moral domain. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 101(2), 366–385.  
 1266 <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021847>
- 1267 Gray, K., MacCormack, J. K., Henry, T., Banks, E., Schein, C., Armstrong-Carter, E., Abrams,  
 1268 S., & Muscatell, K. A. (2022). The affective harm account (AHA) of moral judgment:  
 1269 Reconciling cognition and affect, dyadic morality and disgust, harm and purity. *Journal*  
 1270 *of Personality and Social Psychology*. <https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000310>
- 1271 Gray, K., Young, L., & Waytz, A. (2012). Mind Perception Is the Essence of Morality.  
 1272 *Psychological Inquiry*, 23(2), 101–124. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2012.651387>
- 1273 Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral  
 1274 judgment. *Psychological Review*, 108(4), 814–834. [https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-](https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295X.108.4.814)  
 1275 [295X.108.4.814](https://doi.org/10.1037//0033-295X.108.4.814)
- 1276 Haidt, J., McCauley, C., & Rozin, P. (1994). Individual differences in sensitivity to disgust: A  
 1277 scale sampling seven domains of disgust elicitors. *Personality and Individual*  
 1278 *Differences*, 16(5), 701–713. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869\(94\)90212-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(94)90212-7)
- 1279 Haslam, N. (2016). Concept Creep: Psychology’s Expanding Concepts of Harm and Pathology.  
 1280 *Psychological Inquiry*, 27(1), 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2016.1082418>

- 1281 Hebbali, A. (2020). *olsrr: Tools for building OLS regression models* (0.5.3) [R]. [https://cran.r-](https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/olsrr/index.html)  
 1282 [project.org/web/packages/olsrr/index.html](https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/olsrr/index.html)
- 1283 Huddy, L. (2001). From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity  
 1284 Theory. *Political Psychology*, 22(1), 127–156. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00230>
- 1285 Huddy, L., Mason, L., & Aarøe, L. (2015). Expressive Partisanship: Campaign Involvement,  
 1286 Political Emotion, and Partisan Identity. *American Political Science Review*, 109(1), 1–  
 1287 17. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055414000604>
- 1288 Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D. A., & Bloom, P. (2009). Conservatives are more easily disgusted than  
 1289 liberals. *Cognition & Emotion*, 23(4), 714–725.  
 1290 <https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930802110007>
- 1291 Jacoby, J., & Sassenberg, K. (2011). Interactions do not only tell us when, but can also tell us  
 1292 how: Testing process hypotheses by interaction. *European Journal of Social Psychology*,  
 1293 41(2), 180–190. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.762>
- 1294 Johnston, C. D., & Ollerenshaw, T. (2020). How different are cultural and economic ideology?  
 1295 *Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences*, 34, 94–101.  
 1296 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.01.008>
- 1297 Jones, L., Fabrizi, L., Laudiano-Dray, M., Whitehead, K., Meek, J., Verriotis, M., & Fitzgerald,  
 1298 M. (2017). Nociceptive Cortical Activity Is Dissociated from Nociceptive Behavior in  
 1299 Newborn Human Infants under Stress. *Current Biology*, 27(24), 3846-3851.e3.  
 1300 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2017.10.063>
- 1301 Jost, J. T., Banaji, M. R., & Nosek, B. A. (2004). A Decade of System Justification Theory:  
 1302 Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo.  
 1303 *Political Psychology*, 25(6), 881–919. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2004.00402.x>

- 1304 Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as  
 1305 motivated social cognition. *Psychological Bulletin*, 129(3), 339–375.  
 1306 <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339>
- 1307 Keysers, C., Kaas, J. H., & Gazzola, V. (2010). Somatosensation in social perception. *Nature*  
 1308 *Reviews Neuroscience*, 11(6), 417–428. <https://doi.org/10.1038/nrn2833>
- 1309 Kodapanakkal, R. I., Brandt, M. J., Kogler, C., & van Beest, I. (2022). Moral Frames Are  
 1310 Persuasive and Moralize Attitudes; Nonmoral Frames Are Persuasive and De-Moralize  
 1311 Attitudes. *Psychological Science*, 095679762110408.  
 1312 <https://doi.org/10.1177/09567976211040803>
- 1313 Koleva, S. P., Graham, J., Iyer, R., Ditto, P. H., & Haidt, J. (2012). Tracing the threads: How  
 1314 five moral concerns (especially Purity) help explain culture war attitudes. *Journal of*  
 1315 *Research in Personality*, 46(2), 184–194. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2012.01.006>
- 1316 Kross, E., Berman, M. G., Mischel, W., Smith, E. E., & Wager, T. D. (2011). Social rejection  
 1317 shares somatosensory representations with physical pain. *Proceedings of the National*  
 1318 *Academy of Sciences*, 108(15), 6270–6275. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1102693108>
- 1319 Kteily, N. S., Rocklage, M. D., McClanahan, K., & Ho, A. K. (2019). Political ideology shapes  
 1320 the amplification of the accomplishments of disadvantaged vs. Advantaged group  
 1321 members. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 116(5), 1559–1568.  
 1322 <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1818545116>
- 1323 Kubin, E., Puryear, C., Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2021). Personal experiences bridge moral and  
 1324 political divides better than facts. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*,  
 1325 118(6), e2008389118. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2008389118>

- 1326 Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. *Psychological Bulletin*, 108(3), 480–498.  
 1327 <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.480>
- 1328 Kuznetsova, A., Brockhoff, P. B., & Christensen, R. H. B. (2020). *lmerTest: Tests in linear*  
 1329 *mixed effects models* (3.1-3) [R].
- 1330 Lakoff, G. (2002). *Moral politics: How liberals and conservatives think* (2nd ed). University of  
 1331 Chicago Press.
- 1332 Lamm, C., Decety, J., & Singer, T. (2011). Meta-analytic evidence for common and distinct  
 1333 neural networks associated with directly experienced pain and empathy for pain.  
 1334 *NeuroImage*, 54(3), 2492–2502. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.10.014>
- 1335 Langford, D. J., Crager, S. E., Shehzad, Z., Smith, S. B., Sotocinal, S. G., Levenstadt, J. S.,  
 1336 Chanda, M. L., Levitin, D. J., & Mogil, J. S. (2006). Social Modulation of Pain as  
 1337 Evidence for Empathy in Mice. *Science*, 312(5782), 1967–1970.  
 1338 <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1128322>
- 1339 Lees, J., & Cikara, M. (2019). Inaccurate group meta-perceptions drive negative out-group  
 1340 attributions in competitive contexts. *Nature Human Behaviour*, 4(3), 279–286.  
 1341 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-019-0766-4>
- 1342 Lidhar, N. K., Darvish-Ghane, S., Sivaselvachandran, S., Khan, S., Wasif, F., Turner, H.,  
 1343 Sivaselvachandran, M., Fournier, N. M., & Martin, L. J. (2021). Prelimbic cortex  
 1344 glucocorticoid receptors regulate the stress-mediated inhibition of pain contagion in male  
 1345 mice. *Neuropsychopharmacology*, 46(6), 1183–1193. [https://doi.org/10.1038/s41386-](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41386-020-00912-4)  
 1346 [020-00912-4](https://doi.org/10.1038/s41386-020-00912-4)

- 1347 Lieberman, M. D., & Eisenberger, N. I. (2015). The dorsal anterior cingulate cortex is selective  
 1348 for pain: Results from large-scale reverse inference. *Proceedings of the National*  
 1349 *Academy of Sciences*. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1515083112>
- 1350 Loggia, M. L., Mogil, J. S., & Bushnell, C. M. (2008). Empathy hurts: Compassion for another  
 1351 increases both sensory and affective components of pain perception. *Pain*, 136(1), 168–  
 1352 176. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pain.2007.07.017>
- 1353 MacDonald, G., & Leary, M. R. (2005). Why Does Social Exclusion Hurt? The Relationship  
 1354 Between Social and Physical Pain. *Psychological Bulletin*, 131(2), 202–223.  
 1355 <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.131.2.202>
- 1356 Monroe, A. E., Wyngaarden, J. B., & Plant, E. A. (2020). “They should have followed the rules”:  
 1357 Trade-offs Between Fairness and Authority Values Predict Judgments of Social Justice  
 1358 Protests. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 194855062092385.  
 1359 <https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620923854>
- 1360 National Research Council of the National Academies. (2009). *Recognition and alleviation of*  
 1361 *pain in laboratory animals*. National Academies Press.
- 1362 Nielsen, C. S., Staud, R., & Price, D. D. (2009). Individual Differences in Pain Sensitivity:  
 1363 Measurement, Causation, and Consequences. *The Journal of Pain*, 10(3), 231–237.  
 1364 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpain.2008.09.010>
- 1365 Nock, M. K., Wedig, M. M., Holmberg, E. B., & Hooley, J. M. (2008). The Emotion Reactivity  
 1366 Scale: Development, Evaluation, and Relation to Self-Injurious Thoughts and Behaviors.  
 1367 *Behavior Therapy*, 39(2), 107–116. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2007.05.005>
- 1368 Olatunji, B. O., Williams, N. L., Tolin, D. F., Abramowitz, J. S., Sawchuk, C. N., Lohr, J. M., &  
 1369 Elwood, L. S. (2007). The Disgust Scale: Item analysis, factor structure, and suggestions

- for refinement. *Psychological Assessment*, 19(3), 281–297. <https://doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.19.3.281>
- Petersen, M. B., Tybur, J. M., & Stewart, P. A. (Eds.). (2020). Special issue: Disgust and political attitudes. *Politics and the Life Sciences*, 39(2), 127–227.
- Pizarro, D., Inbar, Y., & Helion, C. (2011). On Disgust and Moral Judgment. *Emotion Review*, 3(3), 267–268. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073911402394>
- Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J.-Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common method biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 88(5), 879–903. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.88.5.879>
- Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 67(4), 741–763. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.4.741>
- Pyszczynski, T., Kesebir, P., Motyl, M., Yetzer, A., & Anson, J. M. (2018). *Ideological Consistency, Political Orientation, and Variability Across Moral Foundations* [Preprint]. PsyArXiv. <https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/qgm5c>
- Qian, K., & Yahara, T. (2020). Mentality and behavior in COVID-19 emergency status in Japan: Influence of personality, morality and ideology. *PLOS ONE*, 15(7), e0235883. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0235883>
- R Core Team. (2022). *R: A language and environment for statistical computing* (4.1.3) [R; R Foundation for Statistical Computing]. <https://www.R-project.org/>



- 1391 Reniers, R. L. E. P., Corcoran, R., Drake, R., Shryane, N. M., & Völlm, B. A. (2011). The  
 1392 QCAE: A Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy. *Journal of Personality*  
 1393 *Assessment*, 93(1), 84–95. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2010.528484>
- 1394 Riva, P., Brambilla, M., & Vaes, J. (2016). Bad guys suffer less (social pain): Moral status  
 1395 influences judgements of others' social suffering. *British Journal of Social Psychology*,  
 1396 55(1), 88–108. <https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12114>
- 1397 Rosseel, Y., Jorgensen, T. D., & Rockwood, N. (2022). *lavaan: Latent variable analysis* (0.6-10)  
 1398 [R]. <https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lavaan/index.html>
- 1399 Ruggeri, K., Većkalov, B., Bojanić, L., Andersen, T. L., Ashcroft-Jones, S., Ayacaxli, N., Barea-  
 1400 Arroyo, P., Berge, M. L., Bjørndal, L. D., Bursalıoğlu, A., Bühler, V., Čadek, M.,  
 1401 Çetinçelik, M., Clay, G., Cortijos-Bernabeu, A., Damjanović, K., Dugue, T. M., Esberg,  
 1402 M., Esteban-Serna, C., ... Folke, T. (2021). The general fault in our fault lines. *Nature*  
 1403 *Human Behaviour*, 5(10), 1369–1380. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01092-x>
- 1404 Ruisch, B. C., Anderson, R. A., Inbar, Y., & Pizarro, D. A. (2020). A matter of taste: Gustatory  
 1405 sensitivity predicts political ideology. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*.  
 1406 <https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000365>
- 1407 Ruisch, B. C., Von Mohr, M., Naber, M., Tsakiris, M., Fazio, R. H., & Scheepers, D. T. (2022).  
 1408 Sensitive liberals and unfeeling conservatives? *Interoceptive sensitivity predicts political*  
 1409 *liberalism. Politics and the Life Sciences*, 41(2), 256–275.  
 1410 <https://doi.org/10.1017/pls.2022.18>
- 1411 Ruscheweyh, R., Marziniak, M., Stumpfenhorst, F., Reinholz, J., & Knecht, S. (2009). Pain  
 1412 sensitivity can be assessed by self-rating: Development and validation of the Pain

- 1413           Sensitivity Questionnaire. *Pain*, 146(1), 65–74.  
 1414           <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pain.2009.06.020>
- 1415   Ruscheweyh, R., Verneuer, B., Dany, K., Marziniak, M., Wolowski, A., Çolak-Ekici, R.,  
 1416           Schulte, T. L., Bullmann, V., Grewe, S., Gralow, I., Evers, S., & Knecht, S. (2012).  
 1417           Validation of the Pain Sensitivity Questionnaire in chronic pain patients. *Pain*, 153(6),  
 1418           1210–1218. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pain.2012.02.025>
- 1419   Santos, L. A., Voelkel, J. G., Willer, R., & Zaki, J. (2022). Belief in the Utility of Cross-Partisan  
 1420           Empathy Reduces Partisan Animosity and Facilitates Political Persuasion. *Psychological*  
 1421           *Science*, 33(9), 1557–1573. <https://doi.org/10.1177/09567976221098594>
- 1422   Schein, C., & Gray, K. (2018). The Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by  
 1423           Redefining Harm. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 22(1), 32–70.  
 1424           <https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868317698288>
- 1425   Sellers, A. B., Ruscheweyh, R., Kelley, B. J., Ness, T. J., & Vetter, T. R. (2013). Validation of  
 1426           the English Language Pain Sensitivity Questionnaire. *Regional Anesthesia and Pain*  
 1427           *Medicine*, 38(6), 508–514. <https://doi.org/10.1097/AAP.0000000000000007>
- 1428   Singer, T., Seymour, B., O’Doherty, J., Kaube, H., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, C. D. (2004). Empathy  
 1429           for Pain Involves the Affective but not Sensory Components of Pain. *Science*, 303(5661),  
 1430           1157–1162. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1093535>
- 1431   Smith, M. L., Hostetler, C. M., Heinricher, M. M., & Ryabinin, A. E. (2016). Social transfer of  
 1432           pain in mice. *Science Advances*, 2(10), e1600855. <https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.1600855>
- 1433   Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., & Fong, G. T. (2005). Establishing a causal chain: Why  
 1434           experiments are often more effective than mediational analyses in examining

- 1435 psychological processes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 89(6), 845–851.  
 1436 <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.89.6.845>
- 1437 Spielberger, C. D. (2012). *State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults* [Data set]. American  
 1438 Psychological Association. <https://doi.org/10.1037/t06496-000>
- 1439 Spielberger, C. D., Jacobs, G., Russell, S., & Crane, R. S. (1983). Assessment of anger: The  
 1440 State-Trait Anger Scale. In J. N. Butcher & C. D. Spielberger (Eds.), *Advances in*  
 1441 *personality assessment* (Vol. 2, pp. 159–187). Erlbaum.
- 1442 Taber, C. S., & Young, E. (2013). *Political Information Processing*. Oxford University Press.  
 1443 <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199760107.013.0017>
- 1444 *Tableau Desktop* (2021.4.3). (2021). Tableau Software.
- 1445 Thompson, C. G., Kim, R. S., Aloe, A. M., & Becker, B. J. (2017). Extracting the Variance  
 1446 Inflation Factor and Other Multicollinearity Diagnostics from Typical Regression  
 1447 Results. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 39(2), 81–90.  
 1448 <https://doi.org/10.1080/01973533.2016.1277529>
- 1449 Van Hiel, A., Onraet, E., Crowson, H. M., & Roets, A. (2016). The Relationship between Right–  
 1450 wing Attitudes and Cognitive Style: A Comparison of Self–report and Behavioural  
 1451 Measures of Rigidity and Intolerance of Ambiguity. *European Journal of Personality*,  
 1452 30(6), 523–531. <https://doi.org/10.1002/per.2082>
- 1453 Van Reyn, C., Koval, P., & Bastian, B. (2022). Sensory Processing Sensitivity and Reactivity to  
 1454 Daily Events. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 194855062211193.  
 1455 <https://doi.org/10.1177/19485506221119357>

- 1456 Wang, H., Li, K., & Xie, X. (2019). Individual differences in pain sensitivity predict the  
1457 experience of unfairness. *Journal of Health Psychology*, 24(7), 953–963.  
1458 <https://doi.org/10.1177/1359105316685902>
- 1459 Waytz, A., Iyer, R., Young, L., Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2019). Ideological differences in the  
1460 expanse of the moral circle. *Nature Communications*, 10(1), 4389.  
1461 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-12227-0>
- 1462 West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. (1997). Toward understanding individual effects in multicomponent  
1463 prevention programs: Design and analysis strategies. In K. J. Bryant, M. Windle, & S. G.  
1464 West (Eds.), *The science of prevention: Methodological advances from alcohol and*  
1465 *substance abuse research*. (pp. 167–209). American Psychological Association.  
1466 <https://doi.org/10.1037/10222-006>
- 1467 Xiao, Q., Zhu, Y., & Luo, W. (2015). Experiencing Physical Pain Leads to More Sympathetic  
1468 Moral Judgments. *PLOS ONE*, 10(10), e0140580.  
1469 <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0140580>  
1470

# Pain Sensitivity Predicts Support for Moral and Political Views Across the Aisle

## SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL

SECTION	PAGE #
<b>SUPPLEMENTAL METHODS AND RESULTS</b>	<b>2–28</b>
<i>Psychophysical Validation of Pain Sensitivity Measure</i>	2–9
<i>Pain Sensitivity Predicts Moral Views (Studies 1a–1c)</i>	9–15
<i>Pain Sensitivity Predicts Political Views (Studies 2a–2b)</i>	15–19
<i>Testing the Process: Perception of Harm (Study 3)</i>	19–23
<i>Lay Intuitions about Pain Sensitivity (Study 4)</i>	23–28
<b>SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES</b>	<b>29–66</b>
<b>SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURES</b>	<b>67–72</b>
<b>SUPPLEMENTAL REFERENCES</b>	<b>73–77</b>

## SUPPLEMENTAL METHODS AND RESULTS

### Psychophysical Validation of Pain Sensitivity Measure

#### *Method*

All data, analysis code, and research materials are available at [https://osf.io/mgcef/?view\\_only=ed0786335fdc41a39ea4b7a1c9c2e444](https://osf.io/mgcef/?view_only=ed0786335fdc41a39ea4b7a1c9c2e444). The study had received institutional ethics approval and was executed in compliance with relevant ethical guidelines and APA ethical standards, including adherence to the legal requirements of the study country.

#### **Participants**

Undergraduate students at a large university in North America were recruited to complete a lab study for course credits. Our data collection targeted a sample size of at least 200 participants with useable data. It proceeded from the beginning to the end of an academic term. In total, 263 participants ( $M_{age} = 19.15$ ,  $SD_{age} = 1.96$ ) completed the study, provided reconsent (7 others did not), and passed the attention check (10 others did not) and problematic response patterns check. Most participants indicated their gender as “female” ( $n = 153$ ) or “male” ( $n = 108$ ), and 2 indicated “other” ( $n = 2$ ).

#### **Equipment, Procedure, and Measures**

Pain was induced using a pressure algometer (Model FDX 50, Wager Instruments, Greenwich, CT; <http://www.wagnerinstruments.com/products/force-gages/digital-force-gages/force-ten-fdx>). Prior work has shown that pressure algometers provide high levels of reliability and validity in force application and pressure-pain assessment (Kinser et al., 2009).

We used the algometer to apply pressure on fingers, a body region chosen for ease of access and in accordance with established experimental procedures (Brennum et al., 1989). We oriented the algometer in such a way that participants could place their finger in a comfortable position but could not see the screen displaying the objective pressure amount (Figure S2).

Data collection took place one participant at a time. Upon arrival at the lab and after providing consent, the participant was reminded that they could terminate their participation at any point. The first part of the study assessed pain threshold and pain tolerance. Experimenter 1 asked the participant to position the index finger of their non-dominant hand such that the midpoint of the middle phalanx (between the first and second knuckles) was right underneath the rubber-tipped load shaft of the algometer.

To assess pain threshold, the participant was told that Experimenter 1 would apply pressure to their finger and was asked to inform Experimenter 1 when they started feeling pain (not when they started feeling touch). Experimenter 1 asked the participant to look away from their finger and then started tightening the screw slowly and continuously to increase the pressure exerted by the algometer. When the participant reported starting to feel pain, Experimenter 2 wrote down the objective pressure amount displayed on the algometer.

Next, to assess pain tolerance, the participant was told that Experimenter 1 would increase the pressure applied to their finger and was asked to inform Experimenter 1 when they reached the maximum amount of pain they could tolerate. Experimenter 1 started tightening the screw slowly and continuously to increase the amount of pressure exerted by the algometer. When the participant reported feeling the maximum amount of pain they could tolerate, Experimenter 2 wrote down the objective pressure amount displayed on the algometer.

51   Experimenter 1 loosened the screw all the way for the participant to remove their index finger  
52   from the algometer. This concluded the first part of the study.

53           The second part of the study assessed changes in subjective intensity of pain experience  
54   in response to increases in objective amount of physical pressure. After reminding the participant  
55   that they could withdraw from the study at any time, Experimenter 1 told them that increasing  
56   pressure would be applied to the middle finger (as opposed to the index finger in the first part of  
57   the study) of their non-dominant hand and that with each pressure increment, they would  
58   verbally rate their pain intensity on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 being no pain at all and 100 being  
59   the maximum amount of pain.

60           Experimenter 1 asked the participant to position the middle finger of their non-dominant  
61   hand such that the midpoint of the middle phalanx (between the first and second knuckles) was  
62   right underneath the rubber-tipped load shaft of the algometer. Experimenter 1 began by  
63   tightening the screw to reach the objective pressure amount at which the participant started  
64   feeling pain in the first part of the study. Experimenter 1 asked the participant to rate their pain  
65   intensity. Experimenter 2 wrote down the subjective pain intensity rated by the participant and  
66   the objective pressure amount displayed on the algometer.

67           Experimenter 1 tightened the screw of the algometer to increase its exerted pressure by  
68   ~10 ozf and asked the participant to rate their pain intensity. Experimenter 2 wrote down the  
69   subjective pain intensity and the objective pressure amount. This cycle was repeated until one of  
70   the following criteria was met: (1) the objective pressure amount reached 500 ozf, (2) the  
71   participant rated their pain intensity at 100, or (3) the participant opted to withdraw from the  
72   study. Criterion 1 was met for 3 participants, criterion 2 for 229 participants, and criterion 3 for



31 participants. Afterwards, Experimenter 1 loosened the screw all the way for the participant to remove their middle finger from the algometer. This concluded the second part of the study.

Recall that throughout the psychophysical assessment, the algometer was always oriented in such a way that the participant could not see the screen displaying the objective pressure amount (Figure S2). The participant was never informed of the objective pressure amount in any part of the study. That means the participant was only aware of their subjective experience, including the experience of starting to feel pain, the experience of feeling the maximum amount of pain they could tolerate, and the experience of feeling higher intensities of pain with pressure increments. All participants had these subjective experiences without knowing the corresponding objective pressure amounts.

After the psychophysical assessment, Experimenter 2 escorted the participant to a different room and asked them to complete an online survey that included the Pain Sensitivity Questionnaire (Ruscheweyh et al., 2009, 2012; Sellers et al., 2013), attention check, demographic measures, debriefing, and reconsent. The PSQ included 14 items (plus three fillers) that measured the extent to which the participant found an imagined situation painful (e.g., “You grazed your knee falling off your bicycle”) on a 11-point scale ( $0 = \textit{not at all painful}$ ,  $10 = \textit{most severe pain imaginable}$ ). All situations pertained to physical pain. Scores were averaged across the 14 items (Cronbach’s  $\alpha = .90$ ) to create a composite index for analysis.

## Analyses

Simple linear regression was used to test whether higher PSQ scores would predict lower pain tolerance and lower pain threshold assessed in the first part of the study. Multilevel modelling was used to test whether higher PSQ scores would predict overall higher subjective

pain intensity assessed in the second part of the study. It was also used to test whether higher PSQ scores would predict a stronger positive effect of objective pressure amount on subjective pain intensity. Analytic details of multilevel modelling are specified below.

Because objective pressure amount was nested within participants, we used 2-level multilevel models. We ran four models that operationalized objective pressure amount in different ways. In model 1, objective pressure amount was simply standardized across all trials. Subjective pain intensity was thus modelled as a function of PSQ score (level 2; standardized), objective pressure amount (level 1; grand standardized), and the interaction between them (cross-level). Because the predictors were standardized, each coefficient would estimate the effect of increasing the predictor's value by one standard deviation. To facilitate interpretation, we also ran model 2, which was identical to model 1 except that the predictors were mean-centered (rather than standardized) such that each coefficient would estimate the effect of increasing the predictor's value by one raw scale unit (1 ozf for objective pressure amount; 1 point on an 11-point scale for PSQ score).

In model 3, we disentangled the distinct influence of both within-participant and between-participant effects of objective pressure amount, which would allow us to examine whether PSQ score separately interacted with the within-participant and between-participant effects of objective pressure amount (Enders & Tofighi, 2007). To determine the within-participant effect of objective pressure amount (i.e., as it increased from trial to trial) on subjective pain intensity, objective pressure amount was standardized within-participant (level 1). To determine the between-participant effect of objective pressure amount (i.e., as it was higher overall for some participants) on subjective pain intensity, participant-level mean objective pressure amount was standardized between-participant (level 2). Together, subjective

pain intensity was modelled as a function of PSQ score (level 2; standardized), objective pressure amount (level 1; standardized within-participant), objective pressure amount (level 2; standardized between-participant), the interaction between PSQ score and objective pressure amount standardized within-participant (cross-level), and the interaction between PSQ score and objective pressure amount standardized between-participant (level 2). Again, because the predictors were standardized, each coefficient would estimate the effect of increasing the predictor's value by one standard deviation. To facilitate interpretation, we also ran model 4, which was identical to model 3 except that the predictors were mean-centered (rather than standardized) such that each coefficient would estimate the effect of increasing the predictor's value by one raw scale unit.

Each model was fit by REML with an unstructured covariance matrix and Satterthwaite degrees of freedom using the `lmer` function in the `lme4` package v1.1-28 (Bates et al., 2022) and the `lmerTest` package v.3.1-3 (Kuznetsova et al., 2020) in R 4.1.3 (R Core Team, 2022). Given the cross-level interaction term, we modelled a random slope for the level 1 predictor (objective pressure amount) in addition to a random intercept (Aguinis et al., 2013). Across models, the intraclass correlation coefficient suggested that subjective pain intensity was mildly clustered within participants ( $ICC = .128$ ), with 12.8% of the total variance in subjective pain intensity attributable to between-participant variation and 87.2% attributable to within-participant variation. Substantial between-participant variations were found both in overall subjective pain intensity (i.e., random intercept, with its 95% confidence interval excluding zero) and in the within-participant association between objective pressure amount and subjective pain intensity (i.e., random slope of objective pressure amount predicting subjective pain intensity, with its 95% confidence interval excluding zero).

## Results

The four multilevel models found conceptually similar results. Key results are summarized below. Full results are presented in Table S20.

Model 1 found that higher PSQ scores predicted overall higher subjective pain intensity (main effect  $\beta = 15.472$ ,  $SE = 3.516$ ,  $t(230.841) = 4.401$ ,  $p = 1.65\text{e-}5$ ,  $R^2 = .077$ ). Unsurprisingly, higher objective pressure amount predicted higher subjective pain intensity (main effect  $\beta = 65.344$ ,  $SE = 1.929$ ,  $t(215.616) = 33.875$ ,  $p < 2\text{e-}16$ ,  $R^2 = .842$ ). This predictive effect (of objective pressure amount on subjective pain intensity) was amplified by higher PSQ scores (cross-level interaction  $\beta = 4.822$ ,  $SE = 1.936$ ,  $t(215.279) = 2.490$ ,  $p = .0135$ ,  $R^2 = .028$ ), as depicted in Figure S3a. Model 2 found the same pattern of results (Figure S3b), only with different coefficient estimates (as the predictors were mean-centered rather than standardized).

As in models 1–2, model 3 found that higher PSQ scores predicted overall higher subjective pain intensity (main effect  $\beta = 3.012$ ,  $SE = 0.874$ ,  $t(253.266) = 3.446$ ,  $p = 6.65\text{e-}4$ ,  $R^2 = .045$ ). Within-participant trial-to-trial increases in objective pressure amount predicted higher subjective pain intensity (main effect  $\beta = 68.736$ ,  $SE = 2.053$ ,  $t(207.874) = 33.448$ ,  $p < 2\text{e-}16$ ,  $R^2 = .843$ ). This predictive effect (of within-participant trial-to-trial increases in objective pressure amount on subjective pain intensity) was amplified by higher PSQ scores (cross-level interaction  $\beta = 5.314$ ,  $SE = 2.060$ ,  $t(208.234) = 2.580$ ,  $p = 1.05\text{e-}4$ ,  $R^2 = .031$ ), as shown in Figure S3c.

Between-participant variations in overall objective pressure amount did not predict subjective pain intensity (main effect  $\beta = 1.290$ ,  $SE = 0.883$ ,  $t(257.507) = 1.461$ ,  $p = .145$ ,  $R^2 = .008$ ). This non-significant predictive effect (of between-participant variations in overall objective pressure amount on subjective pain intensity) was also not affected by PSQ scores (level 2 interaction  $\beta =$

-0.148,  $SE = 0.811$ ,  $t(254.206) = -0.182$ ,  $p = .856$ ,  $R^2 = 0$ ). Model 4 found the same pattern of results (Figure S3d), only with different coefficient estimates (as the predictors were mean-centered rather than standardized).

In short, multilevel modelling analyses found that higher PSQ scores predicted overall higher subjective pain intensity and steeper increases in subjective pain intensity as a result of within-participant trial-to-trial increases in objective pressure amount. In addition, simple linear regression found that higher PSQ scores predicted lower pain tolerance ( $\beta = -0.165$ ,  $SE = 0.063$ ,  $t(252) = -2.640$ ,  $p = .0088$ ,  $R^2 = .0269$ ). Similar to prior findings (Ruscheweyh et al., 2009), higher PSQ scores did not significantly predict lower pain threshold despite the marginal trend ( $\beta = -0.108$ ,  $SE = 0.062$ ,  $t(260) = -1.747$ ,  $p = .0818$ ,  $R^2 = .0116$ ).

## **Pain Sensitivity Predicts Moral Views (Studies 1a–1c)**

### ***Method***

#### **Studies 1a (Exploratory) and 1b (Direct Replication)**

##### ***Participants***

**Study 1a.** Adults in the U.S. were recruited on May 13, 2019 through Amazon Mechanical Turk to complete a multi-part exploratory survey. Our data collection targeted a sample size of roughly 1,000 participants with useable data. In total, 950 participants ( $M_{age} = 36.05$ ,  $SD_{age} = 10.81$ ) completed the survey and provided reconsent (248 others did not) and passed the attention check (8 others did not) and problematic response patterns check (123 others did not). Most participants indicated their gender as “woman” ( $n = 440$ ) or “man” ( $n = 500$ ), and only 10 indicated “something else” ( $n = 2$ ), “prefer not to say” ( $n = 3$ ), or skipped this question ( $n = 5$ ). For all analyses involving gender as a variable, we reported results based on women and

men only; including the other 10 participants would not change any of the conclusions. In terms of political orientation ( $M = 4.87$ ,  $SD = 2.64$ ), 405 participants were left of center ( $M = 2.27$ ,  $SD = 1.11$ ), 404 right of center ( $M = 7.45$ ,  $SD = 1.10$ ), 115 at center, and 26 skipped this question.

**Study 1b.** Adults in the U.S. were recruited on October 6–7, 2020 through Prolific. Our data collection targeted an initial sample size of roughly 500 participants with useable data, after which we would examine the distribution of liberals and conservatives and balance them out by continuing recruitment of participants on the less-represented side of the ideological spectrum. In total, 686 participants ( $M_{age} = 34.20$ ,  $SD_{age} = 12.82$ ) completed the survey and provided reconsent (46 others did not) and passed the attention check (15 others did not) and problematic response patterns check (38 others did not). Most participants indicated their gender as “woman” ( $n = 366$ ) or “man” ( $n = 309$ ), and only 11 indicated “something else” ( $n = 1$ ), “prefer not to say” ( $n = 8$ ), or skipped this question ( $n = 2$ ). For all analyses involving gender as a variable, we reported results based on women and men only; including the other 11 participants would not change any of the conclusions. In terms of political orientation ( $M = 4.87$ ,  $SD = 2.68$ ), 287 participants were left of center ( $M = 2.18$ ,  $SD = 1.06$ ), 288 right of center ( $M = 7.50$ ,  $SD = 1.06$ ), 84 at center, and 27 skipped this question.

## Measures

**Moral Foundations Questionnaire.** The MFQ (Graham et al., 2011) included 15 items that measured the extent to which participants considered something relevant to their judgments of right and wrong (e.g., “Whether or not someone acted unfairly”) on a 6-point scale ( $0 = not at all relevant$ ,  $5 = extremely relevant$ ) and 15 items that measured the extent to which participants supported a moral belief or attitude (e.g., “Compassion for those who are suffering is the most

crucial virtue”) on a 6-point scale ( $0 = \text{strongly disagree}$ ,  $5 = \text{strongly agree}$ ). Two additional filler items were included as in the original MFQ. Each of the 30 items tapped into participants’ endorsement of one of the five moral foundations (care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation). For each moral foundation, a *relevance* score was operationalized as the average score across the three “relevant” items, and a *support* score was operationalized as the average score across the three “support” items.

**Pain Sensitivity Questionnaire.** As described in the *Method* section of the psychophysical validation study, the PSQ (Ruscheweyh et al., 2009, 2012; Sellers et al., 2013) included 14 items (plus three fillers) that measured the extent to which participants found an imagined situation painful (e.g., “You grazed your knee falling off your bicycle”) on a 11-point scale ( $0 = \text{not at all painful}$ ,  $10 = \text{most severe pain imaginable}$ ). All situations pertained to physical pain. Pain sensitivity was operationalized as the average score across all 14 items.

**Disgust Scale.** The DS (Haidt et al., 1994) was chosen because the original demonstration of the link between disgust sensitivity and political conservatism (Inbar et al., 2009) used the same scale (shortened version in their study 1, full version in their study 2). The DS used in our Study 1a included 16 items that measured how participants felt about a potentially disgust-eliciting situation (e.g., “It bothers me to hear someone clear a throat full of mucus”) on a 2-point scale (*agree*, *disagree*) and 15 items that measured the extent to which participants found a situation disgusting (e.g., “You see a bowel movement left unflushed in a public bathroom”) on a 3-point scale (*not disgusting*, *slightly disgusting*, *disgusting*). One item from the original DS was missing in Study 1a due to a clerical error but included in Study 1b, where the scale labels were also revised (first part of the scale: *true*, *false*; second part of the scale: *not disgusting at all*, *slightly disgusting*, *very disgusting*). Disgust sensitivity was

operationalized by coding the first part of the scale (0 = no disgust reaction, 1 = disgust reaction) and the second part of the scale (0 = no disgust reaction, 0.5 = slight disgust reaction, 1 = disgust reaction) on the same scale range, then averaging scores across all but four items that were pre-determined for exclusion due to their relevance to sexual morality (“I think it is immoral for someone to seek sexual pleasure from animals”; “I think homosexual activities are immoral”; “As part of a sex education class, you are required to inflate a new lubricated condom, using your mouth”; “You hear about a 30-year-old man who seeks sexual relationships with 80-year-old women”). Including these four items that tapped into moral disgust would have artifactually inflated the associative effects of physical disgust sensitivity with moral foundations.

**Emotion Reactivity Scale.** 21 items (Nock et al., 2008) measured the extent to which participants considered their emotional reactions to be sensitive, intense, and persistent in general (e.g., “I tend to get very emotional very easily”) on a 4-point scale (*not at all like me, somewhat unlike me, somewhat like me, completely like me*). Emotion reactivity was operationalized as the average score across all items.

**State-Trait Anxiety Inventory.** 20 items (Spielberger, 2012) measured state anxiety (e.g., “I feel nervous”) on a 4-point scale (*not at all, somewhat, moderately so, very much so*) and 19 items measured trait anxiety (e.g., “I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter”) on a 4-point scale (*almost never, sometimes, often, almost always*). One original trait item was missing due to a clerical error in Study 1a but included in Study 1b. Scores across all items were averaged to form the overall index of anxiety.

**Trait Anger Scale.** 15 items (Spielberger et al., 1983) measured the frequency with which participants felt angry (e.g., “It makes me furious when I am criticized in front of others”) on a 4-point scale (*almost never, sometimes, often, almost always*). Scores across all items were



averaged to form the overall index of anger.

**Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy.** 31 items (Reniers et al., 2011)

measured the frequency and ease with which participants experienced cognitive (e.g., “I can easily work out what another person might want to talk about”) and affective empathy (e.g., “I am happy when I am with a cheerful group and sad when the others are glum”) on a 6-point scale (from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*). Scores across all items were averaged to form the overall index of empathy.

**Study 1c (Preregistered Conceptual Replication)**

***Participants***

Adults in the U.S. were recruited on January 6–12, 2021 through Prolific. Our data collection followed the preregistered plan, which determined the required sample size by a priori power analysis (target  $N$  of useable data = 1,131 based on  $\alpha = 0.05$ , power = 0.80, partial  $r^2 = 0.006926$  = the smallest effect size in Study 1a among those of interest within budgetary constraints, namely, the interaction effect of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation on the relevance of loyalty/betrayal) and an expected attrition rate of 10% (target  $N$  of recruitment =  $1,131 / 90\% = 1,257$ ). We also followed the preregistered sampling strategy (adapted from prior research; Camerer et al., 2018), examined the distribution of liberals and conservatives after initial data collection, and balanced them out by continuing recruitment of participants on the less-represented side of the ideological spectrum. In total, 1,313 participants ( $M_{age} = 36.37$ ,  $SD_{age} = 14.24$ ) completed the survey and provided reconsent (61 others did not) and passed the preregistered attention check (27 others did not) and preregistered problematic response patterns check (10 others did not). Most participants indicated their gender as “woman” ( $n = 669$ ) or

“man” ( $n = 598$ ), and only 16 indicated “prefer not to say” ( $n = 14$ ) or skipped this question ( $n = 2$ ). For all analyses involving gender as a variable, we reported results based on women and men only; including the other 16 participants would not change any of the conclusions. In terms of political orientation ( $M = 4.77$ ,  $SD = 2.80$ ), 583 participants were left of center ( $M = 2.09$ ,  $SD = 1.10$ ), 554 right of center ( $M = 7.54$ ,  $SD = 1.11$ ), 123 at center, and 53 skipped this question.

## **Measures**

Study 1c included the same Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011) and PSQ (Ruscheweyh et al., 2009, 2012; Sellers et al., 2013) as in Studies 1a and 1b, but a psychometrically improved version of the Disgust Scale.

**Disgust Scale – Revised.** Studies 1a–1b used the original Disgust Scale, as in the original demonstration of the link between disgust sensitivity and political conservatism (Inbar et al., 2009). Subsequent psychometric research (van Overveld et al., 2011) recommended the use of the “Disgust Scale - Revised” (Olatunji et al., 2007), which we used in Study 1c to ensure robustness of results. The DS-R included many of the same items from the original DS but used different response scales. Specifically, it included 14 items that measured how participants felt about a potentially disgust-eliciting situation (e.g., “It bothers me to hear someone clear a throat full of mucus”) on a 5-point scale [ $0 = \text{strongly disagree (very untrue about me)}$ ,  $2 = \text{neither agree nor disagree}$ ,  $4 = \text{strongly agree (very true about me)}$ ] and 13 items that measured the extent to which participants found a situation disgusting (e.g., “You see maggots on a piece of meat in an outdoor garbage pail”) on a 5-point scale ( $0 = \text{not disgusting at all}$ ,  $4 = \text{extremely disgusting}$ ). Disgust sensitivity was operationalized as the average score across all items, except one that was pre-determined for exclusion due to its relevance to sexual morality (“As part of a

sex education class, you are required to inflate a new unlubricated condom, using your mouth”) and two filler items (“I would rather eat a piece of fruit than a piece of paper”; “You see a person eating an apple with a knife and fork”).

### *Analyses*

In addition to the analyses reported in the article, zero-order correlations are available in Table S21.

## **Pain Sensitivity Predicts Political Views (Studies 2a–2b)**

### *Method*

#### **Study 2a (Exploratory): Pre-Election Primary Data Collection**

##### *Participants*

Adults in the U.S. were recruited on October 10–15, 2020 through Prolific. Our data collection targeted a sample size of roughly 1,000 participants with useable data, with the distribution of liberals and conservatives balanced out by continuing recruitment of participants on the less-represented side of the ideological spectrum. In total, 1,007 participants ( $M_{age} = 40.28$ ,  $SD_{age} = 15.53$ ) completed the survey and provided reconsent (26 others did not) and passed the attention check (19 others did not) and problematic response patterns check (14 others did not). 3 other participants were excluded for repeated completion of the study. Most participants indicated their gender as “woman” ( $n = 484$ ) or “man” ( $n = 507$ ), and only 16 indicated “prefer not to say” ( $n = 11$ ) or skipped this question ( $n = 5$ ). Political orientation was measured the same way as in Studies 1a–1c. We also asked participants, “What is your political affiliation?” with the response options “Democrat,” “Republican,” “Independent,” and “Other

(Please Specify): \_\_\_\_.” In terms of political orientation ( $M = 4.79$ ,  $SD = 2.72$ ), 455 participants were left of center ( $M = 2.15$ ,  $SD = 1.11$ ), 434 right of center ( $M = 7.50$ ,  $SD = 1.10$ ), 116 at center, and 2 skipped this question. In terms of political affiliation, 389 indicated Democrat, 356 Republican, 222 independent, 39 other, and 1 skipped this question.

### **Measures**

**Attitudes Toward Political Issues with Item-Specific Scale Labels.** For 15 issues (adapted from prior research; Day et al., 2014; Feinberg & Willer, 2015; Koleva et al., 2012; Qian & Yahara, 2020), participants were asked to “Please select the attitude that comes closest to your views on \_\_\_\_” (e.g., abortion, illegal immigrants). Responses were made on a 7-point scale, with item-specific scale labels, some of which showed typically conservative attitudes on the higher end and others showed typically liberal attitudes on the higher end (Table S22). The latter category of items was reverse-scored such that higher scores would always indicate more conservative attitudes.

**Attitudes Toward Political Issues with Items-General Scale Labels.** For 10 issues (adapted from prior research; Christie et al., 2019; Feinberg & Willer, 2015; Franks & Scherr, 2019; Frimer et al., 2017; Monroe et al., 2020), participants were asked to “Please rate the extent to which you support or oppose each of the following” on a 7-point scale ( $-3 = \textit{strongly oppose}$ ,  $3 = \textit{strongly support}$ ) (Table S22). Some issues were typically supported by conservatives (e.g., war in Afghanistan) and others by liberals (e.g., legalization of marijuana). The latter category of items was reverse-scored such that higher scores would always indicate more conservative attitudes.

**Generic Voting Likelihood.** 3 items (in fixed order) asked participants to indicate their

likelihood of voting for a liberal, a conservative, or an independent political candidate (Table S23) on a 7-point scale (from *extremely unlikely* to *extremely likely*).

**Support for Political Figures.** Participants were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with 3 statements for each of 11 leading political figures (Table S24) on a 7-point scale (from *strongly disagree* to *strongly agree*) plus an option of *I do not know this person*. Using Donald Trump as an example here, the 3 statements were “I support Donald Trump,” “I approve of Donald Trump’s performance in the administration of his job,” and “I support the political issues that Donald Trump stands for.” For each political figure, the 3 statements had high internal reliability and were thus averaged to form the overall index of support.

**Intended Voting Preference.** Participants were asked, “Who do you intend to vote for in the upcoming presidential election?” Options included “Donald Trump,” “Joe Biden,” “Other (please specify): \_\_,” “I haven’t decided yet,” and “No one.” The vast majority of participants indicated Trump or Biden (Table S8), so our analysis focused on these two options.

**Hypothetical Voting Preference.** Participants were asked an exploratory open-ended question, “Hypothetically, imagine you could vote for anyone in the upcoming presidential election, regardless of whether they are currently in the running. Who would you vote for?” (Table S25).

**Pain Sensitivity Questionnaire.** We used the same PSQ (Ruscheweyh et al., 2009, 2012; Sellers et al., 2013) as in Studies 1a–1c and scored it the same way.

## Study 2a (Exploratory): Post-Election Brief Data Collection

### *Participants*

On November 4, 2020 (right after November 3 the Election Day), we recruited all original participants to complete a brief post-election survey. To ensure timeliness, our data collection was planned such that we would close the survey either 5 days after posting it or when all of the original participants had responded to the invite, whichever would happen first. In the end, we concluded data collection on November 9, 2020. 723 of the 1,007 original participants (71.8%) completed the survey and provided reconsent (17 others did not) and passed the attention check (14 others did not). 2 others were excluded for repeated completion of the study.

### ***Measures***

**Actual Voting Preference.** Participants were asked, “Who did you vote for in the 2020 presidential election?” Options included “Donald Trump,” “Joe Biden,” “Other (please specify): \_\_\_\_\_,” “Couldn’t decide,” and “No one.” Again, the vast majority of participants indicated Trump or Biden (Table S8), so our analysis focused on these two options.

**Hypothetical Voting Preference.** Participants were asked an exploratory open-ended question, “Hypothetically, imagine you could vote for anyone in the 2020 presidential election, regardless of whether they were or were not actually in the running. Who would you vote for?” (Table S25).

### **Study 2b (Preregistered Replication)**

#### ***Participants***

Adults in the U.S. were recruited on July 15–17, 2021 through Prolific. Our data collection followed the preregistered plan, which determined the required sample size by a priori power analysis (target  $N$  of useable data = 759 based on  $\alpha = 0.05$ , power = 0.80, partial  $r =$

0.1015294 = the smallest effect size in Study 2a among those of interest here, namely, the interaction effect of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation on the likelihood of voting for a conservative political candidate) and an expected attrition rate of 10% (target  $N$  of recruitment = 759 / 90% = 843). We also followed the preregistered sampling strategy such that after initial data collection, we examined the distribution of liberals and conservatives and balanced them out by continuing recruitment of participants on the less-represented side of the ideological spectrum. In total, 1,022 participants ( $M_{age} = 35.17$ ,  $SD_{age} = 11.83$ ) completed the survey and provided reconsent (6 others did not) and passed the preregistered attention check (47 others did not) and preregistered problematic response patterns check (165 others did not). 3 others were excluded for repeated completion of the study. Most participants indicated their gender as “woman” ( $n = 426$ ) or “man” ( $n = 572$ ), and only 24 indicated “something else” ( $n = 6$ ), “prefer not to say” ( $n = 10$ ), or skipped this question ( $n = 8$ ). Political orientation was measured the same way as in Studies 1a–2a. We also asked, “What is your political affiliation?” with the response options “Democrat,” “Republican,” “Independent,” and “Other (Please Specify): \_\_\_\_.” In terms of political orientation ( $M = 5.01$ ,  $SD = 2.56$ ), 424 participants were left of center ( $M = 2.39$ ,  $SD = 1.06$ ), 453 right of center ( $M = 7.47$ ,  $SD = 1.07$ ), 138 at center, and 7 skipped this question. In terms of political affiliation, 485 indicated Democrat, 267 Republican, 230 independent, 33 other, and 7 skipped this question.

### Testing the Process: Perception of Harm (Study 3, Preregistered)

#### *Method*

##### **Participants**

Adults in the U.S. were recruited on September 28–October 5, 2021 through Prolific. Our data collection followed the preregistered plan, which involved a multi-stage strategy of sample size determination based on power analyses (see next section). Given our focus on moderated mediation, we used the *lavaan* package v0.6-10 (Rosseel et al., 2022) in R 4.1.3 (R Core Team, 2022) to compute indices of moderated mediation from pilot data, and then the *simsem* package v0.5-16 (Jorgensen et al., 2021) to run simulations for power estimation (final target  $N$  of useable data = 1,645 based on  $\alpha = 0.05$ , power = 0.80, and index of moderated mediation = -0.0192). With an expected attrition rate of 10%, target  $N$  of recruitment =  $1,645 / 90\% = 1,828$ . We also followed the preregistered sampling strategy such that after initial data collection, we examined the distribution of liberals and conservatives and balanced them out by continuing recruitment of participants on the less-represented side of the ideological spectrum. In total, 1,658 participants ( $M_{age} = 33.35$ ,  $SD_{age} = 11.06$ ) completed the survey and provided reconsent (17 others did not) and passed the preregistered attention check (172 others did not) and preregistered problematic response patterns check (381 others did not). Most participants indicated their gender as “female” ( $n = 760$ ) or “male” ( $n = 878$ ), and only 20 indicated “other” ( $n = 14$ ) or skipped this question ( $n = 6$ ). Political orientation was measured the same way as in Studies 1a–2b. We also asked, “What is your political affiliation?” with the response options “Democrat,” “Republican,” “Independent,” and “Other (Please Specify): \_\_\_\_.” In terms of political orientation ( $M = 4.95$ ,  $SD = 2.77$ ), 717 participants were left of center ( $M = 2.26$ ,  $SD = 1.08$ ), 705 right of center ( $M = 7.66$ ,  $SD = 1.10$ ), 145 at center, and 91 skipped this question. In terms of political affiliation, 834 indicated Democrat, 406 Republican, 356 independent, 55 other, and 7 skipped this question.

#### **Preregistered Multi-Stage Data Collection**



Our data collection followed the preregistered plan, which involved a multi-stage strategy of sample size determination adapted from prior research (Camerer et al., 2018): If the preregistered hypotheses were supported in the first stage, we concluded data collection; if not, we proceeded to the second stage. If the preregistered hypotheses were supported in the second stage, we concluded data collection; if not, we proceeded to the third stage, after which we concluded data collection.

Across stages, sample sizes were determined by a priori power analyses based on  $\alpha = 0.05$ , power = 0.80, and an index of moderated mediation. We chose the index of moderated mediation with the smallest absolute value (-0.024) among the significant effects of interest in a pilot study embedded in a larger exploratory survey within budgetary constraints, namely, the index of moderated mediation where political orientation moderated the path from pain sensitivity to perceived harm in violations of authority/subversion, which in turn predicted support for authority/subversion. The first stage of our power analysis assumed 100% of the original index (-0.024). The second stage assumed 90% of the original index ( $90\% * -0.024 = -0.0216$ ). The third stage assumed 80% of the original index ( $80\% * -0.024 = -0.0192$ ). Based on these power analyses, target *N*s of useable data by the end of the first, second, and third stages were 1,055, 1,256, and 1,645, respectively. With an expected attrition rate of 10%, target *N*s of recruitment (= target *N*s of useable data / 90%) by the end of the first, second, and third stages were 1,172, 1,396, and 1,828, respectively.

## Measures

**Perceived Harm in Violations of and Disagreements with Moral Foundations.** We modified each original item in the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011) to

assess participants' perceived harm in behavioral violations of and attitudinal disagreements with  
 each moral foundation. For example, one original item in the MFQ asked participants to indicate  
 the extent to which they considered "Whether or not someone acted unfairly" to be relevant to  
 their judgments of right and wrong (*0 = not at all relevant, 5 = extremely relevant*). We  
 modified the item into a behavioral violation by removing the expression "Whether or not" and  
 asking participants to indicate the extent to which they perceived harm in "Someone acted  
 unfairly" (*0 = no harm at all, 5 = very severe harm*). Another original item in the MFQ asked  
 participants to indicate the extent to which they agreed that "Compassion for those who are  
 suffering is the most crucial virtue" (*0 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree*). We modified the  
 item into an attitudinal disagreement: "Person A **DISAGREES** with the following statement:  
 'Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue.' To what extent do you  
 perceive harm in Person A's view?" (*0 = no harm at all, 5 = very severe harm*). The same  
 structural modifications were made to all original items in the MFQ, rendering a total of 32  
 modified items (Table S26).

#### **Perceived Harm in Liberal Attitude and in Conservative Attitude Toward**

**Contentious Political Issues.** Recall that in an earlier part of the study, participants had rated  
 their own attitudes toward 10 contentious political issues, five with item-specific scale labels and  
 five with items-general scale labels. In this part of the study, we turned each scale label into a  
 stand-alone political view (see next paragraph). We assessed the extent to which participants  
 perceived each political view to be a harmful view (*0 = no harm at all, 5 = very severe harm*).

As an example of the issues with item-specific scale labels, participants read, "Person E  
**AGREES** with the following statement: 'The government should decrease the current  
 restrictions because global warming is a theory that has not yet been proven.' To what extent do

you perceive harm in Person E’s view?” and “Person F **AGREES** with the following statement: ‘The government should increase restrictions on emissions from cars and industrial facilities such as power plants and factories in an attempt to reduce the effects of global warming.’ To what extent do you perceive harm in Person F’s view?” As an example of the issues with item-general scale labels, participants read, “Person S **SUPPORTS** universal health care. To what extent do you perceive harm in Person S’s view?” and “Person T **OPPOSES** universal health care. To what extent do you perceive harm in Person T’s view?”

The same structural modifications were made to all 10 contentious political issues, rendering 20 items that assessed participants’ perceived harm in the liberal attitude and in the conservative attitude toward each issue (Table S27). To simplify analyses, for each issue, the difference score (perceived harm in the liberal attitude minus perceived harm in the conservative attitude;  $PH_{lib-con}$ ) served as the preregistered measure of interest. We also conducted additional analyses that separately examined perceived harm in the liberal attitude and perceived harm in the conservative attitude, which showed conceptually the same results as the difference score (see *Results*).

## Lay Intuitions about Pain Sensitivity (Study 4, Descriptive)

### *Method*

#### **Participants**

Adults in the U.S. were recruited on October 30–31, 2020 through Prolific. Our data collection targeted a sample size of roughly 600 participants with useable data. We chose this sample size because this was a purely descriptive study, with three conditions, and we aimed to have roughly 200 participants per condition in order to obtain reasonably confident estimates of

lay intuitions about pain sensitivity in each condition. With an expected attrition rate of 20%, target  $N$  of recruitment was  $600 / 80\% = 750$ . In total, 724 participants ( $M_{age} = 32.31$ ,  $SD_{age} = 12.13$ ) completed the survey and provided reconsent (129 others did not) and passed the attention check (35 others did not) and problematic response patterns check (5 others did not). Most participants indicated their gender as “woman” ( $n = 361$ ) or “man” ( $n = 349$ ), and only 14 indicated “something else” ( $n = 1$ ), “prefer not to say” ( $n = 10$ ), or skipped this question ( $n = 3$ ).

## Materials

For clear understanding of our operationalizations, we describe the survey below by retaining its formatting features.

**Information about Pain Sensitivity.** Participants were first told that “The following items are examples from a measure of **SENSITIVITY TO PHYSICAL PAIN**. If a person responds to the following items with generally high ratings, they are **high on sensitivity to physical pain**. If a person responds to the following items with generally low ratings, they are **low on sensitivity to physical pain**.” Then, participants read the instructions and six sample items (in fixed order) of the Pain Sensitivity Questionnaire. Next, they were asked to “please imagine a [person] who responded to the items with generally high ratings. We are interested in your impression of the [person] with high sensitivity to physical pain (compared with a [person] with low sensitivity to physical pain). How do you think this person would respond to the following questionnaires?” The text in the [person] placeholder was either “person,” “politically liberal person,” or “politically conservative person.” As noted in the study overview, this manipulation (with three between-participant conditions) allowed us to examine lay

530 intuitions about the interaction effects of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation in two ways (see  
 531 **Analyses** below).

532 **Expected Moral Foundations of a Pain-Sensitive Person.** Participants read, “Part 1.  
 533 When a [person] with high sensitivity to physical pain (compared with a [person] with low  
 534 sensitivity to physical pain) decides whether something is right or wrong, to what extent do you  
 535 think the following considerations are likely to be more relevant, or less relevant, to their  
 536 thinking?” Participants rated the 15 items about relevance to morality (plus 1 filler item) in the  
 537 Moral Foundations Questionnaire on a 7-point scale ( $-3 = \textit{much less relevant to judgments of}$   
 538 *right and wrong by a [person] with high sensitivity to physical pain (than a [person] with low*  
 539 *sensitivity to physical pain)*,  $0 = \textit{about equally relevant...}$ ,  $+3 = \textit{much more relevant...}$ ).  
 540 Afterwards, participants read, “Part 2. To what extent do you think the following statements are  
 541 likely to be agreed or disagreed more by a [person] with high sensitivity to physical pain (than  
 542 a [person] with low sensitivity to physical pain)?” Participants rated the 15 MFQ items about  
 543 moral belief or attitude (plus 1 filler item) on a 7-point scale ( $-3 = \textit{disagreed much more by a}$   
 544 *[person] with high sensitivity to physical pain (than a [person] with low sensitivity to physical*  
 545 *pain)*,  $0 = \textit{agreed or disagreed about equally...}$ ,  $+3 = \textit{agreed much more...}$ ).

546 **Expected Political Orientation of a Pain-Sensitive Person.** Participants were asked to  
 547 “Please indicate the extent to which you think a [person] with high sensitivity to physical pain  
 548 (compared with a [person] with low sensitivity to physical pain) is likely to be more politically  
 549 liberal or conservative” on a 9-point scale ( $1 = \textit{much more liberal}$ ,  $5 = \textit{about the same}$ ,  $9 = \textit{much}$   
 550 *more conservative}*).

551 **Expected Voting Preference of a Pain-Sensitive Person.** Participants were asked,  
 552 “Who do you think a [person] with HIGH sensitivity to physical pain is likely to vote for in

the presidential election?” Options included “Donald Trump,” “Joe Biden,” “Other (please specify): \_\_\_\_,” “Undecided,” and “No one.” Participants were also asked, “Who do you think a [person] with **LOW** sensitivity to physical pain is likely to vote for in the presidential election?” (with the same available options). Asking both questions made it possible to compare expected voting preferences of a [person] with high pain sensitivity vs. a [person] with low pain sensitivity. Next, participants were asked to “Please indicate the extent to which you think a [person] with high sensitivity to physical pain (compared with a [person] with low sensitivity to physical pain) is more or less likely to vote for...” a liberal, a conservative, and an independent political candidate (in fixed order) on a 7-point scale ( $-3 = \text{much less likely}$ ,  $0 = \text{about equally likely}$ ,  $+3 = \text{much more likely}$ ).

**Expected Support for Political Figures of a Pain-Sensitive Person.** Participants were asked to “Please indicate the extent to which you think each of the following politicians and the political issues they stand for are more approved/supported or disapproved/opposed by a [person] with high sensitivity to physical pain (compared with a [person] with low sensitivity to physical pain)” on a 7-point scale ( $-3 = \text{disapproved/opposed much more}$ ,  $0 = \text{approved/supported or disapproved/opposed about equally}$ ,  $+3 = \text{approved/supported much more}$ ) plus an option of *I do not know this person*. The same 11 political figures as in Studies 2a–2b were presented.

**Expected Attitudes Toward Political Issues of a Pain-Sensitive Person.** Participants were presented with the 10 political issues used in Studies 2b–3 (Table S28). For 5 of the political issues, two issue-specific attitudes were provided, and participants were asked to rate the extent to which a pain-sensitive [person]’s attitude was closer to either attitude on a 7-point scale. For the other 5 political issues, participants were asked to rate the extent to which each

issue was likely to be more supported or opposed by a [person] with high pain sensitivity than a [person] with low pain sensitivity, on an issue-general 7-point scale.

#### **Comparison with Expected Political Orientation of a Disgust-Sensitive Person.**

Given prior research on the association between disgust sensitivity and political orientation, we were also interested in exploring the comparison between lay intuitions about the political orientation of a pain-sensitive [person] and lay intuitions about the political orientation of a disgust-sensitive [person]. Therefore, participants were asked to imagine a [person] with high sensitivity to physical disgust by reading the same kind of information as when we asked them to imagine a [person] with high sensitivity to physical pain, except that here the word “pain” was replaced by “disgust” and the Pain Sensitivity Questionnaire was replaced by the Disgust Scale. Then participants were asked to rate their expected political orientation of a [person] with high (vs. low) sensitivity to physical disgust (*1 = much more liberal, 5 = about the same, 9 = much more conservative*).

In addition to examining lay intuitions about how pain sensitivity and disgust sensitivity were associated with political orientation, we also examined lay intuitions about the strength of these associations by asking participants, “To what extent do you think **sensitivity to physical PAIN** is associated with political orientation?” and “To what extent do you think **sensitivity to physical DISGUST** is associated with political orientation?” (*0 = not associated at all, 6 = extremely associated*).

To explore whether participants might form different demographic impressions of the imagined pain-sensitive person and disgust-sensitive person, participants were first asked to “Recall the hypothetical **[person] with high sensitivity to physical PAIN**” and report this person’s age, gender, race/ethnicity, and socioeconomic status (in fixed order). For each

demographic variable, “If [it] was entirely absent from your impression of the hypothetical person, please select ‘N/A’.” Then participants did the same thing for “the hypothetical person with high sensitivity to physical DISGUST.”

### *Results*

Beyond the primary results reported in the article, we also explored the comparison between lay intuitions about the political orientation of a pain-sensitive target and lay intuitions about the political orientation of a disgust-sensitive target. Participants incorrectly expected that a target with higher pain sensitivity was more likely to be politically liberal,  $t(637) = -2.9292$ ,  $p = .00352$ , but correctly expected that a target with higher disgust sensitivity was more likely to be politically conservative,  $t(666) = 4.7973$ ,  $p = 1.986\text{e-}6$ . Participants expected the strength of association with political orientation to be stronger for pain sensitivity ( $M = 2.70$ ,  $SD = 1.62$ ) than for disgust sensitivity ( $M = 2.18$ ,  $SD = 1.73$ ),  $t(722) = 9.6266$ ,  $p < 2.2\text{e-}16$ . When participants imagined a pain-sensitive target and a disgust-sensitive target, they formed comparable demographic impressions in terms of age ( $p = .5796$ ), gender ( $p = .0546$ ), race/ethnicity ( $p = .9761$ ), and socioeconomic status ( $p = .9996$ ), suggesting that participants’ different lay intuitions about pain sensitivity and disgust sensitivity were not due to different demographic inferences.



# SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES

**Table S1**

*Interaction Effects of Pain Sensitivity × Political Orientation on Support for and Relevance of Moral Foundations in Study 1a*

Outcome	Interaction Effect of Pain Sensitivity × Political Orientation on Outcome					Effect of Pain Sensitivity on Outcome			
						Among conservatives		Among liberals	
	$\beta$	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	$\beta$	<i>p</i>	$\beta$	<i>p</i>
<i>Support for moral foundation</i>									
Care/Harm	0.07	0.03	2.21	920	.027	0.38	< .001	0.23	< .001
Fairness/Cheating	0.20	0.03	6.67	920	< .001	0.54	< .001	0.12	.033
Loyalty/Betrayal	-0.07	0.03	-2.91	920	.004	0.40	< .001	0.50	< .001
Authority/Subversion	-0.15	0.03	-5.62	920	< .001	0.20	< .001	0.45	< .001
Sanctity/Degradation	-0.16	0.03	-6.00	920	< .001	0.23	< .001	0.48	< .001
<i>Relevance of moral foundation</i>									
Care/Harm	0.10	0.03	3.19	920	.001	0.23	< .001	-0.01	.827
Fairness/Cheating	0.12	0.03	3.55	920	< .001	0.25	< .001	-0.03	.573
Loyalty/Betrayal	-0.04	0.03	-1.50	920	.134	0.40	< .001	0.42	< .001
Authority/Subversion	-0.06	0.03	-2.32	920	.020	0.37	< .001	0.45	< .001
Sanctity/Degradation	-0.12	0.03	-4.38	920	< .001	0.30	< .001	0.47	< .001

*Note.* If we used the more stringent criterion of Bonferroni-corrected  $\alpha = 0.05 / 10$  interaction effects of interest = 0.005, the interaction effects of pain sensitivity × political orientation remained significant on attitudinal support for four of the five moral foundations ( $ps \leq .00369$ ) and on perceived relevance of three of the five moral foundations ( $ps \leq 0.00147$ ). Graphical depiction is available in Figure 2.

Table S2

Interaction Effects of Pain Sensitivity  $\times$  Political Orientation on Support for and Relevance of

Moral Foundations in Study 1b

Outcome	Interaction Effect of Pain Sensitivity $\times$ Political Orientation on Outcome					Effect of Pain Sensitivity on Outcome			
	$\beta$	SE	t	df	p	Among conservatives		Among liberals	
						$\beta$	p	$\beta$	p
<i>Support for moral foundation</i>									
Care/Harm	0.07	0.04	1.88	655	.060	0.37	< .001	0.17	.003
Fairness/Cheating	0.19	0.03	5.79	655	< .001	0.52	< .001	0.14	.010
Loyalty/Betrayal	-0.11	0.03	-3.81	655	< .001	0.31	< .001	0.51	< .001
Authority/Subversion	-0.16	0.03	-5.69	655	< .001	0.15	< .001	0.47	< .001
Sanctity/Degradation	-0.14	0.03	-4.65	655	< .001	0.22	< .001	0.49	< .001
<i>Relevance of moral foundation</i>									
Care/Harm	0.11	0.04	2.94	655	.003	0.12	.033	-0.11	.070
Fairness/Cheating	0.16	0.04	4.39	655	< .001	0.20	< .001	-0.09	.110
Loyalty/Betrayal	-0.03	0.03	-0.99	655	.324	0.25	< .001	0.36	< .001
Authority/Subversion	-0.07	0.03	-2.12	655	.034	0.28	< .001	0.46	< .001
Sanctity/Degradation	-0.07	0.03	-2.01	655	.045	0.21	< .001	0.34	< .001

631

632 Note. Graphical depiction is available in Figure 3.

633 **Table S3**

634 *Hierarchical Regressions of Support for and Relevance of Moral Foundations on the Interaction*  
 635 *Effect of Pain Sensitivity  $\times$  Political Orientation and Their Main Effects (Step 1), Together with*  
 636 *Control Predictors (Step 2), in Study 1b*

Predictor	Care/Harm		Fairness/Cheating		Loyalty/Betrayal		Authority/Subversion		Sanctity/Degradation	
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2
<i>Support for moral foundation</i>										
<b>Pain Sensitivity <math>\times</math></b>	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>0.05</b>	<b>0.19***</b>	<b>0.17***</b>	<b>-0.11***</b>	<b>-0.10***</b>	<b>-0.16***</b>	<b>-0.16***</b>	<b>-0.14***</b>	<b>-0.14***</b>
<b>Political Orientation</b>	<b>(0.04)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>
Pain Sensitivity	0.31***	0.21***	0.35***	0.28***	0.39***	0.33***	0.30***	0.24***	0.36***	0.26***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Political Orientation	-0.17***	-0.12**	-0.35***	-0.37***	0.44***	0.39***	0.55***	0.53***	0.48***	0.47***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Disgust Sensitivity		0.18***		0.08*		0.07*		0.06		0.20***
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Emotion Reactivity		0.08		0.15**		0.11*		0.05		0.06
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.05)
Anxiety		-0.03		-0.01		-0.18***		-0.16***		-0.10*
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Anger		-0.08		-0.04		0.02		0.02		0.01
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Empathy		0.24***		0.11**		-0.03		0.08*		0.06
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Gender		-0.15*		0.01		0.24***		0.12		0.08
		(0.08)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.06)		(0.07)
$R^2$	.122	.258	.270	.310	.389	.423	.435	.461	.389	.435
$\Delta R^2$		.135		.040		.034		.027		.046
$F$	29.9***	24.58***	79.16***	31.82***	136.60***	51.86***	164.80***	60.64***	136.70***	54.50***
$\Delta F$		19.35***		6.218***		6.167***		5.269***		8.580***
<i>Relevance of moral foundation</i>										
<b>Pain Sensitivity <math>\times</math></b>	<b>0.12**</b>	<b>0.08*</b>	<b>0.17***</b>	<b>0.13***</b>	<b>-0.03</b>	<b>-0.06</b>	<b>-0.07*</b>	<b>-0.08*</b>	<b>-0.06</b>	<b>-0.07*</b>
<b>Political Orientation</b>	<b>(0.04)</b>	<b>(0.04)</b>	<b>(0.04)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.04)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>
Pain Sensitivity	0.04	-0.06	0.07	-0.02	0.30***	0.19***	0.36***	0.25***	0.28***	0.15***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Political Orientation	-0.15***	-0.11**	-0.21***	-0.19***	0.22***	0.22***	0.29***	0.29***	0.36***	0.35***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Disgust Sensitivity		0.15*		0.07		0.09*		0.16***		0.22***
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Emotion Reactivity		0.06		0.08		0.04		0.06		0.04
		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)
Anxiety		-0.09		-0.09		-0.12*		-0.14***		-0.14***
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Anger		0.03		0.03		0.17***		0.07		0.12*
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)
Empathy		0.33***		0.33***		0.18***		0.12***		0.10*
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Gender		-0.05		0.02		0.15		0.05		0.08
		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.07)		(0.07)
$R^2$	.038	.181	.080	.206	.149	.215	.238	.293	.224	.291
$\Delta R^2$		.142		.126		.066		.055		.068
$F$	8.538***	15.58***	18.52***	18.32***	37.41***	19.38***	66.78***	29.29***	61.68***	29.05***
$\Delta F$		18.40***		16.86***		8.965***		8.276***		10.11***

637 *Note.* Political orientation was a continuous variable (1 = liberal, 5 = centrist, 9 = conservative).

638 Gender was coded as a dichotomous variable (-1 = female, 1 = male). Standardized regression

639 coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .005$ , \*\*\*  $p <$

640  $.001$ .

641 **Table S4**

642 *Preregistered Interaction Effects of Pain Sensitivity × Political Orientation on Support for and*

643 *Relevance of Moral Foundations in Study 1c*

Outcome	Interaction Effect of Pain Sensitivity × Political Orientation on Outcome					Effect of Pain Sensitivity on Outcome			
	$\beta$	<i>SE</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>p</i>	Among conservatives		Among liberals	
	$\beta$					$\beta$	<i>p</i>	$\beta$	<i>p</i>
<i>Support for moral foundation</i>									
Care/Harm	0.17	0.03	6.44	1256	< .001	0.38	< .001	0.06	.132
Fairness/Cheating	0.17	0.02	6.72	1256	< .001	0.39	< .001	0.06	.122
Loyalty/Betrayal	-0.12	0.02	-5.47	1256	< .001	0.20	< .001	0.39	< .001
Authority/Subversion	-0.15	0.02	-7.73	1256	< .001	0.12	< .001	0.35	< .001
Sanctity/Degradation	-0.13	0.02	-6.10	1256	< .001	0.20	< .001	0.41	< .001
<i>Relevance of moral foundation</i>									
Care/Harm	0.13	0.03	4.85	1256	< .001	0.16	< .001	-0.11	.005
Fairness/Cheating	0.14	0.03	5.45	1256	< .001	0.11	.012	-0.19	< .001
Loyalty/Betrayal	-0.03	0.02	-1.33	1256	.183	0.27	< .001	0.27	< .001
Authority/Subversion	-0.05	0.02	-1.84	1256	.066	0.30	< .001	0.30	< .001
Sanctity/Degradation	-0.07	0.02	-3.04	1256	.002	0.21	< .001	0.28	< .001

644

645 *Note.* Graphical depiction is available in Figure 4.

646 **Table S5**

647 *Hierarchical Regressions of Support for and Relevance of Moral Foundations on the*  
 648 *Preregistered Interaction Effect of Pain Sensitivity × Political Orientation as well as Their Main*  
 649 *Effects (Step 1), Together with Disgust Sensitivity and Gender (Step 2) and the Interaction Effect*  
 650 *of Disgust Sensitivity × Political Orientation (Step 3), in Study 1c*

Predictor	Care/Harm			Fairness/Cheating			Loyalty/Betrayal			Authority/Subversion			Sanctity/Degradation		
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
<i>Support for moral foundation</i>															
<b>Pain Sensitivity × Political Orientation</b>	<b>0.17***</b> (0.03)	<b>0.14***</b> (0.03)	<b>0.14***</b> (0.03)	<b>0.17***</b> (0.03)	<b>0.16***</b> (0.03)	<b>0.17***</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.12***</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.10***</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.10***</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.15***</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.16***</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.16***</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.13***</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.16***</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.16***</b> (0.02)
Pain Sensitivity	0.20*** (0.03)	0.24** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.02)	0.25*** (0.02)	0.25*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.29*** (0.02)	0.21*** (0.02)	0.20*** (0.02)
Political Orientation	-0.19*** (0.03)	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.18*** (0.03)	-0.36*** (0.03)	-0.37*** (0.03)	-0.37*** (0.03)	0.52*** (0.02)	0.49*** (0.02)	0.49*** (0.02)	0.63*** (0.02)	0.62*** (0.02)	0.62*** (0.02)	0.49*** (0.02)	0.48*** (0.02)	0.48*** (0.02)
Disgust Sensitivity		0.23*** (0.03)	0.23*** (0.03)		0.15*** (0.03)	0.15*** (0.05)		0.03 (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)		0.09*** (0.02)	0.09*** (0.02)		0.26*** (0.02)	0.26*** (0.02)
Gender		-0.18** (0.06)	-0.18** (0.06)		0.06 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)		0.38*** (0.05)	0.38*** (0.05)		0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)		-0.07 (0.05)	-0.06 (0.05)
Disgust Sensitivity × Political Orientation			0.02 (0.03)			-0.04 (0.03)			0.01 (0.02)			0.00 (0.02)			0.01 (0.02)
$R^2$	.099	.160	.160	.174	.192	.193	.387	.420	.420	.471	.477	.477	.358	.419	.419
$\Delta R^2$		.061	.000		.017	.001		.033	.000		.006	.000		.061	.000
$F$	45.43***	47.17***	39.38***	87.30***	58.68***	49.21***	260.90***	179.00***	149.20***	367.40***	225.40***	187.70***	230.10***	178.30***	148.50***
$\Delta F$		44.96***	0.516		13.18***	1.700		34.886***	0.256		7.008***	0.000		64.88***	0.122
<i>Relevance of moral foundation</i>															
<b>Pain Sensitivity × Political Orientation</b>	<b>0.13***</b> (0.03)	<b>0.10***</b> (0.03)	<b>0.10***</b> (0.03)	<b>0.14***</b> (0.03)	<b>0.12***</b> (0.03)	<b>0.13***</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.03</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.04</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.04</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.04</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.06*</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.06*</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.07**</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.10***</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.10***</b> (0.03)
Pain Sensitivity	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	-0.05 (0.03)	-0.10 (0.03)	-0.10 (0.03)	0.27*** (0.03)	0.24*** (0.03)	0.23*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.22*** (0.03)	0.23*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)
Political Orientation	-0.18 (0.03)	-0.16 (0.03)	-0.16 (0.03)	-0.24 (0.03)	-0.23 (0.03)	-0.23 (0.03)	0.29*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.28*** (0.03)	0.37*** (0.03)	0.38*** (0.03)	0.38*** (0.03)
Disgust Sensitivity		0.16*** (0.03)	0.16*** (0.03)		0.17*** (0.03)	0.17*** (0.03)		0.09** (0.03)	0.09** (0.03)		0.20*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.03)		0.20*** (0.03)	0.20*** (0.03)
Gender		-0.32 (0.06)	-0.32 (0.06)		-0.14 (0.06)	-0.15 (0.06)		0.00 (0.05)	0.01 (0.05)		-0.05 (0.05)	-0.05 (0.05)		-0.12 (0.05)	-0.12 (0.05)
Disgust Sensitivity × Political Orientation			0.00 (0.03)			-0.03 (0.03)			0.01 (0.03)			-0.01 (0.03)			0.00 (0.03)
$R^2$	.044	.103	.103	.075	.110	.110	.174	.181	.181	.178	.214	.214	.215	.259	.259
$\Delta R^2$		.058	.000		.035	.001		.007	.000		.037	.000		.043	.000
$F$	19.12***	28.29***	23.56***	33.41***	30.46***	25.59***	87.21***	54.74***	45.61***	89.30***	67.57***	56.28***	113.40***	86.33***	71.88***
$\Delta F$		40.22***	0.005		24.16***	1.206		5.145***	0.169		28.94***	0.089		36.07***	0.004

651 *Note.* Political orientation was a continuous variable (1 = liberal, 5 = centrist, 9 = conservative).

652 Gender was coded as a dichotomous variable (-1 = female, 1 = male). Standardized regression

653 coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .005$ , \*\*\*  $p <$

654 .001.

655

Table S6

*Hierarchical Regressions of Political Orientation on Pain Sensitivity (Step 1), Together with Control Predictors (Step 2), in Studies 1a–1c*

Predictor	Study 1a		Study 1b		Study 1c	
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2
Pain Sensitivity	<b>0.31***</b> (0.03)	<b>0.17***</b> (0.04)	<b>0.12**</b> (0.04)	<b>0.08**</b> (0.04)	<b>0.16***</b> (0.03)	<b>0.11***</b> (0.03)
Disgust Sensitivity		0.09* (0.03)		0.04 (0.04)		0.08** (0.03)
Emotion Reactivity		-0.05 (0.05)		0.01 (0.06)		---
Anxiety		-0.15*** (0.04)		-0.25*** (0.05)		---
Anger		0.33*** (0.03)		0.10 (0.05)		---
Empathy		-0.12*** (0.03)		-0.10* (0.04)		---
Gender		0.01 (0.06)		0.27*** (0.08)		0.35*** (0.06)
$R^2$	.095	.160	.015	.097	.026	.056
$\Delta R^2$		.065		.081		.029
$F$	95.56***	24.71***	10.04**	9.764***	33.60***	24.36***
$\Delta F$		11.776***		9.585***		19.253***

659

*Note.* Political orientation was a continuous variable (1 = liberal, 5 = centrist, 9 = conservative).

Gender was coded as a dichotomous variable (-1 = female, 1 = male). Standardized regression

coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

663

Table S7

Preregistered Hierarchical Regressions of Support for and Relevance of Moral Foundations on Pain Sensitivity (Step 1), Together with Control Predictors (Step 2), in Study 1c

Predictor	Care/Harm		Fairness/Cheating		Loyalty/Betrayal		Authority/Subversion		Sanctity/Degradation	
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2
<i>Support for moral foundation</i>										
<b>Pain Sensitivity</b>	<b>0.19***</b>	<b>0.15***</b>	<b>0.19***</b>	<b>0.18***</b>	<b>0.35***</b>	<b>0.24***</b>	<b>0.30***</b>	<b>0.16***</b>	<b>0.35***</b>	<b>0.19***</b>
	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.02)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.02)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.02)</b>
Political Orientation		-0.17***		-0.35***		0.48***		0.61***		0.47***
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Disgust Sensitivity		0.24***		0.16***		0.02		0.07**		0.24***
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Gender		-0.20***		0.03		0.40***		0.05		-0.04
		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.04)		(0.05)
$R^2$	.038	.139	.035	.166	.122	.409	.085	.451	.124	.393
$\Delta R^2$		.100		.131		.287		.366		.268
$F$	49.27	49.82	45.13	61.66	172.50	214.40	114.70	254.20	176.00	200.10
$\Delta F$		48.13		64.85		200.67		275.41		182.41
<i>Relevance of moral foundation</i>										
<b>Pain Sensitivity</b>	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.00</b>	<b>-0.07*</b>	<b>-0.09**</b>	<b>0.31***</b>	<b>0.23***</b>	<b>0.32***</b>	<b>0.21***</b>	<b>0.29***</b>	<b>0.16***</b>
	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>	<b>(0.03)</b>
Political Orientation		-0.15***		-0.22***		0.28***		0.27***		0.37***
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Disgust Sensitivity		0.17***		0.18***		0.09**		0.19***		0.19***
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Gender		-0.34***		-0.16**		0.01		-0.04		-0.10*
		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)
$R^2$	.000	.092	.004	.094	.096	.180	.104	.210	.082	.249
$\Delta R^2$		.092		.090		.083		.106		.167
$F$	.310	31.50	5.552	32.18	132.30	67.74	145.10	82.53	111.20	102.60
$\Delta F$		41.89		40.88		41.87		55.34		91.60

667

Note. Political orientation was a continuous variable (1 = liberal, 5 = centrist, 9 = conservative).

Gender was coded as a dichotomous variable (-1 = female, 1 = male). Standardized regression

coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .005$ , \*\*\*  $p <$

.001.

672

673 **Table S8**

674 *Intended and Actual Voting Preferences in Study 2a*

Voting preference	Intended voting ( <i>N</i> = 1,006)	Actual voting among participants who completed the post-election survey on						
		November 4-9 ( <i>N</i> = 710)	November 4 ( <i>n</i> = 571)	November 5 ( <i>n</i> = 70)	November 6 ( <i>n</i> = 29)	November 7 ( <i>n</i> = 14)	November 8 ( <i>n</i> = 18)	November 9 ( <i>n</i> = 8)
Trump	368 (36.6%)	257 (36.2%)	216 (37.8%)	21 (30.0%)	8 (27.6%)	6 (42.9%)	3 (16.7%)	3 (37.5%)
Biden	496 (49.3%)	387 (54.5%)	304 (53.2%)	41 (58.6%)	20 (69.0%)	7 (50.0%)	11 (61.1%)	4 (50.0%)
Others	13 (1.29%)	14 (1.97%)	8 (1.40%)	3 (4.29%)	1 (3.45%)	1 (7.14%)	1 (5.56%)	0 (0.00%)
Undecided	85 (8.45%)	7 (0.99%)	6 (1.05%)	1 (1.37%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)
No one	44 (4.37%)	45 (6.34%)	37 (6.48%)	4 (5.71%)	0 (0.00%)	0 (0.00%)	3 (16.7%)	1 (12.5%)

675

676 *Note.* Count of participants and percentage within column are shown.

677



Table S9

Interaction Effects of Pain Sensitivity  $\times$  Political Orientation on Voting or Support for Political

Figures in Study 2a

Outcome	Interaction Effect of Pain Sensitivity $\times$ Political Orientation on Outcome					Effect of Pain Sensitivity on Outcome			
	$\beta$	SE	z	df	p	Among conservatives		Among liberals	
						$\beta$	p	$\beta$	p
<i>Voting (dichotomous)</i>									
Intended voting for Trump over Biden	-1.46	0.16	-9.02	861	< .001	-0.53	< .001	1.92	< .001
Actual voting for Trump over Biden	-1.06	0.21	-5.04	642	< .001	-0.37	.022	0.98	.002
	$\beta$	SE	t	df	p	$\beta$	p	$\beta$	p
<i>Voting (Likert)</i>									
Likelihood of voting for a conservative candidate	-0.08	0.02	-5.06	1001	< .001	0.01	.738	0.14	< .001
Likelihood of voting for a liberal candidate	0.11	0.02	6.53	999	< .001	0.20	< .001	-0.02	.347
<i>Support for Republican political figure (Likert)</i>									
Donald Trump	-0.14	0.02	-6.53	995	< .001	-0.03	.307	0.28	< .001
Mike Pence	-0.16	0.02	-8.12	990	< .001	-0.07	.047	0.27	< .001
Mitch McConnell	-0.13	0.02	-5.61	886	< .001	0.05	.180	0.32	< .001
Kevin McCarthy	-0.15	0.03	-4.96	566	< .001	0.02	.595	0.38	< .001
<i>Support for Democratic political figure (Likert)</i>									
Joe Biden	0.14	0.02	5.89	997	< .001	0.27	< .001	-0.02	.489
Kamala Harris	0.14	0.02	6.28	969	< .001	0.28	< .001	-0.01	.667
Bernie Sanders	0.20	0.02	9.59	993	< .001	0.26	< .001	-0.12	< .001
Elizabeth Warren	0.20	0.02	8.89	924	< .001	0.31	< .001	-0.09	.006
Nancy Pelosi	0.15	0.02	6.69	962	< .001	0.33	< .001	0.02	.627
Steny Hoyer	0.19	0.04	5.01	418	< .001	0.39	< .001	0.03	.586
Chuck Schumer	0.16	0.03	6.21	783	< .001	0.33	< .001	-0.01	.883

Note. If we used the more stringent criterion of Bonferroni-corrected  $\alpha = .05 / (15 \text{ interaction}$ effects of interest in Table S9 + 25 interaction effects of interest in Table S10) =  $.05 / 40 =$  $.00125$ , all 15 interaction effects in Table S9 remained significant ( $ps \leq 9.40e-7$ ). Graphical

depiction is available in Figure 5.

686 **Table S10**687 *Interaction Effects of Pain Sensitivity × Political Orientation on Support for Political Issues in*688 *Study 2a*

Outcome	Interaction Effect of Pain Sensitivity × Political Orientation on Outcome					Effect of Pain Sensitivity on Outcome			
	$\beta$	SE	t	df	p	Among conservatives		Among liberals	
Illegal Immigrants Weaken the U.S. Economy †	-0.21	0.02	-8.23	1000	< .001	-0.25	< .001	0.13	.001
No Wealth Redistribution †	-0.20	0.02	-8.35	1001	< .001	-0.35	< .001	0.04	.210
The Poor Should Work Harder †	-0.19	0.03	-7.39	997	< .001	-0.28	< .001	0.11	< .001
Not Funding Stem Cell Research †	-0.19	0.03	-6.85	999	< .001	-0.21	< .001	0.18	< .001
No Universal Healthcare †	-0.19	0.02	-7.91	998	< .001	-0.31	< .001	0.08	< .001
No Impeachment of Former President Donald Trump †	-0.18	0.02	-8.61	1000	< .001	-0.24	< .001	0.18	< .001
Decrease Global Warming Restrictions †	-0.18	0.02	-7.26	1001	< .001	-0.22	< .001	0.11	< .001
No Sterile Drug Facilities †	-0.18	0.03	-6.71	1001	< .001	-0.22	< .001	0.13	< .001
ACA/Obamacare is Mistake †	-0.18	0.02	-7.72	999	< .001	-0.28	< .001	0.08	.004
No Protests †	-0.17	0.02	-7.60	1001	< .001	-0.19	< .001	0.14	< .001
Keystone Oil Pipeline	-0.17	0.03	-6.67	999	< .001	0.01	.710	0.34	< .001
Free Market †	-0.16	0.03	-5.97	998	< .001	-0.35	< .001	-0.10	.012
Abolishing Unions	-0.15	0.03	-5.53	1000	< .001	0.00	.973	0.27	< .001
Death Penalty	-0.15	0.03	-5.23	998	< .001	-0.07	.078	0.26	< .001
Gun Ownership †	-0.15	0.03	-5.91	1001	< .001	-0.30	< .001	-0.02	.534
Defense Spending	-0.14	0.03	-5.48	1000	< .001	0.14	< .001	0.42	< .001
Teaching Creationism	-0.14	0.03	-5.13	1000	< .001	0.18	< .001	0.45	< .001
No Abortion †	-0.13	0.02	-5.09	999	< .001	-0.09	.048	0.17	< .001
War in Afghanistan	-0.13	0.03	-4.16	1000	< .001	-0.02	.712	0.24	< .001
COVID Exaggerated	-0.12	0.02	-5.00	998	< .001	-0.03	.502	0.21	< .001
Illegal Marijuana †	-0.09	0.03	-3.22	995	.001	0.02	.657	0.23	< .001
Illegal to Burn Flag	-0.09	0.03	-3.31	999	< .001	0.10	.022	0.27	< .001
Torturing Terrorists	-0.08	0.03	-2.65	1001	.008	0.10	.030	0.24	< .001
Confront Terrorism	-0.05	0.03	-1.69	1001	.092	0.09	.059	0.15	< .001
No Same-Sex Marriage †	-0.04	0.03	-1.59	1001	.113	0.19	< .001	0.26	< .001

689 *Note.* Items are listed in descending order of magnitude of the interaction effect  $\beta$ . † denotes

690 items that have been reverse-coded. All items are coded such that higher scores represent more

691 conservative views. If we used the more stringent criterion of Bonferroni-corrected  $\alpha = .05 /$ 

692 (15 interaction effects of interest in Table S9 + 25 interaction effects of interest in Table S10) =

693  $.05 / 40 = .00125$ , 21 of the 25 interaction effects in Table S10 remained significant ( $ps \leq 9.83\text{e-}$ 

694 4). Graphical depiction is available in Figure 6.

695

696 **Table S11**

697 *Preregistered Interaction Effects of Pain Sensitivity × Political Orientation on Voting or Support*  
 698 *for Political Figures in Study 2b*

Outcome	Interaction Effect of Pain Sensitivity × Political Orientation on Outcome					Effect of Pain Sensitivity on Outcome			
	$\beta$	SE	z	df	p	Among conservatives		Among liberals	
	$\beta$	SE	t	df	p	$\beta$	p	$\beta$	p
<i>Voting (dichotomous)</i>									
Actual voting for Trump over Biden	-0.84	0.14	-5.82	780	< .001	-0.89	< .001	0.11	.675
<i>Voting (Likert)</i>									
Likelihood of voting for a conservative candidate	-0.11	0.02	-6.52	1008	< .001	0.06	.005	0.22	< .001
Likelihood of voting for a liberal candidate	0.11	0.02	5.41	1009	< .001	0.25	< .001	0.06	.024
<i>Support for Republican political figure (Likert)</i>									
Donald Trump	-0.23	0.02	-9.66	1007	< .001	-0.09	.018	0.32	< .001
Mike Pence	-0.23	0.02	-9.22	974	< .001	-0.03	.501	0.42	< .001
Mitch McConnell	-0.14	0.03	-5.33	908	< .001	0.19	< .001	0.45	< .001
Kevin McCarthy	-0.16	0.03	-5.01	645	< .001	0.11	.016	0.40	< .001
<i>Support for Democratic political figure (Likert)</i>									
Joe Biden	0.17	0.03	6.62	1008	< .001	0.50	< .001	0.19	< .001
Kamala Harris	0.21	0.03	7.95	988	< .001	0.51	< .001	0.12	< .001
Bernie Sanders	0.31	0.02	12.97	993	< .001	0.44	< .001	-0.22	< .001
Elizabeth Warren	0.24	0.03	8.70	896	< .001	0.53	< .001	0.03	.464
Nancy Pelosi	0.21	0.03	7.88	962	< .001	0.54	< .001	0.13	.003
Steny Hoyer	0.16	0.04	3.74	505	< .001	0.44	< .001	0.10	.161
Chuck Schumer	0.21	0.03	7.00	795	< .001	0.52	< .001	0.11	.035

699 *Note.* Graphical depiction is available in Figure 7.

700 **Table S12**

701 *Preregistered Interaction Effects of Pain Sensitivity × Political Orientation on Support for*

702 *Political Issues in Study 2b*

Outcome	Interaction Effect of Pain Sensitivity × Political Orientation on Outcome					Effect of Pain Sensitivity on Outcome			
	$\beta$	SE	t	df	p	Among conservatives		Among liberals	
	$\beta$					$\beta$	p	$\beta$	p
No Universal Healthcare	-0.31	0.03	-11.78	1007	< .001	-0.53	< .001	0.12	< .001
Decrease Global Warming Restrictions	-0.29	0.03	-10.87	1009	< .001	-0.43	< .001	0.17	< .001
The Poor Should Work Harder	-0.27	0.03	-10.29	1004	< .001	-0.46	< .001	0.09	.013
No Marching in Protest	-0.26	0.03	-9.62	1011	< .001	-0.42	< .001	0.06	.118
ACA/Obamacare is Mistake	-0.24	0.03	-9.02	1007	< .001	-0.51	< .001	-0.04	.287
No Sterile Drug Facilities	-0.21	0.03	-7.40	1009	< .001	-0.45	< .001	-0.07	.091
No Impeachment of Former President Donald Trump	-0.22	0.02	-8.97	1011	< .001	-0.29	< .001	0.12	< .001
No Kneeling in Protest	-0.20	0.03	-7.42	1009	< .001	-0.32	< .001	0.08	.071
Illegal Immigrants Weaken the U.S. Economy	-0.19	0.03	-7.19	1008	< .001	-0.22	< .001	0.16	< .001
Not Funding Stem Cell Research	-0.17	0.03	-5.82	1010	< .001	-0.27	< .001	0.09	.046

703 *Note.* Items are listed in descending order of magnitude of the interaction effect  $\beta$ . All items

704 have been reverse-coded such that higher scores represent more conservative views. Graphical

705 depiction is available in Figure 8.

706 **Table S13**

707  $PH_{lib-con}$  Toward Each Contentious Political Issue, Its Descriptive Statistics, and Its Correlation

708 with Political Orientation in Study 3

Political Issue	Descriptive statistics of $PH_{lib-con}$ toward political issue			Correlation between $PH_{lib-con}$ and political orientation		
	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>p</i>
Illegal immigrants weaken the U.S. economy	1645	-0.87	2.43	1554	0.42	< 0.001
Not funding stem cell research	1650	-0.65	2.33	1559	0.30	< 0.001
Decreasing global warming restrictions	1648	-1.94	2.38	1558	0.37	< 0.001
The poor should work harder	1651	-1.51	2.10	1560	0.39	< 0.001
ACA/ Obamacare was a mistake	1651	-1.00	2.28	1560	0.34	< 0.001
No sterile drug facilities	1648	-0.89	2.55	1558	0.28	< 0.001
No marching in protest	1645	-1.50	2.31	1554	0.36	< 0.001
No kneeling in protest	1648	-0.12	2.37	1561	0.42	< 0.001
No impeachment of Former President Donald Trump	1644	-0.66	2.66	1555	0.48	< 0.001
No universal healthcare	1651	-2.09	2.46	1560	0.41	< 0.001

709

710 *Note.* Political orientation was a continuous variable (*1* = liberal, *5* = centrist, *9* = conservative).

711 *n* = sample size, *M* = mean, *SD* = standard deviation, *r* = Pearson's correlation coefficient.

712 **Table S14**

713 *Pearson's Correlation Between Pain Sensitivity and Political Orientation Among Conservatives*

714 *and Among Liberals in Studies 1a–3*

Study	Correlation between pain sensitivity and political orientation					
	Among conservatives			Among liberals		
	<i>r</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>r</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>p</i>
1a	.103	404	.039	-.066	405	.183
1b	.155	288	.009	.038	287	.524
1c	.209	554	< .001	-.019	583	.642
2a	.082	434	.087	.019	455	.688
2b	.193	453	< .001	-.065	424	.182
3	.315	705	< .001	-.200	717	< .001

715

716 *Note.* Political orientation (1 = liberal, 5 = centrist, 9 = conservative).

717

**Table S15**

*Standardized Regression Coefficient and Significance Level of the Interaction Effect of Pain*

*Sensitivity × Political Orientation Before and After Adding Ideological Extremity as a Predictor*

*to the Regression Models in Studies 1a–3*

Dependent variable	Interaction effect of pain sensitivity × political orientation			
	In the original regression model (without ideological extremity as a predictor)		In the new regression model (after adding ideological extremity as a predictor)	
	$\beta$	$p$	$\beta$	$p$
<i>Study 1a</i>				
<i>Regressing support for moral foundations on pain sensitivity × political orientation and their main effects (step 1)</i>				
Care/harm	0.071	.026	0.065	.046
Fairness/cheating	0.203	< .001	0.189	< .001
Loyalty/betrayal	-0.076	.003	-0.078	.003
Authority/subversion	-0.157	< .001	-0.152	< .001
Sanctity/degradation	-0.166	< .001	-0.157	< .001
<i>Regressing support for moral foundations on pain sensitivity × political orientation and their main effects together with control predictors (step 2)</i>				
Care/harm	0.068	.026	0.065	.037
Fairness/cheating	0.181	< .001	0.173	< .001
Loyalty/betrayal	-0.071	.006	-0.070	.008
Authority/subversion	-0.148	< .001	-0.140	< .001
Sanctity/degradation	-0.154	< .001	-0.141	< .001
<i>Regressing relevance of moral foundations on pain sensitivity × political orientation and their main effects (step 1)</i>				
Care/harm	0.106	.001	0.104	.002
Fairness/cheating	0.117	< .001	0.115	< .001
Loyalty/betrayal	-0.044	.112	-0.041	.153
Authority/subversion	-0.068	.014	-0.071	.012
Sanctity/degradation	-0.123	< .001	-0.120	< .001
<i>Regressing relevance of moral foundations on pain sensitivity × political orientation and their main effects together with control predictors (step 2)</i>				
Care/harm	0.084	.005	0.085	.006
Fairness/cheating	0.102	.001	0.102	.001
Loyalty/betrayal	-0.060	.032	-0.053	.063
Authority/subversion	-0.083	.003	-0.081	.004
Sanctity/degradation	-0.118	< .001	-0.112	< .001
<i>Study 1b</i>				
<i>Regressing support for moral foundations on pain sensitivity × political orientation and their main effects (step 1)</i>				
Care/harm	0.079	.027	0.076	.033
Fairness/cheating	0.189	< .001	0.187	< .001
Loyalty/betrayal	-0.108	< .001	-0.103	< .001
Authority/subversion	-0.158	< .001	-0.155	< .001
Sanctity/degradation	-0.138	< .001	-0.138	< .001
<i>Regressing support for moral foundations on pain sensitivity × political orientation and their main effects together with control predictors (step 2)</i>				
Care/harm	0.053	.114	0.054	.104
Fairness/cheating	0.165	< .001	0.165	< .001
Loyalty/betrayal	-0.105	< .001	-0.100	< .001
Authority/subversion	-0.162	< .001	-0.158	< .001
Sanctity/degradation	-0.141	< .001	-0.140	< .001
<i>Regressing relevance of moral foundations on pain sensitivity × political orientation and their main effects (step 1)</i>				
Care/harm	0.121	.001	0.113	.003
Fairness/cheating	0.171	< .001	0.165	< .001
Loyalty/betrayal	-0.031	.381	-0.025	.480
Authority/subversion	-0.065	.049	-0.066	.046
Sanctity/degradation	-0.060	.076	-0.062	.065
<i>Regressing relevance of moral foundations on pain sensitivity × political orientation and their main effects together with control predictors (step 2)</i>				
Care/harm	0.082	.019	0.079	.025
Fairness/cheating	0.131	< .001	0.130	< .001
Loyalty/betrayal	-0.058	.092	-0.051	.141
Authority/subversion	-0.080	.014	-0.079	.016
Sanctity/degradation	-0.072	.028	-0.072	.027

## Study 1c

*Regressing support for moral foundations on pain sensitivity × political orientation and their main effects (step 1)*

Care/harm	0.172	< .001	0.163	< .001
Fairness/cheating	0.168	< .001	0.165	< .001
Loyalty/betrayal	-0.116	< .001	-0.119	< .001
Authority/subversion	-0.151	< .001	-0.151	< .001
Sanctity/degradation	-0.133	< .001	-0.140	< .001

*Regressing support for moral foundations on pain sensitivity × political orientation and their main effects together with control predictors (step 2)*

Care/harm	0.144	< .001	0.136	< .001
Fairness/cheating	0.157	< .001	0.155	< .001
Loyalty/betrayal	-0.101	< .001	-0.106	< .001
Authority/subversion	-0.157	< .001	-0.158	< .001
Sanctity/degradation	-0.158	< .001	-0.165	< .001

*Regressing support for moral foundations on pain sensitivity × political orientation and their main effects together with control predictors and disgust sensitivity × political orientation (step 3)*

Care/harm	0.137	< .001	0.131	< .001
Fairness/cheating	0.170	< .001	0.167	< .001
Loyalty/betrayal	-0.105	< .001	-0.109	< .001
Authority/subversion	-0.158	< .001	-0.158	< .001
Sanctity/degradation	-0.161	< .001	-0.166	< .001

*Regressing relevance of moral foundations on pain sensitivity × political orientation and their main effects (step 1)*

Care/harm	0.128	< .001	0.126	< .001
Fairness/cheating	0.143	< .001	0.139	< .001
Loyalty/betrayal	-0.311	.212	-0.034	.180
Authority/subversion	-0.042	.091	-0.042	.096
Sanctity/degradation	-0.074	.003	-0.082	.001

*Regressing relevance of moral foundations on pain sensitivity × political orientation and their main effects together with control predictors (step 2)*

Care/harm	0.099	< .001	0.099	< .001
Fairness/cheating	0.121	< .001	0.118	< .001
Loyalty/betrayal	-0.039	.122	-0.042	.103
Authority/subversion	-0.062	.012	-0.062	.014
Sanctity/degradation	-0.097	< .001	-0.104	< .001

*Regressing relevance of moral foundations on pain sensitivity × political orientation and their main effects together with control predictors and disgust sensitivity × political orientation (step 3)*

Care/harm	0.098	< .001	0.099	< .001
Fairness/cheating	0.132	< .001	0.129	< .001
Loyalty/betrayal	-0.043	.111	-0.045	.098
Authority/subversion	-0.060	.025	-0.059	.027
Sanctity/degradation	-0.096	< .001	-0.102	< .001

## Study 2a

*Interaction effects of pain sensitivity × political orientation on voting or support for political figures*

Intended voting	-1.458	< .001	-1.418	< .001
Actual voting	-1.057	< .001	-1.003	< .001
Conservative candidate	-0.081	< .001	-0.082	< .001
Liberal candidate	0.110	< .001	0.112	< .001
Donald Trump	-0.138	< .001	-0.152	< .001
Mike Pence	-0.163	< .001	-0.170	< .001
Mitch McConnell	-0.135	< .001	-0.139	< .001
Kevin McCarthy	-0.154	< .001	-0.154	< .001
Joe Biden	0.135	< .001	0.143	< .001
Kamala Harris	0.140	< .001	0.146	< .001
Bernie Sanders	0.196	< .001	0.201	< .001
Elizabeth Warren	0.204	< .001	0.205	< .001
Nancy Pelosi	0.153	< .001	0.154	< .001
Steny Hoyer	0.189	< .001	0.192	< .001
Chuck Schumer	0.159	< .001	0.159	< .001

*Interaction effects of pain sensitivity × political orientation on support for political issues*

Illegal immigrants weaken the U.S. economy	-0.206	< .001	-0.207	< .001
No wealth redistribution	-0.200	< .001	-0.201	< .001
The poor should work harder	-0.191	< .001	-0.188	< .001
Not funding stem cell research	-0.190	< .001	-0.191	< .001
No universal healthcare	-0.189	< .001	-0.198	< .001
No impeachment of former president Donald Trump	-0.182	< .001	-0.190	< .001
Decrease global warming restrictions	-0.179	< .001	-0.186	< .001
No sterile drug facilities	-0.178	< .001	-0.178	< .001
ACA/Obamacare is mistake	-0.177	< .001	-0.185	< .001
No protests	-0.171	< .001	-0.171	< .001
Keystone oil pipeline	-0.171	< .001	-0.165	< .001
Free market	-0.162	< .001	-0.156	< .001
Abolishing unions	-0.154	< .001	-0.147	< .001



Death penalty	-0.150	< .001	-0.145	< .001
Gun ownership	-0.148	< .001	-0.152	< .001
Defense spending	-0.140	< .001	-0.142	< .001
Teaching creationism	-0.139	< .001	-0.137	< .001
No abortion	-0.127	< .001	-0.134	< .001
War in Afghanistan	-0.125	< .001	-0.118	< .001
COVID exaggerated	-0.122	< .001	-0.126	< .001
Illegal marijuana	-0.093	.001	-0.098	< .001
Illegal to burn Flag	-0.092	< .001	-0.085	.002
Torturing terrorists	-0.075	.008	-0.074	.009
Confront terrorism	-0.050	.092	-0.048	.111
No same-sex marriage	-0.043	.113	-0.051	.055

## Study 2b

*Interaction effects of pain sensitivity × political orientation on voting or support for political figures*

Actual voting	-0.840	< .001	-0.845	< .001
Conservative candidate	-0.113	< .001	-0.118	< .001
Liberal candidate	0.108	< .001	0.114	< .001
Donald Trump	-0.228	< .001	-0.241	< .001
Mike Pence	-0.227	< .001	-0.232	< .001
Mitch McConnell	-0.140	< .001	-0.142	< .001
Kevin McCarthy	-0.164	< .001	-0.166	< .001
Joe Biden	0.171	< .001	0.177	< .001
Kamala Harris	0.206	< .001	0.209	< .001
Bernie Sanders	0.315	< .001	0.306	< .001
Elizabeth Warren	0.235	< .001	0.229	< .001
Nancy Pelosi	0.213	< .001	0.211	< .001
Steny Hoyer	0.158	< .001	0.158	< .001
Chuck Schumer	0.208	< .001	0.204	< .001

*Interaction effects of pain sensitivity × political orientation on support for political issues*

No universal healthcare	-0.307	< .001	-0.311	< .001
Decrease global warming restrictions	-0.294	< .001	-0.298	< .001
The poor should work harder	-0.273	< .001	-0.263	< .001
No marching in protest	-0.259	< .001	-0.259	< .001
ACA/Obamacare is mistake	-0.239	< .001	-0.243	< .001
No sterile drug facilities	-0.219	< .001	-0.204	< .001
No impeachment of former president Donald Trump	-0.218	< .001	-0.229	< .001
No kneeling in protest	-0.201	< .001	-0.205	< .001
Illegal immigrants weaken the U.S. economy	-0.193	< .001	-0.202	< .001
Not funding stem cell research	-0.171	< .001	-0.168	< .001

## Study 3

*Interaction effects of pain sensitivity × political orientation on perceived harm in attitudinal disagreements with moral foundations*

Care/harm	-0.007	.778	-0.016	.511
Fairness/cheating	0.072	.003	0.059	.015
Loyalty/betrayal	-0.093	< .001	-0.096	< .001
Authority/subversion	-0.113	< .001	-0.114	< .001
Sanctity/degradation	-0.117	< .001	-0.123	< .001

*Interaction effects of pain sensitivity × political orientation on perceived harm in behavioral violations of moral foundations*

Care/harm	0.117	< .001	0.113	< .001
Fairness/cheating	0.139	< .001	-0.139	< .001
Loyalty/betrayal	-0.082	< .001	-0.089	< .001
Authority/subversion	-0.050	.014	-0.054	.010
Sanctity/degradation	-0.112	< .001	-0.115	< .001

*Interaction effects of pain sensitivity × political orientation on difference in perceived harm in liberal attitude and in conservative attitude toward political issues*

Decreasing global warming restrictions	-0.324	< .001	-0.328	< .001
No universal healthcare	-0.287	< .001	-0.283	< .001
No impeachment of former president Donald Trump	-0.241	< .001	-0.248	< .001
Illegal immigrants weaken the U.S. economy	-0.272	< .001	-0.275	< .001
ACA/Obamacare was a mistake	-0.288	< .001	-0.286	< .001
The poor should work harder	-0.275	< .001	-0.276	< .001
No marching in protest	-0.220	< .001	-0.218	< .001
Not funding stem cell research	-0.196	< .001	-0.202	< .001
No sterile drug facilities	-0.181	< .001	-0.184	< .001
No kneeling in protest	-0.146	< .001	-0.146	< .001

722

723 *Note.* Political orientation (1 = liberal, 5 = centrist, 9 = conservative). Ideological extremity was

724 created by coding political orientation in terms of difference from the midpoint (i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,

725    6, 7, 8, 9 became 4, 3, 2, 1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4).

726 **Table S16**727 *Collinearity Diagnostics for Regression Analyses in Studies 1a–3*

Outcome	Predictor: Pain sensitivity × political orientation		Predictor: Pain sensitivity		Predictor: Political orientation		Condition index		
	VIF	Tolerance	VIF	Tolerance	VIF	Tolerance	OD1	OD2	OD3
<i>Study 1a</i>									
All outcomes (support for or relevance of each moral foundation)	16.72	0.06	5.47	0.18	8.92	0.11	1.50	1.80	8.14
<i>Study 1b</i>									
All outcomes (support for or relevance of each moral foundation)	11.92	0.08	4.53	0.22	7.21	0.14	1.44	1.54	6.77
<i>Study 1c</i>									
All outcomes (support for or relevance of each moral foundation)	12.64	0.08	4.17	0.24	7.95	0.13	1.46	1.59	7.00
<i>Study 2a</i>									
Voting for a Conservative Candidate	11.37	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.45	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.60
Voting for a Liberal Candidate	11.39	0.09	4.33	0.23	7.44	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.60
Support for Donald Trump	11.38	0.09	4.33	0.23	7.43	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.60
Support for Mike Pence	11.38	0.09	4.28	0.23	7.50	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.60
Support for Mitch McConnell	11.30	0.09	4.19	0.24	7.37	0.14	1.42	1.49	6.58
Support for Kevin McCarthy	11.55	0.09	4.42	0.23	7.46	0.13	1.42	1.59	6.83
Support for Joe Biden	11.36	0.09	4.30	0.23	7.46	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.59
Support for Kamala Harris	11.43	0.09	4.26	0.23	7.52	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.62
Support for Bernie Sanders	11.30	0.09	4.30	0.23	7.41	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.57
Support for Elizabeth Warren	11.49	0.09	4.25	0.24	7.59	0.13	1.42	1.48	6.63
Support for Nancy Pelosi	11.32	0.09	4.27	0.23	7.42	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.58
Support for Steny Hoyer	12.79	0.08	4.44	0.23	8.42	0.12	1.40	1.82	7.44
Support for Chuck Schumer	11.37	0.09	4.24	0.24	7.39	0.14	1.43	1.50	6.62
Illegal Immigrants Weaken the U.S. Economy	11.37	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.45	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.60
No Wealth Redistribution	11.37	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.45	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.60
The Poor Should Work Harder	11.41	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.45	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.61
Not Funding Stem Cell Research	11.39	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.46	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.60
No Universal Healthcare	11.34	0.09	4.30	0.23	7.44	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.59
No Impeachment of Former President Donald Trump	11.35	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.43	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.59
Decreasing Global Warming Restrictions	11.37	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.45	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.60
ACA/Obamacare Was a Mistake	11.37	0.09	4.32	0.23	7.45	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.60
No Sterile Drug Facilities	11.37	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.45	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.60
No Protesting	11.37	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.45	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.60
Keystone Oil Pipeline	11.37	0.09	4.30	0.23	7.47	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.60
Free Market	11.50	0.09	4.36	0.23	7.49	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.64
Abolishing Unions	11.35	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.44	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.59
Death Penalty	11.40	0.09	4.33	0.23	7.46	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.61
Right to Own Guns	11.37	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.45	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.60
Increasing Defence Spending	11.37	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.45	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.60
Teaching Creationism	11.34	0.09	4.30	0.23	7.45	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.59
Not Permitting Abortion	11.37	0.09	4.32	0.23	7.43	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.60
War in Afghanistan	11.35	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.43	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.59
Response to COVID-19 Has Been Exaggerated	11.36	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.43	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.59
No Legalization of Marijuana	11.33	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.42	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.58
Criminalizing Flag-Burning	11.40	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.46	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.61
Torture on Suspected Terrorist	11.37	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.45	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.60
Confronting Terrorism	11.37	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.45	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.60
Not Permitting Same-Sex Marriage	11.37	0.09	4.31	0.23	7.45	0.13	1.42	1.47	6.60
<i>Study 2b</i>									
Voting for a Conservative Candidate	14.50	0.07	5.03	0.20	8.88	0.11	1.45	1.57	7.51
Voting for a Liberal Candidate	14.51	0.07	5.02	0.20	8.88	0.11	1.45	1.57	7.51
Support for Donald Trump	14.49	0.07	5.04	0.20	8.85	0.11	1.45	1.57	7.50
Support for Mike Pence	14.75	0.07	5.11	0.20	8.97	0.11	1.45	1.57	7.57
Support for Mitch McConnell	14.62	0.07	4.96	0.20	9.00	0.11	1.45	1.58	7.54
Support for Kevin McCarthy	15.92	0.06	5.29	0.19	10.15	0.10	1.49	1.68	8.23
Support for Joe Biden	14.49	0.07	5.01	0.20	8.90	0.11	1.45	1.56	7.50
Support for Kamala Harris	14.82	0.07	5.10	0.20	9.02	0.11	1.45	1.58	7.59
Support for Bernie Sanders	14.42	0.07	5.00	0.20	8.83	0.11	1.45	1.57	7.48
Support for Elizabeth Warren	14.61	0.07	4.93	0.20	8.97	0.11	1.45	1.59	7.54
Support for Nancy Pelosi	14.94	0.07	5.19	0.19	9.07	0.11	1.45	1.57	7.62
Support for Steny Hoyer	18.49	0.05	5.46	0.18	12.43	0.08	1.54	1.92	9.48
Support for Chuck Schumer	14.91	0.07	5.28	0.19	9.16	0.11	1.48	1.57	7.73
No Universal Healthcare	14.54	0.07	5.03	0.20	8.89	0.11	1.45	1.57	7.52
Decreasing Global Warming Restrictions	14.59	0.07	5.06	0.20	8.89	0.11	1.45	1.57	7.53
The Poor Should Work Harder	14.56	0.07	5.05	0.20	8.88	0.11	1.45	1.57	7.52
The Poor Should Work Harder	14.56	0.07	5.05	0.20	8.88	0.11	1.45	1.57	7.52
No Marching in Protest	14.51	0.07	5.03	0.20	8.88	0.11	1.45	1.57	7.51

ACA/Obamacare Was a Mistake	14.53	0.07	5.06	0.20	8.86	0.11	1.45	1.57	7.51
No Sterile Drug Facilities	14.48	0.07	5.02	0.20	8.88	0.11	1.45	1.56	7.50
No Impeachment of Former President Donald Trump	14.51	0.07	5.03	0.20	8.88	0.11	1.45	1.57	7.51
No Kneeling in Protest	14.48	0.07	5.02	0.20	8.87	0.11	1.45	1.56	7.50
Illegal Immigrants Weaken the U.S. Economy	14.51	0.07	5.03	0.20	8.87	0.11	1.45	1.57	7.51
Not Funding Stem Cell Research	14.54	0.07	5.05	0.20	8.91	0.11	1.45	1.56	7.52
<i>Study 3</i>									
All outcomes related to moral foundations (support for or relevance of each moral foundation)	12.52	0.08	3.93	0.25	7.97	0.13	1.46	1.62	6.97
Decreasing Global Warming Restrictions	12.54	0.08	3.93	0.25	7.97	0.13	1.46	1.62	6.98
No Universal Healthcare	12.50	0.08	3.93	0.25	7.95	0.13	1.46	1.62	6.96
No Impeachment of Former President Donald Trump	12.52	0.08	3.93	0.25	7.97	0.13	1.46	1.62	6.97
Illegal Immigrants Weaken the U.S. Economy	12.54	0.08	3.91	0.26	8.00	0.12	1.46	1.62	6.98
ACA/Obamacare Was a Mistake	12.51	0.08	3.93	0.25	7.97	0.13	1.46	1.62	6.97
The Poor Should Work Harder	12.52	0.08	3.94	0.25	7.94	0.13	1.46	1.62	6.97
No Marching in Protest	12.55	0.08	3.94	0.25	7.98	0.13	1.46	1.62	6.98
Not Funding Stem Cell Research	12.48	0.08	3.92	0.25	7.95	0.13	1.46	1.62	6.96
No Sterile Drug Facilities	12.52	0.08	3.93	0.25	7.97	0.13	1.46	1.62	6.97
No Kneeling in Protest	12.52	0.08	3.93	0.25	7.97	0.13	1.46	1.62	6.97

728

729 *Note.* VIF = variance inflation factor. Tolerance =  $1 / \text{VIF}$ . OD = orthogonal dimension extracted  
730 from principal components analysis. For each outcome (i.e., in each row), the largest condition  
731 index is also known as the condition number (i.e., the square root of the ratio of the largest  
732 eigenvalue to the smallest eigenvalue among all orthogonal dimensions extracted from principal  
733 components analysis).

734 **Table S17**735 *Reliability Coefficient and Descriptive Statistics of Scales in Studies 1a–1c*

Variables	Study 1a			Study 1b			Study 1c		
	$\alpha$	$M$	$SD$	$\alpha$	$M$	$SD$	$\alpha$	$M$	$SD$
<i>Support for Moral Foundation</i>									
Care/Harm	0.49	3.53	0.97	0.48	3.57	0.97	0.48	3.50	0.97
Fairness/Cheating	0.35	3.37	0.93	0.38	3.38	0.90	0.35	3.32	0.87
Loyalty/Betrayal	0.64	2.74	1.14	0.63	2.42	1.19	0.63	2.37	1.17
Authority/Subversion	0.66	3.08	1.13	0.73	3.04	1.22	0.70	2.99	1.19
Sanctity/Degradation	0.80	2.79	1.36	0.75	2.66	1.34	0.75	2.56	1.33
<i>Relevance of Moral Foundation</i>									
Care/Harm	0.73	3.63	0.99	0.72	3.70	0.92	0.69	3.67	0.90
Fairness/Cheating	0.76	3.63	1.02	0.75	3.78	0.90	0.71	3.80	0.85
Loyalty/Betrayal	0.77	2.60	1.21	0.69	2.76	1.10	0.70	2.68	1.07
Authority/Subversion	0.68	2.73	1.10	0.64	2.76	1.02	0.64	2.77	0.99
Sanctity/Degradation	0.75	2.57	1.35	0.62	2.73	1.21	0.65	2.67	1.21
Pain Sensitivity	0.95	4.81	2.05	0.95	4.18	1.81	0.95	4.06	1.72
Disgust Sensitivity	0.78	0.58	0.16	0.82	0.56	0.17	0.87	2.22	0.64
Emotion Reactivity	0.96	2.37	0.73	0.95	2.34	0.67	-	-	-
Anger	0.94	2.03	0.69	0.91	1.92	0.55	-	-	-
Anxiety	0.95	2.07	0.57	0.96	2.10	0.53	-	-	-
Empathy	0.91	4.19	0.67	0.91	4.16	0.64	-	-	-

736

737 *Note.*  $\alpha$  = reliability coefficient (Cronbach's alpha),  $M$  = mean,  $SD$  = standard deviation. All

738 scale reliabilities resemble prior research, including the lower reliabilities of Support for

739 Care/Harm and Fairness/Cheating in the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011).

**Table S18**

*Incoherent Pattern of Interaction Effects of Pain Sensitivity  $\times$  Political Orientation on Attitudes Toward Political Issues in Study 2a if Reverse-Wording and Reverse-Scoring Were Ignored*

Political issues	$\beta$ when reverse-wording and reverse-scoring were properly considered	$\beta$ if reverse-wording and reverse-scoring were ignored
Illegal Immigrants Weaken the U.S. Economy †	-0.21	0.21
No Wealth Redistribution †	-0.20	0.20
The Poor Should Work Harder †	-0.19	0.19
Not Funding Stem Cell Research †	-0.19	0.19
No Universal Healthcare †	-0.19	0.19
No Impeachment of Former President Donald Trump †	-0.18	0.18
Decreasing Global Warming Restrictions †	-0.18	0.18
No Sterile Drug Facilities †	-0.18	0.18
ACA/Obamacare was a Mistake †	-0.18	0.18
No Protests †	-0.17	0.17
Keystone Oil Pipeline	-0.17	-0.17
Free Market †	-0.16	0.16
Abolishing Unions	-0.15	-0.15
Death Penalty	-0.15	-0.15
Gun Ownership †	-0.15	0.15
Defense Spending	-0.14	-0.14
Teaching Creationism	-0.14	-0.14
No Abortion †	-0.13	0.13
War in Afghanistan	-0.13	-0.13
COVID Exaggerated	-0.12	-0.12
Illegal Marijuana †	-0.09	0.09
Illegal to Burn Flag	-0.09	-0.09
Torturing Terrorists	-0.08	-0.08
Confront Terrorism	-0.05	-0.05
No Same-Sex Marriage †	-0.04	0.04

*Note.* Items are listed in descending order of magnitude of the interaction effect of pain sensitivity  $\times$  political orientation in Study 2a. † denotes items that were reverse-worded and thus should be reverse-coded (so higher scores should always represent more conservative views).

748 **Table S19**749 *Zero-Order Correlations in Studies 1a–1b*

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1. Pain Sensitivity	1.00	.29***	.32***	.43***	.34***	.39***	.04	.07	.33***	.39***	.32***	.13***	.35***	.27***	-.01	.23***	.13***
2. Support for Care	.22***	1.00	.47***	.13***	.11**	.20***	.42***	.37***	.21***	.24***	.20***	-.12**	.32***	.19***	.02	.02	.35***
3. Support for Fairness	.28***	.44***	1.00	-.01	-.11**	.00	.32***	.43***	.11**	.09*	.02	-.30***	.21***	.29***	.14***	.14***	.25***
4. Support for Loyalty	.53***	.15***	.15***	1.00	.63***	.61***	-.08*	-.13***	.49***	.52***	.44***	.49***	.17***	.04	-.21***	.08*	-.04
5. Support for Authority	.40***	.07*	.05	.61***	1.00	.66***	-.05	-.11**	.43***	.59***	.53***	.59***	.15***	-.02	-.25***	.02	.02
6. Support for Sanctity	.43***	.15***	.12***	.63***	.63***	1.00	.03	-.05	.46***	.59***	.70***	.51***	.30***	.07	-.17***	.06	.04
7. Relevance of Care	.03	.46***	.35***	-.03	-.03	.05	1.00	.68***	.31***	.27***	.30***	-.14***	.15***	.15***	.02	.04	.38***
8. Relevance of Fairness	.04	.36***	.41***	-.08**	-.07*	-.03	.68***	1.00	.22***	.23***	.20***	-.20***	.14***	.18***	.03	.06	.38***
9. Relevance of Loyalty	.48***	.18***	.15***	.61***	.50***	.55***	.16***	.09**	1.00	.61***	.56***	.26***	.19***	.16***	-.06	.20***	.17***
10. Relevance of Authority	.49***	.18***	.15***	.59***	.57***	.62***	.18***	.15***	.71***	1.00	.65***	.34***	.28***	.11**	-.14***	.10**	.13***
11. Relevance of Sanctity	.46***	.15***	.09**	.58***	.57***	.77***	.14***	.04	.65***	.66***	1.00	.39***	.28***	.11**	-.13**	.13***	.09*
12. Political Orientation	.30***	-.13***	-.18***	.50***	.49***	.49***	-.20***	-.20***	.39***	.41***	.46***	1.00	.02	-.08*	-.22***	.00	-.12**
13. Disgust Sensitivity	.36***	.22***	.16***	.30***	.28***	.40***	.10**	.06	.34***	.33***	.41***	.16***	1.00	.21***	.07	.05	.20***
14. Emotion Reactivity	.48***	.11***	.16***	.29***	.19***	.26***	-.04	-.08*	.35***	.32***	.31***	.19***	.29***	1.00	.54***	.65***	.24***
15. Anxiety	.23***	-.02	.02	.06	-.05	.06	-.08*	-.09**	.16***	.10**	.11***	.07*	.11***	.66***	1.00	.49***	.06
16. Anger	.54***	-.01	.11***	.33***	.22***	.27***	-.11***	-.10**	.37***	.35***	.31***	.32***	.19***	.73***	.61***	1.00	.03
17. Empathy	.18***	.37***	.35***	.11**	.12***	.12***	.43***	.34***	.16***	.16***	.15***	-.06	.17***	.19***	-.03	.02	1.00

750

751 *Note.* Political orientation was a continuous variable (*1 = liberal, 5 = centrist, 9 = conservative*). Study 1a correlation coefficients are752 below the diagonal, Study 1b correlation coefficients above it. \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

753 **Table S20**

754 *Results of Psychophysical Validation Study as a Function of How the Level 1 Predictor*

755 *(Objective Pressure Amount) and Level 2 Predictor (PSQ Score) Were Analyzed*

Results	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
<i>Model summary</i>				
How was OPA analyzed?	Grand standardized (level 1)	Grand mean-centered (level 1)	Standardized within participant (level 1); participant-level mean being standardized between participants (level 2)	Mean-centered within participant (level 1); participant-level mean being mean-centered between participants (level 2)
How was PSQ score analyzed?	Standardized	Mean-centered	Standardized	Mean-centered
<i>Basic model statistics</i>				
Random intercept				
var	3,129.90	3218.09	185.67	183.93
SD	55.95	56.73	13.63	13.56
95% CI of SD	50.80, 61.28	50.80, 61.28	12.38, 14.82	12.38, 14.82
Random slope of OPA				
var	845.92	0.1151	944.02	0.1368
SD	29.09	0.3393	30.73	0.3605
95% CI of SD	26.07, 32.19	0.3023, 0.3733	27.51, 34.06	0.3190, 0.3950
r between random intercept and random slope				
r	.54	.55	-.08	-.08
95% CI of r	.4336, .6355	.4336, .6355	-.2275, .0712	-.2275, .0712
<i>Primary results</i>				
Main effect of PSQ score (level 2)				
β	15.472	10.934	3.012	2.128
SE	3.516	2.517	0.874	0.615
df	230.841	222.787	253.266	256.677
t	4.401	4.334	3.446	3.463
p	1.65e-05	2.12e-05	.0007	.0006
R <sup>2</sup>	.077	.078	.045	.045
Main effect of OPA (level 1)				
β	65.344	0.7588	68.659	0.7963
SE	1.929	0.0225	2.0527	0.0238
df	215.616	213.0150	207.874	208.133
t	33.875	33.746	33.448	33.469
p	< 2e-16	< 2e-16	< 2e-16	< 2e-16
R <sup>2</sup>	.842	.842	.843	.843
Interaction effect of PSQ score (level 2) × OPA (level 1)				
β	4.822	0.0396	5.314	0.0435
SE	1.936	0.0159	2.060	0.0169
df	215.279	212.703	208.234	208.490
t	2.490	2.483	2.580	2.581
p	.0135	.0138	.0106	.0105
R <sup>2</sup>	.028	.028	.031	.031
Main effect of OPA (level 2)				
β	-	-	1.290	0.0171
SE	-	-	0.883	0.0116
df	-	-	257.507	260.856
t	-	-	1.461	1.475
p	-	-	.1452	.1413
R <sup>2</sup>	-	-	.008	.008
Interaction effect of PSQ score (level 2) × OPA (level 2)				
β	-	-	-0.1477	-0.0014
SE	-	-	0.8113	0.0075
df	-	-	254.206	257.492
t	-	-	-0.182	-0.184
p	-	-	.8557	.8541
R <sup>2</sup>	-	-	.000	.000

756



757 *Note.* OPA = objective pressure amount. PSQ = pain sensitivity questionnaire. *var* = variance.  
758 *SD* = standard deviation. 95% CI = 95% confidence interval. *r* = Pearson's correlation  
759 coefficient. A positive (or negative) *r* between random intercept and random slope indicated that  
760 participants with a higher intercept in subjective pain intensity tended to show a more positive  
761 (or negative) association between objective pressure amount and subjective pain intensity.  
762 When OPA was standardized or mean-centered within participant (models 3–4), each  
763 participant's mean was reintroduced as a level 2 predictor into the multilevel model so that both  
764 within-participant and between-participant effects of OPA could be separately investigated  
765 (Enders & Tofighi, 2007). This step of reintroducing each participant's mean was unnecessary  
766 when OPA was grand standardized or grand mean-centered (models 1–2).  
767

Table S21

## Zero-Order Correlations in Study 1c

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
1. Pain Sensitivity	1.00												
2. Support for Care/Harm	.19***	1.00											
3. Support for Fairness/Cheating	.19***	.46***	1.00										
4. Support for Loyalty/Betrayal	.34***	.05	-.06*	1.00									
5. Support for Authority/Subversion	.29***	-.01	-.14***	.69***	1.00								
6. Support for Sanctity/Degradation	.35***	.15***	.01	.58***	.66***	1.00							
7. Relevance of Care/Harm	.02	.41***	.33***	-.14***	-.09**	.01	1.00						
8. Relevance of Fairness/Cheating	-.06*	.33***	.36***	-.24***	-.18***	-.14***	.62***	1.00					
9. Relevance of Loyalty/Betrayal	.31***	.11***	.08**	.47***	.47***	.48***	.23***	.10	1.00				
10. Relevance of Authority/Subversion	.32***	.17***	.10***	.46***	.55***	.55***	.27***	.18	.61***	1.00			
11. Relevance of Sanctity/Degradation	.29***	.13***	.02	.44***	.54***	.69***	.22***	.07*	.57***	.64***	1.00		
12. Political Orientation	.17***	-.13***	-.30***	.56***	.65***	.52***	-.16***	-.23	.33***	.32***	.41***	1.00	
13. Disgust Sensitivity	.37***	.30***	.19***	.12***	.18***	.36***	.19***	.13	.20***	.30***	.30***	.10***	1.00

770

771 Note. Political orientation was a continuous variable (1 = liberal, 5 = centrist, 9 = conservative). \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

772

773 **Table S22**774 *Political Issues and Their Scale Labels and Descriptive Statistics in Studies 2a–2b*

Issues and scale labels	Reverse-scored?	Study 2a			Study 2b		
		<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
“Please select the attitude that comes closest to your views on ____.”							
abortion (1 = Abortion should not be permitted at all; 3 = Abortion should be against the law except in cases of rape, incest and to save the woman’s life; 5 = Abortion should be available but under stricter limits than it is now; 7 = Abortion should be generally available to those who want it)	Yes	1005	3.05	2.13	-	-	-
defence spending (1 = The federal government should decrease its defence spending; 4 = The federal government should maintain its current defence spending; 7 = The federal government should increase its defence spending)	No	1006	3.65	1.80	-	-	-
teaching intelligent design/creationism (1 = Public schools should only teach the theory of evolution; 4 = Public schools should teach intelligent design/creationism along with evolution; 7 = Public schools should only teach intelligent design/creationism (instead of evolution))	No	1006	3.35	1.91	-	-	-
illegal immigrants (1 = Illegal immigrants do more to weaken the US economy overall because they do not all pay taxes but can use public services; 7 = Illegal immigrants do more to strengthen the US economy overall because they provide low-cost labor and they spend money)	Yes	1006	3.73	2.16	1022	3.82	1.94
terrorism (1 = In the long run, the US will be safer from terrorism if it stays out of other countries’ affairs in the Middle East; 7 = In the long run, the US will be safer from terrorism if it confronts the countries and troops that promote terrorism in the Middle East)	No	1007	3.86	1.97	-	-	-
torture (1 = It is NEVER justified to use forceful interrogation techniques/torture to get information from a suspected terrorist; 4 = It is SOMETIMES justified to use forceful interrogation techniques/torture to get information from a suspected terrorist; 7 = It is OFTEN justified to use forceful interrogation techniques/torture to get information from a suspected terrorist)	No	1007	3.23	1.79	-	-	-
stem cell research (1 = The federal government should NOT fund research that would use newly created stem cells obtained from human embryos; 7 = The federal government should fund research that would use newly created stem cells obtained from human embryos)	Yes	1005	3.13	2.04	1024	3.16	1.83
flag-burning (1 = I oppose a constitutional amendment that would make it illegal to burn the American flag; 7 = I favour a constitutional amendment that would make it illegal to burn the American flag)	No	1005	3.85	2.43	-	-	-
gun control legislation (1 = When it comes to gun control legislation, I think it is more important to protect the right of Americans to own guns; 7 = When it comes to gun control legislation, I think It is more important to control gun ownership)	Yes	1007	3.61	2.32	-	-	-
global warming (1 = The government should decrease the current restrictions because global warming is a theory that has not yet been proven; 4 = The restrictions that are currently in place are sufficient to reduce the effects of global warming; 7 = The government should increase restrictions on emissions from cars and industrial facilities such as power plants and factories in an attempt to reduce the effects of global warming)	Yes	1007	2.65	1.92	1023	2.42	1.64
same-sex couples (1 = Same-sex couples should NOT be allowed to marry nor have civil unions; 4 = Same-sex couples should be allowed to have a civil union, but not to marry; 7 = Same-sex couples should be allowed to legally marry)	Yes	1007	2.59	2.16	-	-	-
the response to COVID-19 (1 = The government is not doing enough to fight COVID-19; 4 = The government is doing enough to fight COVID-19; 7 = The response of the society to COVID-19 has been exaggerated)	No	1004	3.09	2.09	-	-	-
economic regulation (1 = The economic market will naturally correct itself; 7 = The federal government must regulate the economy)	Yes	1004	3.45	1.75	-	-	-

social welfare (1 = The poor should learn to work harder; 7 = Social programs serve a valuable role in our society)	Yes	1003	2.58	1.68	1018	2.59	1.52
the Affordable Care Act (ObamaCare) (1 = The passage of the Affordable Care Act (ObamaCare) was a great mistake in American history; 3 = The Supreme Court should find the Affordable Care Act (Obama Care) unconstitutional; 5 = The Affordable Care Act (Obama Care) should continue to go into effect over the next few years; 7 = The passage of the Affordable Care Act (ObamaCare) was a great moment in American history)	Yes	1005	3.42	2.03	1020	3.20	1.71

---

<b>“Please rate the extent to which you support or oppose each of the following:”</b> (-3 = strongly oppose, -2 = oppose, -1 = somewhat oppose, 0 = neither oppose nor support, 1 = somewhat support, 2 = support, 3 = strongly support)							
Government funded facilities that provide sterile supplies (clean needles, sterile water for injections) to drug users	Yes	1007	-0.58	2.08	1023	-0.82	1.87
Legalization of marijuana	Yes	1001	-1.31	1.92	-	-	-
Wealth redistribution	Yes	1007	-0.60	2.13	-	-	-
War in Afghanistan	No	1006	-0.95	1.78	-	-	-
[Different forms of protesting]	Yes	1007	-0.72	1.65	-	-	-
Marching in a protest (e.g., Black Lives Matter, Occupy Wall Street)	Yes	1007	-0.93	2.05	1024	-1.05	1.80
Kneeling during the national anthem	Yes	1007	-0.21	2.25	1023	-0.04	1.97
Going on strike	Yes	1004	-1.02	1.60	-	-	-
Abolishing unions	No	1006	-0.70	1.84	-	-	-
Impeachment of President Donald Trump	Yes	1006	-0.37	2.50	1025	-0.59	2.20
Universal health care	Yes	1004	-1.29	2.09	1021	-1.71	1.65
Keystone Oil Pipeline	No	1005	-0.24	1.85	-	-	-
Death penalty	No	1004	0.24	2.02	-	-	-

---

775

776 *Note.* Some items were reverse-scored such that on all items, higher scores would indicate more

777 conservative attitudes. Different forms of protesting were analyzed as a single issue in Study 2a.

778 Two forms of protesting were included and analyzed separately in Study 2b as preregistered.  $n =$ 779 sample size,  $M$  = mean (after reverse-scoring where relevant),  $SD$  = standard deviation.

780 **Table S23**

781 *Generic Voting Likelihood Items and Their Scale Labels and Descriptive Statistics in Studies 2a–*

782 *2b*

Items and scale labels	Study 2a			Study 2b		
	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
<p>“How likely are you to vote for.....”  <i>(extremely unlikely, moderately unlikely, slightly unlikely, neither likely nor unlikely, slightly likely, moderately likely, extremely likely)</i> scored 1 to 7</p>						
A Liberal Political Candidate	1005	4.26	2.35	1023	4.26	2.06
A Conservative Political Candidate	1007	4.01	2.32	1022	4.34	2.04
An Independent Political Candidate	1007	4.26	1.65	1021	4.52	1.44

783

784 *Note.* *n* = sample size, *M* = mean, *SD* = standard deviation.

**Table S24***Support for Political Figures in Studies 2a–2b*

Political Figure	Study 2a				Study 2b			
	<i>n</i>	$\alpha$	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	$\alpha$	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Donald Trump (President, Republican)	1001	0.98	3.44	2.45	1020	0.97	3.35	2.14
Mike Pence (Vice President, Republican)	996	0.99	3.50	2.33	986	0.97	3.55	1.90
Mitch McConnell (Senate Majority Leader, Republican)	892	0.98	3.06	1.97	921	0.97	3.23	1.79
Kevin McCarthy (House Minority Leader, Republican)	570	0.98	3.61	1.88	657	0.95	3.80	1.69
Joe Biden (Presidential candidate, Democrat)	1003	0.97	3.90	2.20	1022	0.97	4.41	1.95
Kamala Harris (Vice Presidential candidate, Democrat)	975	0.98	3.80	2.22	1002	0.96	4.06	1.89
Nancy Pelosi (Speaker of the House of Representatives, Democrat)	968	0.98	3.57	2.22	976	0.97	3.68	1.88
Steny Hoyer (House Majority Leader, Democrat)	424	0.97	4.06	1.69	515	0.93	4.12	1.41
Chuck Schumer (Senate Minority Leader, Democrat)	789	0.98	3.68	2.00	806	0.96	3.79	1.70
Bernie Sanders (former presidential primary candidate, Democrat)	999	0.97	4.17	2.19	1006	0.96	4.44	1.83
Elizabeth Warren (former presidential primary candidate, Democrat)	930	0.98	3.97	2.11	908	0.96	4.05	1.75

*Note.* Participants were asked to “Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements regarding \_\_\_\_.” Three statements were used for each political figure (e.g., “I support Donald Trump,” “I approve of Donald Trump’s performance in the administration of his job,” and “I support the political issues that Donald Trump stands for”). Response options included *I do not know this person*, *strongly disagree*, *disagree*, *somewhat disagree*, *neither agree nor disagree*, *somewhat agree*, *agree*, and *strongly agree*, which were scored 1 to 7 after excluding participants who indicated “I do not know this person.” For context, this table provides the role and party affiliation of each political figure at the time of data collection. In the actual survey, only the name of the political figure was shown, not the information in parentheses. *n* = sample size,  $\alpha$  = reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) of the three items, *M* = mean, *SD* = standard deviation.

799 **Table S25**800 *Hypothetical Voting Preference in Study 2a*

Hypothetical voting preference	Pre-election survey	Post-election survey
Donald Trump	200	136
Bernie Sanders	174	128
Joe Biden	98	54
Barack Obama	62	59
Elizabeth Warren	51	37
Andrew Yang	34	18
Don't know / unsure / undecided	34	16
Mike Pence	23	16
Michelle Obama	17	14
No one	17	6
Someone else (based on ideology)	16	3
Hillary Clinton	14	9
Me	14	8
Tulsi Gabbard	12	6
Kamala Harris	11	6
Pete Buttigieg	10	8
Ted Cruz	10	6
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez	8	13
Ben Carson	8	4
Dwayne Johnson	8	1
Ron Paul	8	3
Mitt Romney	6	2
Rand Paul	6	3
A Republican other than Donald Trump	5	2
Andrew Cuomo	5	3
Arnold Schwarzenegger	5	2
Ben Shapiro	5	2
Bill Gates	5	1
Candace Owens	5	4
Nikki Haley	5	3
Ronald Reagan	5	5
Amy Coney Barrett	4	
Elon Musk	4	2
Mark Cuban	4	3
Condoleezza Rice	3	3
Family/ friend	3	3
Jimmy Carter	3	
Jo Jorgensen	3	5
John Kasich	3	3
Kanye West	3	6
Patrick Buchanan	3	2
Tucker Carlson	3	2
A non career politician	2	
Ben Sasse	2	
Bill Clinton	2	2
Dan Crenshaw	2	5
George Washington	2	1
Howie Hawkins	2	1
Michael Bloomberg	2	5
Mike Huckabee	2	2
Oprah Winfrey	2	6
Theodore Roosevelt	2	1
A Democrat	1	
A Kennedy	1	
A Republican	1	
A younger candidate	1	2
Adam Schiff	1	
Al Gore	1	
Allen West	1	
Amy Klobuchar	1	1
Angela Merkel	1	
Anthony Fauci	1	1
Any Democrat	1	
Anyone other than Biden or Trump	1	
Bill Bradley	1	
C. Stephen Evans	1	
Carly Fiorina	1	
Charlie Baker	1	1
Chris Christie	1	
Chuck Schumer	1	
Clark Howard	1	
Colin Powell	1	1

Hypothetical voting preference	Pre-election survey	Post-election survey
Cory Booker	1	
David Nunes	1	
Dwight Eisenhower	1	
Ellen DeGeneres	1	
Evan McMullin	1	
Franklin Roosevelt	1	
Gavin Newsom	1	
George Bush	1	
Grady Judd	1	1
Hank Williams Jr.	1	1
Hayley Kiyoko	1	
Homer Simpson	1	1
Ice Cube	1	1
Ivanka Trump	1	2
James Agnew	1	
James Corbett	1	1
James Woods	1	
Jared Polis	1	
Jay Inslee	1	1
Jeb Bush	1	
Jeffrey Sachs	1	
Jesus	1	8
Jim Carrey	1	
Jim Jordan	1	2
Jim Webb	1	1
John Boehner	1	1
John F. Kennedy	1	2
John James	1	1
John MacArthur	1	
John Maxwell	1	
John McCain	1	
John Morgan	1	
John Smith	1	
Jordan Peterson	1	1
Katie Porter	1	
Keanu Reeves	1	
Kimberly Klacik	1	
Lesser of two evils	1	
Libertarian candidate	1	
Lil Wayne	1	
Lindsey Graham	1	1
Lisa Murkowski	1	
Marco Rubio	1	3
Martin Luther King	1	
Michael Dukakis	1	
Mike Ditka	1	
Mike Pompeo	1	
Mike Rowe	1	
Mimi Soltysik	1	1
Misha Collins	1	1
Mitch Daniels	1	1
Nancy Pelosi	1	1
Nate Silver	1	
Phil Murphy	1	
Rashida Tlaib	1	
Rick Scott	1	
Rob Portman	1	
Robert Kennedy	1	1
Ron DeSantis	1	1
Ross Perot	1	3
Rush Limbaugh	1	3
Russell M. Nelson	1	
Sam Elliott	1	
Snoop Dogg	1	1
Stacey Abrams	1	2
Steve Bullock	1	
Superman	1	
Tom Fitton	1	
Tony Perkins	1	
Waldo	1	
Willie Nelson	1	



801  
802 *Note.* Participants were asked the following open-ended questions in the pre- and post-election  
803 surveys, respectively: “Hypothetically, imagine you could vote for anyone in the upcoming  
804 presidential election, regardless of whether they are currently in the running. Who would you  
805 vote for?” (pre-election survey); “Hypothetically, imagine you could vote for anyone in the 2020  
806 presidential election, regardless of whether they were or were not actually in the running. Who  
807 would you vote for?” (post-election survey). Responses are sorted here in descending order of  
808 frequency in the pre-election survey; ties are sorted in alphabetical order.  
809

810 **Table S26**811 *Items for Measuring Perceived Harm in Attitudinal Disagreements with and Behavioral*812 *Violations of Moral Foundations and Their Scale Labels and Descriptive Statistics in Study 3*

Items	Moral foundations (not shown to participants)	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
<i>Perceived harm in attitudinal disagreements with moral foundations</i>				
<p><b>“Please read the following descriptions and indicate the extent to which you perceive harm in each of the views.”</b>  <b>(0 = no harm at all, 1 = very mild harm, 2 = mild harm, 3 = moderate harm, 4 = severe harm, 5 = very severe harm)</b></p>				
Person A <b>DISAGREES</b> with the following statement: "Compassion for those who are suffering is the most crucial virtue." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person A's view?	Care/harm	1652	2.53	1.52
Person B <b>DISAGREES</b> with the following statement: "When the government makes laws, the number one principle should be ensuring that everyone is treated fairly." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person B's view?	Fairness/cheating	1653	2.82	1.61
Person C <b>DISAGREES</b> with the following statement: "I am proud of my country's history." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person C's view?	Loyalty/betrayal	1653	1.69	1.63
Person D <b>DISAGREES</b> with the following statement: "Respect for authority is something all children need to learn." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person D's view?	Authority/subversion	1646	2.26	1.57
Person E <b>DISAGREES</b> with the following statement: "People should not do things that are disgusting, even if no one is harmed." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person E's view?	Sanctity/degradation	1650	1.93	1.5
Person F <b>DISAGREES</b> with the following statement: "It is better to do good than to do bad." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person F's view?	Not applicable (filler)	1654	3.00	1.71
Person G <b>DISAGREES</b> with the following statement: "One of the worst things a person could do is hurt a defenceless animal." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person G's view?	Care/harm	1654	2.91	1.62
Person H <b>DISAGREES</b> with the following statement: "Justice is the most important requirement for a society." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person H's view?	Fairness/cheating	1650	2.58	1.59
Person I <b>DISAGREES</b> with the following statement: "People should be loyal to their family members, even when they have done something wrong." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person I's view?	Loyalty/betrayal	1655	1.81	1.52
Person J <b>DISAGREES</b> with the following statement: "Men and women each have different roles to play in society." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person J's view?	Authority/subversion	1652	1.68	1.58
Person K <b>DISAGREES</b> with the following statement: "I would call some acts wrong on the grounds that they are unnatural." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person K's view?	Sanctity/degradation	1646	1.82	1.41
Person L <b>DISAGREES</b> with the following statement: "It can never be right to kill a human being." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person L's view?	Care/harm	1653	2.71	1.73
Person M <b>DISAGREES</b> with the following statement: "I think it's morally wrong that rich children inherit a lot of money while poor children inherit nothing." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person M's view?	Fairness/cheating	1653	1.75	1.48
Person N <b>DISAGREES</b> with the following statement: "It is more important to be a team player than to express oneself." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person N's view?	Loyalty/betrayal	1654	1.72	1.39
Person O <b>DISAGREES</b> with the following statement: "If I were a soldier and disagreed with my commanding officer's orders, I would obey anyway because that is my duty." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person O's view?	Authority/subversion	1657	2.18	1.45
Person P <b>DISAGREES</b> with the following statement: "Chastity is an important and valuable virtue." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person P's view?	Sanctity/degradation	1650	1.64	1.58

---

*Perceived harm in behavioral violations of moral foundations*

---

**“Please read the following sentences and indicate the extent to which you perceive harm in each of them.”**  
**(0 = no harm at all, 1 = very mild harm, 2 = mild harm, 3 = moderate harm, 4 = severe harm, 5 = very severe harm)**

Someone suffered emotionally.	Care/harm	1652	3.29	1.19
Some people were treated differently than others.	Fairness/cheating	1655	3.34	1.15
Someone's action did not show love for his or her country.	Loyalty/betrayal	1654	2.11	1.59
Someone showed a lack of respect for authority	Authority/subversion	1655	2.63	1.32
Someone violated standards of purity and decency.	Sanctity/degradation	1657	2.46	1.53
Someone was good at math.	Not applicable (filler)	1654	0.58	1.28
Someone did not care for someone weak or vulnerable.	Care/harm	1655	3.30	1.16
Someone acted unfairly.	Fairness/cheating	1650	3.01	1.14
Someone did something to betray his or her group.	Loyalty/betrayal	1655	3.00	1.20
Someone did not conform to the traditions of society.	Authority/subversion	1649	1.82	1.46
Someone did something disgusting.	Sanctity/degradation	1653	2.44	1.42
Someone was cruel.	Care/harm	1643	3.66	1.11
Someone was denied his or her rights.	Fairness/cheating	1653	3.94	1.10
Someone showed a lack of loyalty.	Loyalty/betrayal	1652	2.75	1.26
An action caused chaos or disorder.	Authority/subversion	1653	3.50	1.14
Someone acted in a way that God would not approve of.	Sanctity/degradation	1655	2.17	1.78

---

813

814 *Note.*  $n$  = sample size,  $M$  = mean,  $SD$  = standard deviation.

815 **Table S27**816 *Items for Measuring Perceived Harm in Liberal Attitude and in Conservative Attitude Toward*817 *Contentious Political Issues and Their Scale Labels and Descriptive Statistics in Study 3*

Items	Political issues and attitudes toward them (not shown to participants)	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
<p><b>"Please read the following descriptions and indicate the extent to which you perceive harm in each of the views."</b>  <b>(0 = no harm at all, 1 = very mild harm, 2 = mild harm, 3 = moderate harm, 4 = severe harm, 5 = very severe harm)</b></p>				
Person A <b>AGREES</b> with the following statement: "Illegal immigrants do more to weaken the US economy overall because they do not all pay taxes but can use public services." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person A's view?	Illegal immigrants; conservative attitude	1651	2.34	1.59
Person B <b>AGREES</b> with the following statement: "Illegal immigrants do more to strengthen the US economy overall because they provide low-cost labor and they spend money." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person B's view?	Illegal immigrants; liberal attitude	1652	1.46	1.50
Person C <b>AGREES</b> with the following statement: "The federal government should NOT fund research that would use newly created stem cells obtained from human embryos." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person C's view?	Stem cell research; conservative attitude	1653	2.06	1.54
Person D <b>AGREES</b> with the following statement: "The federal government should fund research that would use newly created stem cells obtained from human embryos." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person D's view?	Stem cell research; liberal attitude	1655	1.41	1.51
Person E <b>AGREES</b> with the following statement: "The government should decrease the current restrictions because global warming is a theory that has not yet been proven." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person E's view?	Global warming; conservative attitude	1652	2.96	1.68
Person F <b>AGREES</b> with the following statement: "The government should increase restrictions on emissions from cars and industrial facilities such as power plants and factories in an attempt to reduce the effects of global warming." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person F's view?	Global warming; liberal attitude	1654	1.03	1.38
Person G <b>AGREES</b> with the following statement: "The poor should learn to work harder." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person G's view?	Social welfare; conservative attitude	1656	2.36	1.66
Person H <b>AGREES</b> with the following statement: "Social programs serve a valuable role in our society." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person H's view?	Social welfare; liberal attitude	1652	0.85	1.23
Person I <b>AGREES</b> with the following statement: "The passage of the Affordable Care Act (ObamaCare) was a great mistake in American history." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person I's view?	Affordable Care Act; conservative attitude	1653	2.19	1.59
Person J <b>AGREES</b> with the following statement: "The passage of the Affordable Care Act (ObamaCare) was a great moment in American history." To what extent do you perceive harm in Person J's view?	Affordable Care Act; conservative attitude	1656	1.20	1.45
Person K <b>SUPPORTS</b> government funded facilities that provide sterile supplies (clean needles, sterile water for injections) to drug users. To what extent do you perceive harm in Person K's view?	Drug facilities; liberal attitude	1653	1.34	1.52
Person L <b>OPPOSES</b> government funded facilities that provide sterile supplies (clean needles, sterile water for injections) to drug users. To what extent do you perceive harm in Person L's view?	Drug facilities; conservative attitude	1652	2.23	1.59
Person M <b>SUPPORTS</b> marching in a protest (e.g., Black Lives Matter, Occupy Wall Street). To what extent do you perceive harm in Person M's view?	Marching in protest; liberal attitude	1650	0.94	1.32
Person N <b>OPPOSES</b> marching in a protest (e.g., Black Lives Matter, Occupy Wall Street). To what extent do you perceive harm in Person N's view?	Marching in protest; conservative attitude	1652	2.44	1.65

Person O <b>SUPPORTS</b> kneeling during the national anthem. To what extent do you perceive harm in Person O's view?	Kneeling in protest; liberal attitude	1653	1.40	1.61
Person P <b>OPPOSES</b> kneeling during the national anthem. To what extent do you perceive harm in Person P's view?	Kneeling in protest; conservative attitude	1653	1.52	1.59
Person Q <b>SUPPORTS</b> the impeachment of former President Donald Trump. To what extent do you perceive harm in Person Q's view?	Impeachment of Trump; liberal attitude	1652	1.41	1.64
Person R <b>OPPOSES</b> the impeachment of former President Donald Trump. To what extent do you perceive harm in Person R's view?	Impeachment of Trump; conservative attitude	1650	2.07	1.76
Person S <b>SUPPORTS</b> universal health care. To what extent do you perceive harm in Person S's view?	Universal health care; liberal attitude	1655	0.83	1.31
Person T <b>OPPOSES</b> universal health care. To what extent do you perceive harm in Person T's view?	Universal health care; conservative attitude	1653	2.92	1.66

818

819 *Note.  $n$  = sample size,  $M$  = mean,  $SD$  = standard deviation.*

820

821 **Table S28**822 *Items for Measuring Lay Intuitions Regarding the Political Attitudes of a Pain-Sensitive Person*823 *in Study 4*

Issues and scale labels			<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
<p>“On the issue of <b>[X]</b>, to what extent do you think the views of a <b>[person] with high sensitivity to physical pain</b> (compared with a [person] with low sensitivity to physical pain) are closer to one of the following attitudes?”</p> <p>(1 = <i>Much closer to A</i>, 2 = <i>Moderately closer to A</i>, 3 = <i>Slightly closer to A</i>, 4 = <i>About equally between A and B</i>, 5 = <i>Slightly closer to B</i>, 6 = <i>Moderately closer to B</i>, 7 = <i>Much closer to B</i>)</p>					
<b>[X]</b>	<b>Attitude A</b>	<b>Attitude B</b>			
illegal immigrants	Illegal immigrants do more to weaken the US economy overall because they do not all pay taxes but can use public services.	Illegal immigrants do more to strengthen the US economy overall because they provide low-cost labor and they spend money.	716	3.60	1.80
stem cell research	The federal government should NOT fund research that would use newly created stem cells obtained from human embryos.	The federal government should fund research that would use newly created stem cells obtained from human embryos.	720	3.88	1.74
global warming	The government should decrease the current restrictions because global warming is a theory that has not yet been proven.	The government should increase restrictions on emissions from cars and industrial facilities such as power plants and factories in an attempt to reduce the effects of global warming.	721	3.26	1.83
social welfare	The poor should learn to work harder.	Social programs serve a valuable role in our society.	721	3.30	1.89
Affordable Care Act (ObamaCare)	The passage of the Affordable Care Act (ObamaCare) was a great mistake in American history.	The passage of the Affordable Care Act (ObamaCare) was a great moment in American history.	722	3.39	1.85
<p>“Please indicate the extent to which you think each of the following issues is likely to be more supported or opposed by a <b>[person] with high sensitivity to physical pain</b> (compared with a [person] with low sensitivity to physical pain)”</p> <p>(-3 = <i>opposed much more</i>, -2 = <i>opposed moderately more</i>, -1 = <i>opposed slightly more</i>, 0 = <i>supported or opposed about equally</i>, +1 = <i>supported slightly more</i>, +2 = <i>supported moderately more</i>, +3 = <i>supported much more</i>)</p>					
Impeachment of President Donald Trump			723	-0.29	1.93
Kneeling during the national anthem			724	-0.13	1.74
Universal health care			721	-0.95	1.77
Government funded facilities that provide sterile supplies (clean needles, sterile water for injections) to drug users			723	-0.58	1.72
Marching in a protest (e.g., Black Lives Matter, Occupy Wall Street)			724	-0.42	1.82

824

825 *Note.* Five issues used a 7-point scale that ranged between two issue-specific attitudes. Five826 issues used an issues-general 7-point scale. *n* = sample size, *M* = mean, *SD* = standard deviation.


827

828

**SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURES**829 **Figure S1**830 *Actual Effects of Pain Sensitivity in Studies 1a–3 versus Lay Intuitions about Pain Sensitivity*831 *When the Target's Political Orientation Was Inferred in Study 4*

832 **a**

Liberal participants in Studies 1-3 and participants in the “target’s political orientation unspecified” condition who inferred the target to be liberal in Study 4



833



834 **b**

Conservative participants in Studies 1-3 and participants in the “target’s political orientation unspecified” condition who inferred the target to be conservative in Study 4




835

836 *Note. (a)* Actual effects of pain sensitivity among liberal participants in Studies 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a,  
837 2b, and 3 ( $ns = 406, 287, 583, 455, 424$ , and  $717$ ) versus lay intuitions about pain sensitivity for a  
838 target inferred as liberal in Study 4 ( $n = 110$ ). *(b)* Actual effects of pain sensitivity among  
839 conservative participants in Studies 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a, 2b, and 3 ( $ns = 404, 288, 554, 434, 456$ , and  
840  $705$ ) versus lay intuitions about pain sensitivity for a target inferred as conservative in Study 4 ( $n$   
841  $= 48$ ). To facilitate comparison, all actual effects and lay intuitions were converted to the same  
842 metric of effect size,  $r$ . Error bars represent 95% confidence interval.

843

844 **Figure S2**

845 *Pressure Algometer for Pain Induction in Psychophysical Validation Study*




846

847

**Figure S3**

*Effects of PSQ Score (Level 2), Objective Pressure Amount (Level 1), and Their Interaction (Cross-Level) on Subjective Pain Intensity in Psychophysical Validation Study*



*Note. (a) Model 1. (b) Model 2. (c) Model 3. (d) Model 4. 95% confidence intervals are shown around the lines for three levels of PSQ scores ( $M$  minus 1  $SD$ ;  $M$ ;  $M$  plus 1  $SD$ ).*

# SUPPLEMENTAL REFERENCES

- 859
- 860 Aguinis, H., Gottfredson, R. K., & Culpepper, S. A. (2013). Best-Practice Recommendations for
- 861 Estimating Cross-Level Interaction Effects Using Multilevel Modeling. *Journal of*
- 862 *Management*, 39(6), 1490–1528. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206313478188>
- 863 Bates, D., Maechler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2022). *lme4: Linear mixed-effects models*
- 864 *using “Eigen” and S4* (1.1-28) [R]. [https://cran.r-](https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lme4/index.html)
- 865 [project.org/web/packages/lme4/index.html](https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lme4/index.html)
- 866 Brennum, J., Kjeldsen, M., Jensen, K., & Jensen, T. S. (1989). Measurements of human
- 867 pressure-pain thresholds on fingers and toes. *Pain*, 38(2), 211–217.
- 868 [https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3959\(89\)90240-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3959(89)90240-6)
- 869 Camerer, C. F., Dreber, A., Holzmeister, F., Ho, T.-H., Huber, J., Johannesson, M., Kirchler, M.,
- 870 Nave, G., Nosek, B. A., Pfeiffer, T., Altmejd, A., Buttrick, N., Chan, T., Chen, Y.,
- 871 Forsell, E., Gampa, A., Heikensten, E., Hummer, L., Imai, T., ... Wu, H. (2018).
- 872 Evaluating the replicability of social science experiments in Nature and Science between
- 873 2010 and 2015. *Nature Human Behaviour*, 2(9), 637–644.
- 874 <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-018-0399-z>
- 875 Christie, N. C., Hsu, E., Iskiwitch, C., Iyer, R., Graham, J., Schwartz, B., & Monterosso, J. R.
- 876 (2019). The Moral Foundations of Needle Exchange Attitudes. *Social Cognition*, 37(3),
- 877 229–246. <https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2019.37.3.229>
- 878 Day, M. V., Fiske, S. T., Downing, E. L., & Trail, T. E. (2014). Shifting Liberal and
- 879 Conservative Attitudes Using Moral Foundations Theory. *Personality and Social*
- 880 *Psychology Bulletin*, 40(12), 1559–1573. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167214551152>

- 881 Enders, C. K., & Tofighi, D. (2007). Centering predictor variables in cross-sectional multilevel  
 882 models: A new look at an old issue. *Psychological Methods*, 12(2), 121–138.  
 883 <https://doi.org/10.1037/1082-989X.12.2.121>
- 884 Feinberg, M., & Willer, R. (2015). From Gulf to Bridge: When Do Moral Arguments Facilitate  
 885 Political Influence? *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 41(12), 1665–1681.  
 886 <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167215607842>
- 887 Franks, A. S., & Scherr, K. C. (2019). Economic Issues Are Moral Issues: The Moral  
 888 Underpinnings of the Desire to Reduce Wealth Inequality. *Social Psychological and*  
 889 *Personality Science*, 10(4), 553–562. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550618772821>
- 890 Frimer, J. A., Tell, C. E., & Motyl, M. (2017). Sacralizing Liberals and Fair-Minded  
 891 Conservatives: Ideological Symmetry in the Moral Motives in the Culture War:  
 892 Ideological Symmetry. *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 17(1), 33–59.  
 893 <https://doi.org/10.1111/asap.12127>
- 894 Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011). Mapping the  
 895 moral domain. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 101(2), 366–385.  
 896 <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021847>
- 897 Haidt, J., McCauley, C., & Rozin, P. (1994). Individual differences in sensitivity to disgust: A  
 898 scale sampling seven domains of disgust elicitors. *Personality and Individual*  
 899 *Differences*, 16(5), 701–713. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869\(94\)90212-7](https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(94)90212-7)
- 900 Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D. A., & Bloom, P. (2009). Conservatives are more easily disgusted than  
 901 liberals. *Cognition & Emotion*, 23(4), 714–725.  
 902 <https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930802110007>

- 903 Jorgensen, T. D., Pornprasertmanit, S., Miller, P., & Schoemann, A. (2021). *simsem: Simulated*  
 904 *structural equation modeling* (0.5-16) [R]. [https://cran.r-](https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/simsem/index.html)  
 905 [project.org/web/packages/simsem/index.html](https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/simsem/index.html)
- 906 Kinser, A. M., Sands, W. A., & Stone, M. H. (2009). Reliability and Validity of a Pressure  
 907 Algometer. *Journal of Strength and Conditioning Research*, 23(1), 312–314.  
 908 <https://doi.org/10.1519/JSC.0b013e31818f051c>
- 909 Koleva, S. P., Graham, J., Iyer, R., Ditto, P. H., & Haidt, J. (2012). Tracing the threads: How  
 910 five moral concerns (especially Purity) help explain culture war attitudes. *Journal of*  
 911 *Research in Personality*, 46(2), 184–194. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2012.01.006>
- 912 Kuznetsova, A., Brockhoff, P. B., & Christensen, R. H. B. (2020). *lmerTest: Tests in linear*  
 913 *mixed effects models* (3.1-3) [R].
- 914 Monroe, A. E., Wyngaarden, J. B., & Plant, E. A. (2020). “They should have followed the rules”:  
 915 Trade-offs Between Fairness and Authority Values Predict Judgments of Social Justice  
 916 Protests. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 194855062092385.  
 917 <https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620923854>
- 918 Nock, M. K., Wedig, M. M., Holmberg, E. B., & Hooley, J. M. (2008). The Emotion Reactivity  
 919 Scale: Development, Evaluation, and Relation to Self-Injurious Thoughts and Behaviors.  
 920 *Behavior Therapy*, 39(2), 107–116. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2007.05.005>
- 921 Olatunji, B. O., Williams, N. L., Tolin, D. F., Abramowitz, J. S., Sawchuk, C. N., Lohr, J. M., &  
 922 Elwood, L. S. (2007). The Disgust Scale: Item analysis, factor structure, and suggestions  
 923 for refinement. *Psychological Assessment*, 19(3), 281–297. [https://doi.org/10.1037/1040-](https://doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.19.3.281)  
 924 [3590.19.3.281](https://doi.org/10.1037/1040-3590.19.3.281)

- 925 Qian, K., & Yahara, T. (2020). Mentality and behavior in COVID-19 emergency status in Japan:  
 926 Influence of personality, morality and ideology. *PLOS ONE*, 15(7), e0235883.  
 927 <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0235883>
- 928 R Core Team. (2022). *R: A language and environment for statistical computing* (4.1.3) [R; R  
 929 Foundation for Statistical Computing]. <https://www.R-project.org/>
- 930 Reniers, R. L. E. P., Corcoran, R., Drake, R., Shryane, N. M., & Völlm, B. A. (2011). The  
 931 QCAE: A Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy. *Journal of Personality*  
 932 *Assessment*, 93(1), 84–95. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2010.528484>
- 933 Rosseel, Y., Jorgensen, T. D., & Rockwood, N. (2022). *lavaan: Latent variable analysis* (0.6-10)  
 934 [R]. <https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lavaan/index.html>
- 935 Ruscheweyh, R., Marziniak, M., Stumpfenhorst, F., Reinholz, J., & Knecht, S. (2009). Pain  
 936 sensitivity can be assessed by self-rating: Development and validation of the Pain  
 937 Sensitivity Questionnaire. *Pain*, 146(1), 65–74.  
 938 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pain.2009.06.020>
- 939 Ruscheweyh, R., Verneuer, B., Dany, K., Marziniak, M., Wolowski, A., Çolak-Ekici, R.,  
 940 Schulte, T. L., Bullmann, V., Grewe, S., Gralow, I., Evers, S., & Knecht, S. (2012).  
 941 Validation of the Pain Sensitivity Questionnaire in chronic pain patients. *Pain*, 153(6),  
 942 1210–1218. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pain.2012.02.025>
- 943 Sellers, A. B., Ruscheweyh, R., Kelley, B. J., Ness, T. J., & Vetter, T. R. (2013). Validation of  
 944 the English Language Pain Sensitivity Questionnaire. *Regional Anesthesia and Pain*  
 945 *Medicine*, 38(6), 508–514. <https://doi.org/10.1097/AAP.0000000000000007>
- 946 Spielberger, C. D. (2012). *State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults* [Data set]. American  
 947 Psychological Association. <https://doi.org/10.1037/t06496-000>



- 948   Spielberger, C. D., Jacobs, G., Russell, S., & Crane, R. S. (1983). Assessment of anger: The  
949       State-Trait Anger Scale. In J. N. Butcher & C. D. Spielberger (Eds.), *Advances in*  
950       *personality assessment* (Vol. 2, pp. 159–187). Erlbaum.
- 951   van Overveld, M., de Jong, P. J., Peters, M. L., & Schouten, E. (2011). The Disgust Scale-R: A  
952       valid and reliable index to investigate separate disgust domains? *Personality and*  
953       *Individual Differences*, 51(3), 325–330. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2011.03.023>  
954